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ABSTRACT
TOWARDS SOCIALLY EQUITABLE CONDITIONS: CHANGE IN COMPLEX
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
Katherine A. Hoffman
Graduate School of Leadership and Change
Yellow Springs, OH

The purpose of this qualitative participatory action research was to explore how complexity is
engaged and experienced in complex regulatory systems, and to understand how cannabis might
be regulated in ways that lead to socially equitable conditions. This was accomplished by
studying the lived experiences of governmental leaders charged with the responsibility of
establishing regulatory frameworks for legalized cannabis where none previously existed. Using
the learning history methodology, the study deeply explores the ways that complex systems
coexist by capturing the lived experiences of research participants and enhance theoretical
understanding of complex regulatory systems. Data collection occurred through reflective
interviews, followed by distillation and thematic analysis. This resulted in the creation of a data
table and a learning history artifact that were validated by distribution to research participants
and used as both an actionable tool for participants and an analytical tool to distill and categorize
research findings. The data table and the artifact established three main findings: complexity is
both a property and characteristic of systems; complexity is not a behavior, characteristic or
action of “leadership” or “leaders” in complex regulatory systems; and the interplay between
social justice and social equity is complex and often oversimplified. Rather than directing,
participants brought about change by building interactive trust through dialogue and
relationship-building in interactive spaces across and between macro, meso, and micro systems
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levels. Complexity arose from these participatory human relationships when both the properties
and characteristics of these systems were engaged, but the theoretical construct of complexity
does not explain the presence of agency within this dynamic. By recognizing agency across all
systems, structural barriers may be reduced, resulting in regulatory frameworks that may lead to
more socially equitable conditions. This research contributes to leadership and complexity
scholarship by empirically describing how complexity is engaged in complex regulatory systems,
examining whether complexity has any connection to the practice of leadership, and adding to
the emerging area of cannabis scholarship as it relates to social equity and the broader impacts of
the war on drugs. This dissertation is available in open access at AURA (https://aura.antioch.edu)
and OhioLINK ETD Center (https://etd.ohiolink.edu).

Keywords: cannabis, cannabis regulation, complex regulatory systems, complexity, complexity
leadership theory, drug policy, leadership, learning history, participatory action research, public
administration, regulatory construction, social equity, social justice, structure and agency, war on
drugs
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1
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The challenge for each one of you is to take up these ideals of tolerance and respect for
others, and put them to practical use in your schools, your communities, and throughout
your lives.
—Nelson Mandela, Nelson Mandela by
Himself: The Authorised Book of Quotations
Initium (The Beginning)
This dissertation tells the story of cannabis legalization in Washington State, Colorado,
and Oregon by engaging the process of learning history to better understand the complexities of
moving a product once considered to be illicit into mainstream commerce. Its purpose is to
understand if cannabis might be regulated in a way that leads to socially equitable conditions.
This study approaches this question from an assumption that to accomplish this, one needs to
engage with complex systems across multiple dimensions with aspects that are
incommensurable.
This dissertation also begins to examine and ask questions about ways of learning,
knowing, and leading to better understand the past, present, and future of cannabis legalization.
It accomplishes that by memorializing the lived experiences of governmental leaders charged
with the responsibility of establishing regulatory frameworks for legal cannabis markets where
none previously existed. It does this by asking what they did, what they learned, how they
learned it, and now knowing all of that, how they envision moving into the next ten years.
The approach to this research is unique. Most of the scholarship and research around this
topic is filtered through the lens of those outside of the regulatory system, and from a theoretical
perspective, that positionality may control for bias. While that may be preferable in certain
research circumstances, this topic is different: the people charged with effectuating cannabis law
reform were metaphorically building their planes while flying them. I joined the flight crew in
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2018. Detached analysis from the control tower is one thing; being there, doing and building it,
and adjusting in the air without navigation tools is entirely another. By evoking and honoring
these stories, with the researcher moving into a storytelling facilitator and curator role, the true
substance and richness of each narrative can be honored and maintained, laying a foundation,
and establishing a pathway for future learning.
At the same time, this research is a story about ideals of tolerance and respect for others
put to practical use. The weaponization of cannabis is well-documented, resulting in the
disproportionate incarceration of Black and Brown people across the globe, but those numbers
are higher in the United States as a direct result of federal legislation and initiative. Cannabis
reform efforts realized in state-level decriminalization and legalization have begun to dismantle
the legal structures on which those measures were built. Even so, the stigma associated with
cannabis production and sale, illicit or legal, is very much embedded in the social contours of
the existing national landscape. Pulling back the curtain of illegality through both statutory and
regulatory reform that may lead to socially equitable conditions offers opportunity to realize the
practice tolerance and respect toward people who have historically been the targets of
anti-cannabis bias.
But first, a caveat: this work exposes some of the raw, insidious truths about how
institutional and structural racism are intricately and deeply imbedded in the foundation, frame,
and architecture of American society. Reliance on injustice and inequality, and a caste system
that white America does not believe exists, made prosperity accessible for a privileged few
(Wilkerson, 2020). That injustice continues to be demonstrated and experienced in actions and
attitudes that were codified fifty years ago and are still experienced today. For example, Richard
Nixon’s 1971 “war on drugs” policies disproportionately targeted all people of color, but
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particularly Black people, through cannabis (marijuana) laws. The American Civil Liberties
Union (2020) recently reported that nationwide, Black people are 3.6 times more likely than
white people to be arrested for a cannabis offense, despite similar usage rates. That’s roughly
the same rate of disparity that existed when the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
released the first version of its report in 2013. That report also noted that since 2010, racial
disparities related to incarceration have become worse in 31 states.
Why is this still happening? Why does it seem that the equality needle rarely moves, and
when it does, it barely budges? Compare cannabis in relation to other substances it is often
grouped with, like alcohol, tobacco, and vapor products. Consider that throughout history,
alcohol has played various societal roles, from being believed to cure disease, headaches, and as
both an anesthetic and antiseptic on the battlefield. It has been viewed as a product that pitted the
country against itself during prohibition; it was also viewed as a commodity that could pull the
United States out of the Great Depression by taxation overlaid with strict regulation (Okrent,
2011). Similarly, tobacco followed the same path: women were encouraged to smoke “Torches
of Freedom” during early 1920s as part of the suffrage movement (Amos & Haglund, 2000), and
soldiers in both the First and Second World Wars received an ample supply of cigarettes in daily
rations (Brandt, 2007). These products were viewed as both necessary and relatively harmless.
However, today, smoking is the leading cause of preventable death, and is responsible for more
than 480,000 deaths per year in the United States, including more than 41,000 deaths resulting
from secondhand smoke exposure. This equates to about one in five deaths annually, or 1,300
deaths every day (Warren et al., 2014). Similarly, also in the United States between 2011 and
2015, an average of 95,158 alcohol-attributable deaths occurred, and 2.8 million years of
potential life were lost annually (Esser et al., 2020).
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In contrast, cannabis has been treated very differently. Simply the word—cannabis—
prompts a wide range of reaction. From a scientific perspective, cannabis in the botanical word
for a hemp plant derivative. The slang word for cannabis—marijuana, largely believed to be of
Mexican origin—carries sometimes dark, socially nuanced, and purposely racist undertones.
Indeed, in 1925, Mexico prohibited its export to the United States following the International
Opium Convention, and once this specific prohibition was enacted, both illegal immigrants
residing in the United States, and United States citizens could be arrested for possession of it. In
the United States it was largely an unnoticed, almost benign weed.
However, in 1930, a gentleman named Harry Anslinger was appointed to lead the first
United States Federal Bureau of Narcotics, a tiny agency at the time that was a precursor to the
current Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) branch of the Department of Justice (Hari, 2015).
Anslinger made it his purpose in life to eradicate drugs—specifically marijuana—not because it
posed a threat to United States citizens, but because “the [B]lacks, Mexicans and Chinese were
using these chemicals, forgetting their place, and menacing white people” (Hari, 2015, p. 26). To
assist in that endeavor, the United States Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 put a tax on the sale of
cannabis, legitimizing the use of the term “marijuana” as a label for hemp and cannabis plants
and products in the United States and globally (Galliher & Walker, 1977). Through Anslinger’s
effective propaganda and misinformation campaign, public perception of cannabis was negative,
and connected to criminal activity and “behavior that could cause loss of control” (Galliher &
Walker, 1977, p. 367). Thus, using this term in place of the scientific terminology has been a
successful framing tactic with racial connotations that has crossed generations, and continues
today.
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Despite this, movement toward repealing prohibition accelerated in the mid-1960s.
Efforts to illuminate the connection of cannabis prohibition to the disproportionate incarceration
of Black and Brown people began to gain traction. The campaign to save the United States from
the ravages of what was framed as an assault on youth by illicit drug pushers and promoted
under the guise of protecting “teenagers from drugs and prevent[ing] addiction in general” (Hari,
2015, p. 26) has remained as a continuation of Anslinger’s decades old the war on drugs. As the
promise of saving the nation through stringent, rigid drug enforcement began to fade, a
significant shift in perceptions of cannabis emerged, leading to the beginning of legalization
efforts (American Civil Liberties Union, 2013).
Currently, 19 of 50 United States have legalized cannabis for both adult and medical use.
Although many industry insiders consider national legalization to be inevitable, it remains a
prohibited, Schedule 1 narcotic at the federal level. This restrains many potential researchers
from exploring its uses, prevents federal agencies who would normally provide regulatory
oversight from doing so, and supports financial institutions hesitant to fund cannabis businesses.
Added to all of this are the entrenched social dimensions of cannabis use, including the lingering
effects of stigma, cannabis-related incarceration, public health, and prevention concerns, and
established illicit markets. Simply stated, cannabis has been and continues to be weaponized to
disproportionately incarcerate Black and Brown people, but under a homogenous, less dubious
name: public safety. For states like Washington, where social equity was not a foundational
element of cannabis law reform, but public safety was, the opportunity to course-correct
regulation through a social equity lens toward a restorative regulatory approach presents unique
opportunities to deconstruct long-held beliefs and practices connected to institutional racism.
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In this study, I seek to understand the multidimensional and coarsely textured story of
legalization and regulation of cannabis in the United States. I will also explore what part social
equity played in that process. These are complex issues individually, but when considered
together they may serve to deepen existing and future discussion around institutional and
structural racism associated with cannabis law reform.
This introductory chapter is a compressed representation of my research. I begin by
describing the challenge this work addresses, offering background, areas of controversy, and
making connections to leadership, cannabis regulation, and social equity. I move to the
overarching purpose and goal of this work. This is followed by a discussion of literature,
primarily focused on complexity in context, and how this research attempts to contribute to that
work by offering content designed to challenge, and indeed, question some current thinking
around complexity and leadership. I then describe my positionality to this work, both
professionally and academically. The research method is then introduced, followed by a
discussion of how this work may contribute to leadership and complexity scholarship. In closing,
I assert why I believe this research matters.
Note that each section of heading of this chapter is intentionally presented in Latin to
demonstrate how assumptions concerning knowledge and access (we all know Latin, don’t we?)
can act as institutional barriers to understanding. Additionally, I lowercase the term “white” as it
relates to race, ethnicity, and culture because white people generally do not share the same
history and culture, or the experience of being discriminated against because of their skin color
(Daniszewski, 2020). In that spirit, I offer the following.
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Provocatio (The Challenge)
How did and do regulators interact with complexity in the context of ground-breaking
regulation? This work seeks to answer that overarching question by exploring complex systems
and the current and former practitioners within those systems: the Washington state liquor and
cannabis board (WSLCB), the Colorado Marijuana Enforcement Division (MED), and the
Oregon Liquor and Cannabis Commission (OLCC). Washington and Colorado were the first
states to establish a legal adult-use cannabis markets, and Oregon quickly followed. These states
are some of the first in the United States to pioneer and navigate the initial regulatory landscape.
While many viewed this as a rather simple undertaking, it is important to first understand the
truly complex and background of cannabis legalization in the United States.
Legalization Versus Decriminalization and Social Equity
It is important to pause here and distinguish between cannabis legalization and
decriminalization. It is a difference that matters, and one that is often blurred in policy discourse
around cannabis. Decriminalization essentially means that a given activity no longer qualifies
as criminal conduct and can only be treated as a civil infraction, but that activity is
unregulated. In contrast, legalization ultimately includes the ability to lawfully regulate a
given activity, and that the activity is no longer considered criminal conduct (Harris Bricken,
2014).
These are important distinctions to understand because it directly relates to an
important sub-interest of this research: whether cannabis decriminalization is enough to
address social inequity even if it is one of many steps towards legalization and regulation.
Does simply legalizing cannabis without additional action help to preserve the existing
criminal monopoly over it? If so, does that monopoly sustain the social inequity associated
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with cannabis because it maintains the structural consequences of illegality, including but not
limited to risk of arrest for production? While these are not the primary research questions
for this project, these subjects are important to states considering policy options a nd
regulatory structures for cannabis legalization. Perhaps on an even broader scale,
observations around these questions may have implications for other countries contemplating
federal legalization.
A Brief History of Cannabis Legalization in Washington, Colorado, and Oregon
The use, sale, and possession of cannabis over 0.3% tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in the
United States remains federally illegal, despite a patchwork of state laws.
Washington State
Washington began its cannabis law reform efforts with a focus on increasing accessibility
of cannabis for medicinal use. This occurred through a series of measures that began to frame the
narrative for future recreational, or adult use legalization. For example, in 1998, Initiative 692
was approved by a 59% margin, creating an affirmative defense to the violation of state laws
relating to possession of cannabis for medicinal purposes. Qualifying patients or their designated
primary caregivers could establish the defense if they possessed only the amount of cannabis
necessary for their personal use (up to a 60-day supply), and if they presented valid
documentation from a physician to law enforcement officers (Washington State Senate, 2015).
Nine years later, the legislature directed the Washington State Department of Health (DOH) to
adopt rules to define a presumptive quantity for a 60-day supply of cannabis for medicinal use.
The legislature also required DOH to expand the conditions for which cannabis could be
authorized and revised the parameters of the documentation required from physicians
(Washington State Senate, 2015).
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In 2010, Washington State Senate Bill (SB) 5787 expanded on previous legislation by
broadening the list of professionals who could authorize the use of cannabis for medicinal
purposes by including all licensed health care professionals with prescribing authority, such as
physicians, osteopathic physicians, naturopaths, and others (Washington State Senate, 2015).
The following year, SB 5073 established a regulatory system for the production and distribution
of cannabis intended for medicinal use. It also created a voluntary patient registry where
qualifying patients and their designated providers could enroll and receive protection from arrest
and prosecution. However, many parts of the bill were vetoed based on concerns that state
employees would have faced prosecution for engaging in the activities associated with licensing
cannabis production and dispensing facilities. Instead, patient home grows and collective gardens
were authorized, giving rise to a statewide expansion of a sizable and profitable unregulated,
untaxed and unmonitored grey market (Washington State Senate, 2015).
That market was reconciled in 2012 by Initiative 502 (I-502) that established a
comprehensive regulatory structure for the licensing and taxation of cannabis production and
distribution. It authorized the possession of cannabis for personal use (1 ounce or less) for
persons 21 and older, and dedicated tax revenue for substance-abuse prevention, research,
education, and healthcare. The measure was approved by 55.7% of the voters and directed
WSLCB to establish regulations around production, processing, and sale of adult-use cannabis
by December 1, 2013. It was designed to dismantle the existing vertically integrated grey
medicinal cannabis market, placing all regulatory oversight with the WSLCB (Washington State
Senate, 2015). That deconstruction continues to serve as a controversial and complex political
undertone in the current environment.
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In August 2013, the United States Department of Justice announced that it would not
interfere with state legalization, if distribution and sales were strictly regulated by the state (Cole,
2014). On November 18, 2013, Washington began accepting applications for cannabis
businesses including producers, processors, and retail outlets. The first recreational cannabis
stores in Washington opened to the public in July 2014.
Colorado
In 2000, Colorado voters passed Amendment 20 the legalized small amounts of medical
cannabis for patients and their primary caregivers. However, express authority to regulate the
product, including its distribution and sale, was not included in the Amendment, although the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment exercised some limited authority over
distribution of product in dispensaries, and at one point attempted to limit the number of medical
patients that could be served and the number of dispensaries (Sensible Colorado, n.d.).
In 2009, the Colorado legislature enacted the Colorado Medical Marijuana code that
created a comprehensive system of medical cannabis distribution and regulation. The first of its
kind in the world, it created a licensing system for the production and distribution of medical
cannabis, and placed restrictions on patients, caregivers and doctors. At the time Colorado
licensed more medical cannabis businesses than any other state in the country (Sensible
Colorado, n.d.).
Colorado’s proposal to legalize adult use cannabis, Amendment 64, gathered enough
signatures and qualified to be on the ballot on February 13, 2012. Like Washington, the
proposition encouraged regulating cannabis in the same way that alcohol had been, in a tightly
regulated, age-gated and closed system.
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The proposal passed on November 6, 2012, with 55.3% in favor and 44.7% opposed
(Bowlan & Ames, 2018). Since Colorado was able to essentially replicate the existing medical
market based for the adult use market, Cannabis sales from dispensaries began on January 1,
2014 (Hudak, 2020).
Oregon
The state of Oregon approached cannabis law reform in much the same way as
Washington and Colorado. In 1998, Oregon joined a handful of states in legalizing medicinal use
cannabis when voters approved Measure 67. The measure allowed patients with qualifying
medical conditions to obtain a medical cannabis card, allowing them to grow, possess, and use
limited amounts of cannabis. The law also created a registry for patients and their designated
primary providers who could assist them in accessing medical cannabis. This resulted in the
creation of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Program (OMMP) to administer the patient registry
and housed within the Public Health Division of the Oregon Health Authority (OHA; Oregon
Liquor Control Commission & Oregon Health Authority, 2019).
In 2005, the Oregon Legislature mandated a state registry for cannabis grow sites,
permitting patients to obtain marijuana from an assigned grower. Beyond the registry, the law
did not implement regulatory controls, and a grey market emerged in the same way that it did in
neighboring Washington State. Eight years later, the state legislature passed a measure legalizing
medicinal cannabis dispensaries and establishing a new registry program. This added a new
regulatory component to OHA’s role in medicinal cannabis, which had previously focused more
on health. The law introduced regulatory controls to the medical market: dispensary registrants
were required to install security systems, participate in product testing, and submit to inspections.
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The law also gave the agency authority to inspect dispensaries (Oregon Liquor Control
Commission & Oregon Health Authority, 2019).
In 2014, Oregon voters approved Initiative 91 legalizing the production and sale of
recreational cannabis in Oregon. The OLCC was charged with regulating recreational cannabis
in Oregon, including licensing recreational cannabis growers, processors, and retailers. The
state’s medical cannabis program remained with OMMP. The first retail cannabis store in
Oregon opened in June 2014 (Oregon Liquor Control Commission & Oregon Health Authority,
2019).
Regulatory Framing
All 50 United States have regulatory structures in place based on federal statutes to
manage the commerce of alcohol. Prohibition of alcohol in the United States ended with the
ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933, although some states continued prohibition
for a period of time after that. It is well documented that the period immediately following the
end of prohibition was tumultuous in terms of its regulation (Okrent, 2011). However, over the
last 89 years, states and the federal government have perfected and refined regulatory approaches
related to alcohol, and have agreed on issues associated with its use, such as underaged drinking,
impaired driving, and the potential health risks of consumption and over consumption. While the
layers of regulation are often viewed and experienced as a tangled web of bureaucratic red tape
and burden by those to whom they apply, they have served and continue to serve their ultimate
purpose to protect public health and safety to the extent possible.
Cannabis legalization and subsequent regulation, however, is different than alcohol.
While it could be compared to the period following the end of alcohol prohibition, states have
learned that the substances are not the same and cannot be regulated in the same way. The first
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few states legalizing cannabis overlaid existing alcohol regulatory frameworks since these had
successfully guided that line of commerce for several decades. However, over the last few years
it has become clear that among other things, not only are cannabis products different, but their
producers, lobbyists, and consumers differ from their counterparts in the alcohol business. One
market is mature where the other is still emerging and maturing. The major difference, however,
lies in the products themselves. For example, alcohol is measured by volume, or ABV, meaning
that the alcohol content in a product containing alcohol is represented by a specific number or
range. Alcohol content statements are required by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Alcohol
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) and are uniform throughout the United States.
Although a 1% variance is allowed, consumers can distinguish between what products have high
or low ABV, and consumption choices can be made based on ABV (Alcohol and Tobacco Tax
and Trade Bureau, n.d.). Additionally, alcohol blood levels to determine intoxication or
impairments levels can be accurately determined by breathalyzer tests or blood draws.
In contrast, cannabis falls into one of two categories: hemp or marijuana. Both were
considered to be Schedule I substances under the United States Uniform Controlled Substances
Act because they both contain delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). The distinguishing factor is
the level of THC, either <0.3% or >0.3%. Hemp is distinguished by its lower levels of delta-9
THC and marijuana by its higher levels, even though it is the same plant. Products identified as
marijuana above 0.3% delta-9 THC are considered to be intoxicating or mind altering in a way
similar to alcohol. However, there are no uniform standards for that measurement, and in a way
similar to alcohol, intoxication levels vary based on metabolism, and a variety of other factors.
However, determining intoxication levels following marijuana consumption is far from exact
science. In states where the product has been legalized and driving under the influence of drug
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standards have been established, such as the 5 nanograms of active THC per milliliter of blood
standard in Washington State, a medical cannabis consumer may regularly exceed that limit
regularly based on their therapeutic dose.
These dissimilarities become more profound when layered with the social stigma
connected with cannabis consumption, its connection to the war on drugs, and the
disproportionate incarceration rates of Black and Brown people for possession of cannabis
before, and after legalization. Top all of this with the reality that organizations leading the
legalization charge viewed cannabis through the lens of social justice, meaning that the focus
was on harm reduction as opposed to equity. These measures would never have gained any
traction or the support of middle-of-the-road and swing voters of the time had they contemplated
more than establishing basic regulatory structures and driving while under the influence of drug
(DUID) limits. In the ten years since these measures passed, however, the United States has
begun to seriously reckon with racism, and we can think about social equity in cannabis law and
regulation that the political climate of 2011 and 2012 did not.
For early cannabis legalizers, no regulatory structures existed in the United States or
elsewhere from which to borrow knowledge or extract guidance. In Washington, while the
medicinal cannabis program administered through a public health agency (DOH) never quite had
enough steam to get off the ground, the WSLCB—an alcohol licensing and enforcement
agency—was the only agency tasked with creating a system for cannabis production, processing,
and retail sales. This framework included, but was not limited to:
•

how crops were grown;

•

what pesticides could and could not be used during growth cycles and at what levels;

•

creating product standards, establishing cannabis testing laboratory accreditation and
protocols (which are not established at the federal level, so there are no uniform
standards); and
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•

establishing product testing standards.

None of these activities typically fell under or within the expertise of an agency that previously
only licensed alcohol business. For similar products, other agencies such as the Washington State
Departments of Agriculture, Health, and Ecology, or the federal Food and Drug Administration
would be tasked with shared oversight. These agencies remain unsure about how to assist based
on federal funding streams that prohibit participation in illegal activity.
In contrast, the Oregon Liquor Control Commission’s responsibilities for regulation were
shared by their public health counterparts at Oregon Medical Marijuana Program. The existing
structure designed to regulate medical cannabis provided somewhat of a blueprint for the
development and creation of a recreational regulatory structure. The same was true in Colorado.
Leadership and Cannabis Regulation
There was no indication or promise that the social experiment of legalization would be
successful, and the leaders of pioneering cannabis regulatory agencies found themselves in
unique and uncharted territory. Leading change in this space was unprecedented. The intricacies
around not only the product, but the authorizing environment and everything else associated with
the production, processing and sale of cannabis offered many challenges. Among these was the
opportunity to engage with existing unregulated and illicit systems and move them into a legal
and regulated space within distinct state and federal boundaries in ways that had never been
attempted before.
The COVID-19 outbreak served as a stress-test of the existing cannabis regulatory
structure, even though it is consistently compared to the more mature alcohol industry. Similarly,
the alcohol industry endured multiple stress tests post-prohibition (Okrent, 2011). For example,
while the cannabis industry was deemed an essential service in states with legalized systems,
most alcohol production was not unless the ethanol used to create the product was being offered
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as an ingredient for hand sanitizer. Alcohol producers, distributors and retailers trying to keep the
supply of alcohol flowing in restaurants, bars, and retail establishments were unable to remain
viable as restaurants closed or went out of business, and stores selling alcohol temporarily
shuttered their operations. And, once the demand for hand sanitizer was met by companies such
as Purell and Clorox, distilleries, wineries, and other alcohol production facilities had little
choice other than to reduce or eliminate production.
In some ways, this contrast between these major business lines—alcohol and
cannabis—underscores the challenge of regulating cannabis during this moment in history.
There are times when the regulator’s role seems similar to directing a scene from West Side
Story although without choreography, costumes, and music. Like the musical, a dominant group
(larger, more mechanized, and commercialized processors and producers) struggle to figure out
how and if territory might be shared with a less dominant, but equally important group (smaller,
less mechanized, more agriculturally oriented and specialized processors and producers). This
struggle inadvertently, yet simultaneously honors and tests boundaries that were not really all
that stable to begin with. Such a dynamic occurred as the Washington alcohol industry grew and
is being realized in the cannabis industry. However, the pressure on regulators to make no
mistakes from legislators, the industry itself, and local governments on a product with little
history of regulation often neglects the fact that it took many years of alcohol regulation to reach
this point in that industry’s maturity.
For example, in Washington State, the three-tiered system for cannabis production is
based on the total size of growing space, referred to as canopy, that an applicant selects for
cannabis production: up to 4,000, up to 10,000, or up to 30,000 square feet. A limited number of
production licenses were initially issued based on demographics, consumer demand, and
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economic forecasts. Licensees selected growing methods, sometimes based on several factors,
such as the availability of and access to capital and resources, and the location of the license.
Different methods of production exist within these production spaces. High-tech, highly
controlled indoor grows with year-round production that is suitable, generally, for the Western,
more damp side of the state is one option. Lower-tech, outdoor grows that use light deprivation,
hooping techniques, and other agricultural practices consistent with outdoor farming traditions
is another. These methods are better suited to the Eastern, dryer and more agriculturally
appropriate of the state. Each method has strengths and weaknesses. However, the contrast
highlights one of the early yet often overlooked signals that the regulatory structure did not
result in socially equitable conditions. Minority applicants experienced barriers to license
attainment in ways that the majority of licensees, who were and are primarily white,
well-capitalized males, did not. For minority licensees, limited access to capital and lack of
generational wealth often determined license type and tier, growing methods, facility placement,
and other business decisions. Additionally, an applicant’s criminal history impacted the ability
to qualify for a license, underscoring one of the many disproportionate impacts of the war on
drugs. For some, business models were based on choice and access, and for others, a narrow
pathway to participation.
To regulators, neither indoor nor outdoor production is superior to the other. Instead, each
produces a different type of product with unique characteristics exclusive to the manner in which
the product was produced. Yet, within these license types and groups, discord exists. Rivalry
between indoor growers who harvest year-round and outdoor growers who harvest once or twice
per year is common. Advantages, either real or perceived, are believed to be leveraged by “big
business” at the expense of “small business,” even though technically, the majority of these
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businesses are considered “small” as defined in statute (see RCW 19.85.020(3)). There is
disagreement over which growing style is more sustainable and efficient. There is competition
over shelf space, branding and product development. Self-regulation realized as a propensity to
report and expose real or perceived violation of state or local regulation by competing licensees
is common. That self-regulation is often administered through social media channels, in private
groups, or in complaints to the agency. These tensions within the Washington state closed system
are examples of just one dimension of the complex system that is cannabis regulation.
How do we better understand that complexity, its characteristics, and contours, and where
it fits in the broader conversation around regulatory leadership? Does the desire to create or
achieve social equity influence any or all of these elements? In other words, what exactly is
complexity in this context, and how do regulatory leaders in legalized cannabis markets interact
with it? What approaches have these regulatory leaders found to help or hinder progress as
cannabis markets in Washington, Colorado, and Oregon mature?
This research adds to that conversation in a way that moves toward identifying and
understanding the characteristics of change in new, complex, and unpredictable regulatory
systems. It goes one step further in a participatory way by capturing and sharing what these
regulatory innovators have learned in a learning history artifact described below and in Chapter
III.
Condictio (The Purpose)
I am interested in this research from two distinct, and yet separate perspectives: as a
practitioner working in cannabis regulation, and as a researcher who wants to explore the
complex, multidimensional landscape that forms cannabis regulation. My practitioner-self is
interested in specific topics, including whether leadership theories have any practical application,
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and what is the best way to approach complexity. In contrast, my researcher-self cautions that
bridging theory and real-life practice is not the only research imperative. As Bradbury (2001)
notes, “Knowledge is about rendering useful interpretations for preferred action in the world,
rather than simply ‘knowing’ facts which are thought to describe independent reality” (p. 312).
To that end, the objectives of this study are three-pronged:
1. To understand how complexity is engaged and experienced in complex regulatory
systems and understand what the practice of leadership looks like when engaging
with such complexity.
2. To understand how the history and story of cannabis legalization told from the
perspectives of regulatory pioneers can help us to understand the ways in which that
complexity was navigated, including an exploration of social justice and social equity
dimensions.
3. To memorialize the story of cannabis legalization in the United States from the
perspectives of early adopters by creating a living learning history artifact that serves
not only as a historical tool but supports movement toward sustainable “yes/and”
policy options.
Another important purpose of this research is to give voice to the leaders of three states
that led the way in cannabis legalization before anyone else in the world tried it. Washington
State, Colorado, and Oregon were tasked with moving an illicit market to a legal one without the
benefit of federal oversight or direction. Their lived experiences can serve to offer guidance for
future legalization efforts that can contribute to the discussion of leading change in new areas of
complex regulation. Their stories also have the potential to inform broader conversations about
transformative interventions that may reduce institutional barriers to opportunity. This is the
social equity component of cannabis legalization that was not built into legalization initiatives of
the time.
If there is anything to learn from 2020 and 2021—the period of time in which this
research was proposed and conducted—it is that whatever leadership tenets and theories we held

20
as the absolute truth resulted in a complex, out-of-control global pandemic that led to loss of life.
I hope that this research helps us to unthink and deconstruct what got us here, and moves us from
thinking about what is, to what could be. In other words, instead of seeking yes/no solutions, it
seems like a good time to look at what we have done, where we have been, and consider instead,
yes/and . . .
Ad Litteras Pertinens (The Literature)
I take a critical view of the literature for a variety of reasons, but primarily because in its
current form, there are many difficulties with the way in which leadership engages with
complexity. The extant literature describes almost utopian leadership models that enable,
administrate, and adapt to achieve a particular outcome or direction in complex systems. It
accomplishes this through visuals and persuasive Harvard Business Review-style, polished
narratives. Complexity-inspired leadership is performed by a person who possesses a “keen”
(Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009, p. 640) sense of knowing precisely when to engage with the agents
of a complex system to move them toward emergence. Virtually all of the literature describes
this remarkable, new process through metaphor, analogy, and colorful diagrams that do not
address the messy, unglamorous, human parts of change. Most notably lacking are discussions or
depictions of the power dynamics and politics that occur in these systems. This forms the
backdrop for one of my overarching research questions: is leading complex systems as a practice
really built on a theoretical construct? Are we merely relabeling power dynamics and traditional
forms of leadership as “innovative approaches” to leadership in complex systems? I believe that
my established positionality as a practitioner has guided my emerging positionality as a
researcher in exploring this question. Before unpacking any of that, I must understand how
complexity has been theorized, because no one can agree on that.
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Merriam-Webster (n.d.-a) defines “complex” as a noun meaning “a whole made up of
complicated or interrelated parts.” Merriam-Webster (n.d.-a) also describes it as an adjective,
meaning “composed of two or more parts: composite.” It can also be a verb meaning “to make
complex or into complex.” On one hand, it is interesting that a word can have so many
meanings, in so many contexts, and so many ways. The English language is full of words like
this. Yet, on the other hand, multiple definitions of the same word can lead to
misinterpretation, misapplication, and more often misunderstanding. For the casual bystander,
calling something “complex” or using the phrase “complexity theory” to describe something
reminds us of some of the ways we have visualized complexity. For example, see Glouberman
and Zimmerman’s (2004) table where at the differences between simple, complicated, and
complex problems are described. For example, a simple problem is equated with following a
recipe, where the recipe is essential to assure easy replication and the best recipe delivers the
same results consistently. This is compared to an example of the complicated problem of
sending a rocket to the moon, where high expertise is needed to complete the mission and
there is a high degree of certainty in the outcome. Both of these examples are then compared
to complex problem of raising a child, where formulas, like consistent parenting do not assure
success, and because each child is unique, uncertainty of outcome, such as whether the child
reaches adulthood, are unpredictable and largely unknown (Glouberman & Zimmerman,
2004).
Similarly, Snowden’s helpful and often cited Cynefin model (see Snowden & Boone,
2007) adds a chaotic category to the problem types described by Glouberman and Zimmerman.
Importantly, the concern that each of these models attempts to address is bringing order to
disorder, and tables can nicely organize the distinctions between these problems in a way that
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makes sense. These descriptions are often extended to systems and organizations by way of
analogy and metaphor. However, neither approach quite gets to why it is always necessary to
bring order to disorder, or why only one person or leader can or should do that. In other words,
the literature tells us that complexity is sort of implied in multiple ways in multiple contexts, but
it does not tell us how it is applied, if it applies at all, or what it even means.
In the chapters ahead, I will examine how complexity is characterized in literature and
elsewhere in a number of ways, including but not limited to:
•

origins, progression and development,

•

the multiple ways complexity is defined, and

•

how complexity is linked to leadership.

All of this suggests a larger question, however: if complexity is so problematic, why
would I use it as a key construct for this dissertation? How does an abstract concept have any
concrete or physical application in practice? The answer is because the systems and authorizing
environments that comprise the cannabis regulatory landscape are complex. To learn about how
cannabis might be regulated in socially equitable way, this research engages those complex
systems to better understand them and move toward frameworks that have the potential to make
socially equitable conditions possible. Thus, rather than continuing to theorize how complexity
might apply in context, this research will attempt to move complexity beyond the abstract, into
considering its use as tool that can be practically, collaboratively, and purposely leveraged to
lead change in complex regulatory environments.
Positio (My Position)
I serve the citizens of Washington State as the policy and rules manager for the WSLCB.
Among other things, I lead policy and interpretive statement development, advise agency and

23
other governmental leaders on cannabis and liquor policy, and manage the agency rules
program. I have served as a policy advisor at various governmental agencies for many years.
Our mission statement provides that we “Promote public safety and trust through fair
administration and enforcement of liquor, cannabis, tobacco, and vapor laws” (WSLCB, n.d.). I
hold this mission less in the back of my mind, and more in my line of sight. I also maintain
focus on two of our agency goals very closely. These are to “Ensure the highest level of public
safety by continually improving and enforcing laws, regulations, and policies that reflect today’s
dynamic environment” and, “Inform and engage licensees, the public and stakeholders in
addressing issues related to our mission” (WSLCB, n.d.). I focus heavily on the second goal in
my practice.
I see these as more than words on a webpage . . . I try put them to practical use in the
spirit of Mandela. I have learned in many years of public service that demonstrating tolerance
and respect for others is critical to constituent engagement. My personal values, based on a
lifetime commitment to social justice, belief in equality, and human dignity cannot be balanced
with professional responsibility without tolerance and respect.
How does one tie any of that to the regulation of alcohol, cannabis, tobacco, and vapor
products? How can ideals of tolerance and respect be associated with products, and the people
who produce and sell them, that some governments have intentionally age-gated because they
may cause harm? Products that some believe to be addictive, offering gateways to more
dangerous substances. Products that can, if used for protracted periods of time, over-used or
abused, result in death and disease. Products that are associated with criminal behavior, and as
noted above, have been weaponized as tools to harm, incarcerate and marginalize Black and
Brown people?
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The connection, or the tie in, is that there are social justice and social equity implications
for the legalization of cannabis. My experience suggests that leading change in this context,
through policy development, regulatory framework development, or guiding legislation, involves
taking on dense problems of monumental, and sometimes overwhelming proportions. Social
equity is one of those problems, and my experience also suggests that complexity is often used to
describe these problems.
I am grateful to scholars for carefully constructed, thoughtful contributions to complexity
discourse. Without them, I likely would not have become interested in the topic, thought about
how it layered into the rest of my work, or tried to connect it with my commitment to social
justice. Yet, if the limit of my contribution to academia was only to explore, explain or further
existing theories, I would be doing the study of complexity and my lifelong commitment to
social justice a great disservice. Here, I aim to offer new thinking and theorizing about how we
approach complex regulatory systems and how we might create regulatory frameworks that lead
to socially equitable conditions.
Where does that leave my research and why would I want to move it forward, situated in
an inherently unstable and controversial landscape? What value is there in becoming comfortable
with uncertainty and instability when, generally speaking, most bureaucratic structures are
designed to achieve the opposite: bring order to disorder and keep it that way. Is that not what
regulators are supposed to do? Is that not how bureaucracy works? I hope this work will move
toward answering some of those questions. To accomplish that, I selected a unique participatory
action research method.
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Modum Investigationis (Research Method)
I am ultimately interested in knowing how the complexity of cannabis legalization is
experienced by the state government leaders and organizations who initially established and
currently maintain legal cannabis markets. I would also like to understand more about
implications for social equity in that space. Collecting and memorializing lived experiences can
contribute and guide present and future discussions and efforts related to cannabis reform. These
lived experiences may provide insight into how barriers to opportunity could be reduced in ways
that lead to socially equitable conditions, and help us understand what role, if any, leadership
plays in the process.
When I began contemplating this work, it seemed to lend itself to the action research
paradigm because such an approach allows research and practice to coexist and co-work
simultaneously in problem solving. Action research seeks to effectively facilitate the creative
tension inherent in the relationship between action and reflection by catalyzing synergy between
scholarship and practice (Lewin, 1951). Knowledge, within the paradigm of action research, is
about rendering useful interpretations for preferred action in the world, rather than simply
knowing more “facts” that are thought to describe independent reality. In this sense, action
research can be understood as a part within a wider trajectory of pragmatism (Rorty, 1989).
I offer that engaging scholarship that can lead to action is a critical outcome of action
research, and necessary if one wishes to conduct research that results in actionable learning and
outcomes. These are the essential goals of my research. Van de Ven (2007) defined engaged
scholarship as,
a participative form of research for obtaining different perspectives of key stakeholders
(researchers, users, clients, sponsors, and practitioners) in solving complex problems. By
involving others, and leveraging different kinds of knowledge, engaged scholarship can
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produce knowledge that is more penetrating and insightful than when scholars or
practitioners work on the problems alone. (p. 9)
Boyer (1990) defined engagement as reciprocal and mutually beneficial partnerships: two-way
streets defined by mutual respect for what each partner brings to the table (Shultz & Kajner,
2013). As noted above, this aligns well with the approach to this work and what I wish to
contribute to both practice and scholarship.
The Learning History
The origins of learning history can be traced back to a movement in the late 1990s that
was focused on building a learning organization (Gearty et al., 2015; Kleiner & Roth, 1996;
Senge, 2006). A learning organization can be defined as an organization that proactively makes
efforts both in the form of investment and encouragement to educate their employees so that the
company can adapt with a rapidly changing technology and business environment. In addition to
education, a learning organization gives support to its employees to take risks with innovative
and creative ideas. In this way, they inculcate creative thinking and learning from experience and
experiment in its employees (Senge, 2006).
The learning history emerged at a time when employees and organizations needed to find
a way to evaluate the worth and significance of past learning experiences to the extent that those
experiences supported continuous improvement initiatives connected to organizational
development. Those experiences could be built upon to repeat successes, avoid mistakes, and
spread a sense of achievement throughout the organization. Many companies found it difficult to
institutionalize subgroup learning in way that could help the rest of the organization develop.
Successful organizational learning efforts, however, generally require people to rise above their
conventional blinders to add new ways of thinking and new forms of behavior to their repertoire
(Kleiner & Roth, 1996). This needed to be seen through the various perspectives of people who
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had been directly involved with the learning, based on actual data and offered in a way that made
sense to them. Thus, when an organization has been through a learning or change process,
participants needed and benefited from a feedback loop that established guidance and support.
Yet reacting to the pressure of assessing learning could easily undermine any learning effort. As
people became aware of being assessed and measured, the intrinsic motivation which drove them
to learn was supplanted by an extrinsically motivated desire to look successful. Any feedback,
mediated through an outside observer’s eyes, could be tainted by this built-in set of distortions.
Learning histories were invented in response to these concerns and needs (Kleiner & Roth,
1996).
Of the many action-research based methodologies considered for this research, the
learning history method was determined to be the best fit. It helps to tell the story of how people
learned to collectively inquire in new ways, generate insights, and then take actions which
weren’t believed to be possible before (Kleiner & Roth, 1996). This aligned exactly with what I
am was trying to understand here: Washington State, Colorado, and the state of Oregon had little
to no insight or guidance to develop regulatory structures for an adult use cannabis market. This
methodology allowed people in these agencies to tell their stories, describe how they acted and
why. These stories and experiences, shared in their own words, and through their own
self-reflection, helped to gain insight for future direction while leaving a rich history for current
and future organizations to learn from. This research approach is more fully described in Chapter
III.
Conlationem (Contribution)
This research contributes to leadership and complexity scholarship in three ways. First, it
empirically describes how complexity is engaged and experienced in complex regulatory
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systems. Next, it examines whether complexity has any connection to the practice of leadership.
Finally, it adds to the emerging area of cannabis scholarship, particularly as it relates to
understanding social equity and the broader impacts of the war on drugs.
Quid Refert (Why It Matters)
Who wants to talk or read about the complexities of leading change in new regulatory
areas, such as cannabis, and issues of economic, legal, environmental and development rights to
access, such as social equity—in one dissertation? None of these things, taken separately or
cumulatively, suggest simplicity or light reading. For example, we do not really know what
complexity means. We are afraid or uncomfortable discussing cannabis because it has been
criminalized, stigmatized and remains federally illegal. It is a symbol of counterculture and
weaponized through propaganda campaigns such as the film Reefer Madness (Gasnier, 1936).
Meaningfully discussing social equity means some of us might have to confront and sit with
uncomfortable and inconvenient truths. One of those truths is that “cannabis enforcement
remains as racialized as ever, notwithstanding similar underlying usage rates” (American Civil
Liberties Union, 2020, p. 37).
All of that is exactly why this research matters.
Understanding the multidimensional complexities of cannabis—from its social
connotations to its demonization to its ultimate legalization—might reveal some beliefs held as
truth that are embedded in statutory and regulatory construction. Examining those truths may
help us recognize their degrees of influence over regulatory outcomes that have not resulted in
socially equitable conditions. Building on that learning, we can begin to sketch the contours of
regulatory frameworks that might achieve socially equitable outcomes. To start this work, let us
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take a look at what scholarship tells us about complex regulatory structures, complexity itself,
and how complexity has been treated in leadership literature.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review is designed to achieve several goals. The first is to explore and
understand the characteristics of regulatory environments, with a concentration on the unique
challenges regulatory agencies experience when creating regulatory frameworks where none
existed before. This is accomplished by reviewing literature that speaks to the differences in
service delivery options, and how governments tackle complex, wicked problems in equally
complex environments and systems.
Next, I unpack the ways that complexity has been theorized. This is accomplished by
reviewing literature describing the origins, progression, and development of complexity as a
science and subsequently, a theoretical construct. I explore multiple definitions and contexts of
complexity. I provide a review and analysis of complexity’s arguably reluctant metamorphosis
from a scientific construct to its appearance in the social sciences with a focus on leadership
literature.
These analysis streams are then merged and discussed in a theoretical critique that serves
to situate research goals concerning complexity in the context of this research.
The Characteristics of Regulatory Environments
Despite negative stereotypes, governmental organizations and agencies excel at
implementing policies and delivering services that are relatively standardized, routine, and high
volume (Head & Alford, 2015). The Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board (WSLCB) is
a governmental agency providing services responsive to the needs of Washington State citizens
in a critical yet narrow area of service delivery. WSLCB does not regulate or create policy
related to behavioral health, public health and prevention, law enforcement, substance use or
local government services or delivery. Services are offered in a variety of ways, including but
not limited to cannabis, alcohol, tobacco, and vapor product business license application review
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and issuance; consultative services that support regulatory compliance, and business inspections
related to license issuance and renewal. In other words, services are limited to, generally,
oversight of product production, assuring that products are age-gated, and taxes are appropriately
and timely collected. WSLCB is not authorized to establish product pricing, taxation rates or
structures, or new license or endorsement types. These frameworks are all legislatively created.
Less routine service opportunities, such as those legislatively mandated by Initiative 502
(I-502) that required WSLCB to establish a “tightly regulated” framework for cannabis, a
federally prohibited substance, presented many unique challenges (Initiative 502, 2012, p. 1).
While those challenges can generally be characterized as complex, the two identified for this
research can be identified in the following theoretical traditions:
•

The first challenge—regulatory construction—can be conceptualized as a macro
process (for example, see Berry & Berry (2018) regarding innovation and diffusion
models). Creating a regulatory structure for the production, processing and sale of
cannabis was a high-profile, time-sensitive legislative mandate clearly articulating
that WSLCB design and implement such a framework. At the time of legislative
enactment, it was unclear whether Washington implementation of I-502 would be
preempted by the federal government since cannabis was classified as a prohibited
schedule I drug. Here, the complex issue is connected to objectively created systems
and program design, rather than individual values, choices, and behaviors.

•

The second challenge—social equity—can be conceptualized in terms of the relations
between micro processes (such as individual values, choices and behaviors) and
macro policy processes (for example, see Kim & Roh, 2008, Ostrom, 1990; Sabatier
& Jenkins-Smith, 2010). Social equity did not initially receive the level of attention or
scrutiny that regulatory construction was given because it was not explicit in the
legislative language. Although legalization had been promoted as a way to address
the disproportionate social impacts of cannabis prohibition by removing criminal
penalties for possession, some assert that social equity was implied, even though
legalization was initially introduced as a harm reduction measure. However, such a
measure reflective of social values presents a type of complexity beyond systems and
program design. This underscores how subjective values can be deeply embedded in
legislation, but if not explicitly articulated, unrealized in regulation.

Regardless of how these elements of regulatory and social construction were interpreted
by members of the authorizing landscape, both involved many interactions and
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interdependencies, some similar and some profoundly distinct. These interactions and
interdependencies were and continue to be characterized, expressed, and realized in multiple
ways, such as conflicting views and interests, lack of any type of longitudinal data on which to
base decision-making, absence of funding for research, local moratoriums, and many others. The
cause-and-effect relationships within those interactions and interdependencies was unknown
when I-502 was being implemented in regulation, and to an extent, remain unknown today.
Implementation is a term used to describe the process of realizing or creating regulation
mandated or required by legislation.
Regulatory challenge of this magnitude can be difficult to estimate. Sometimes,
governmental organizations trying to find solutions to these types of issues may actually
contribute to causing them (Manning & Reinecke, 2016). An example of this is climate change.
As global temperatures rise, developed countries respond by using more energy to meet the
needs of populations seeking relief from soaring heat. This results in increased, often
non-renewable energy consumption contributing to greenhouse gases that in turn reduce the
global ozone layer shielding the earth from the sun. And that reduction or thinning of the delicate
ozone layer contributes to global warming . . . which is the reason developed countries seek
cooling options to begin with. Climate change is a type of problem, along with others like
poverty, hunger, and others that are considered to be “wicked problems” (Rittel & Webber,
1973). Grint (2005, 2010, 2022) describes wicked problems as problems that are either new or
recalcitrant, for which there are no apparent answers, and which require collaborative effort to
address. While each wicked problem has unique and distinguishing characteristics, their common
thread is that each involves a complex system or multiple systems whose interactions have the
potential to allow dynamic reorganization and adaptation, sometimes for the greater good, and

33
sometimes in detrimental ways. Thus, not only are some problems extremely complex, or
wicked, but the environment or systems in which they occur are equally complex.
In the regulatory context, such environments or systems are referred to as the authorizing
environment. The authorizing environment matters here because it is not only a key focal point
of both cannabis legalization and social equity, but also of the literature on regulatory leadership
in complex systems. Within each component of the authorizing environment lies a heightened
awareness of value and interest differences that mark and underscore deep-rooted disagreements
“about the nature and significance of particular problems and possible solutions (e.g., policies
concerning environmental protection, poverty, crime, welfare services, immigration, and
citizenship)” (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 715). Indeed, these value and interest differences are
distributed across the diverse social and political landscape and can collide with institutional
complexity (the context of interorganizational cooperation and multilevel governance), and
scientific uncertainty (fragmentation and gaps in reliable knowledge; Head & Alford, 2015).
Within that multidimensional landscape, or authorizing environment, lies authority that can be
exercised by some agents over others. Authority can constrain, control, influence or support
certain behaviors, and has significant implications for what organizations do, how things are
done, when, where and with whom those things are done (Andrews et al., 2017).
How is such an authorizing environment managed? Head and Alford (2015) suggest
through collaboration and coordination. Collaboration offers one way of recognizing the
complexity of problems and engaging the multiplicity of actors affecting the “wickedness” of a
problem (Head & Alford, 2015, p. 728). This involves creating relationships of trust and a degree
of autonomy, both of which can be vulnerable to political or financial barriers that can
underscore power asymmetries (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). Similarly, coordination in this
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context can be considered in terms of how complexity could be accommodated, rather than
reduced, through the purposeful synchronization of independent actors (Scharpf, 1994).
However, there seems to be an absence of literature diving deeply into the power imbalances and
agency within the authorizing environments of regulatory systems, and literature regarding the
ways that regulatory systems grapple with wicked problems, beyond theoretical application, is
scant at best.
Given this backdrop, how might wicked problems be approached in complex regulatory
systems? In beginning to define wicked problems, Rittel and Webber (1973) offered that, “There
seems to be a growing realization that a weak strut in the professional's support system lies at the
juncture where goal-formulation, problem-definition and equity issues meet (p. 156). And, they
were somewhat bleak about wicked problem solving (Crowley & Head, 2017), never quite
making it to offer a “constructive companion piece” (Catron, 1981, p. 14) to wicked dilemmas.
Catron (1981) suggests that
perhaps some social problems can be solved “once, for all, and for always,” but most
clearly cannot be. The more appropriate attitude, and the more promising analytic
approach, is one which attempts to identify “preferred directions” rather than “optimal
solutions” one that focuses on coping with problems rather than solving them. (p. 13)
This seems to align with Webber’s later support of “fostering of multiplicities of potential
outcomes compatible with the wants of plural publics” (Crowley & Head, 2017, citing Webber,
1983, p. 89). However, resolving “problems of equity” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 169) in
regulatory systems seems to be an untouched area of research ripe for inquiry.
The Nature of Complexity
Origins, Progression, and Development
In Chapter I, I compared simple, complicated, and complex according to
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Glouberman and Zimmerman (2004). I also spoke to why such an abstract concept might have
a place as a key construct for this work. The systems and authorizing environments that
comprise the cannabis regulatory landscape are complex. To better understand and learn more
about how cannabis might be regulated in socially equitable way, those complex systems must
be engaged so we can better understand and move toward frameworks that make socially
equitable conditions possible. Thus, rather than continuing to theorize how complexity might
apply in context, this research moves complexity beyond the abstract, into considering it as a
feature of a system that can be practically, collaboratively, and purposely leveraged to achieve
greater understanding. To begin that work, let us take a look at its origins.
During the industrial age, natural and physical sciences relied on Newtonian science to
assert that precisely determined conditions established every element of natural processes, and
that the laws governing these processes never changed because they were completely
predictable. Fact, which Newton argued could be separated and empirically tested, was separated
from the values of the knowing subject, which were inexplicable subjective states of their mind
or heart (Morçöl, 2001). This model remained constant for more than three centuries, influencing
and guiding sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, and eventually the
humanities, until it was met with a two-pronged challenge.
The first challenge to this understanding was the law of entropy advanced by Clausius in
1865 (Dreyer et al., 2000; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). The law of entropy is the second of the
laws of thermodynamics, holding that the disorder of closed systems can never decrease, and
when an isolated system reaches maximum entropy (the measure for the degree of disorder of
particles), it remains in equilibrium, or balance, and can no longer change (Gunaratne, 2003).
Clausius formulated this second law of thermodynamics by the statement that “the entropy of the
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universe tends toward a maximum” (Raman, 1970, p. 333). This is relevant here because entropy
considered an approximation, rather than an absolute determination of outcomes, and this did not
align with Newtonian thinking.
The second challenge came from quantum physics, emerging in the early part of the 20th
century. Quantum physics offered a theoretical frame describing the “incessant transformation of
particles into one another” (Gunaratne, 2003, p. 438), that rather weakly spoke to the
indeterminism of entropy suggested by Clausius. The literature reviewed offered little more than
this, although Morçöl (2005) touches on it briefly in reference to “quantum weirdness” (p. 2)
followed by an assertion that it was largely dismissed based on the absence of any strong
evidence of its effects on macro-levels of experience.
Each of these challenges was a shift toward questioning deeply rooted scientific belief
and understanding. Despite this movement, Newtonian science drove most research agendas
through the mid-20th century, and eventually complexity studies began to emerge. The most
important came from the Brussels school of the natural sciences under Ilya Prigogine.
Prigogine’s Nobel Prize-winning theory of dissipative structures pointed out that the
Newtonian paradigm made several unfounded and incorrect presumptions. He reasoned that
although Newtonian theory implied that all matter and energy in the universe would ultimately
degrade to a state in inert uniformity, or equilibrium, it was actually an open, rather than a closed
system. In simpler terms, Prigogine posited that systems did not naturally move to a state of
equilibrium or stability, but instead were in a constant state of evolution, where the matter and
energy of the system or systems freely interacted and self-organized, emerging as a new system,
or a collection of systems. Prigogine then took this a few steps further by audaciously suggesting
that this phenomenon was not exclusive to physics.
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Prigogine’s willingness to extend scientific findings and outcomes toward other
disciplines represents the beginning of an on-going tendency to apply complexity and complexity
theories to economics, political science, the humanities, and others by metaphor. As I will
discuss below, this is problematic, but consider that Prigogine and Stengers (1984) found the
implicit metaphor of Newtonian science—the clockwork universe—to be misleading (Morçöl,
2001). Even so, Prigogine’s comprehensive theory of change became one of the foundations of
complexity science. It offered the following notable points that are critical to understanding not
only the origins of complexity, but its structure and formed the basis for generally asserted
understandings of complexity:
Most parts of the universe are open systems, exchanging energy or matter with their
environment. Some systems are isolated, others are near-equilibrium, and yet others are
dissipated. Steady state systems, like mechanical systems, cannot evolve internally, and
find themselves in the isolated category. Systems that are organized around the principle
of minimum entropy production also cannot evolve internally but belong to the
near-equilibrium category. Evolving systems found in enriched, free-energy
environments whose far from equilibrium configurations are non-replicable over time
belong to the dissipative category. (Harvey & Reed, 1997)
Fluctuation occurs in an open dissipative structure when energy flows become too
complex for the system to absorb. When a single fluctuation or combination of
fluctuations gathers enough power through positive feedback, a single bifurcation point
arises that forces the system to reorganize. Each reorganization produces greater
complexity and a greater likelihood of random fluctuations, or evolution. It is impossible
to determine in advance the direction of the systems change, whether it will spiral into
chaos, or give rise to a new, possibly higher order. (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984)
Non-linear relationships prevail when a system is in far from equilibrium state, where it
becomes sensitive to external influences. A small fluctuation, or perturbation, can bring
about startling, structure-breaking waves that replace the old with a new system, bringing
order out of chaos. In contrast, a system in equilibrium may have reached its entropy
capacity, and becomes paralyzed. (Gunaratne, 2003)
From these three points, the study of the science of complexity emerged, offering the
notion that “instability, evolution, and fluctuation [are] everywhere” (Wallerstein, 2001, p. 165).
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Defining Complexity
Prigogine expanded on the concept of probability in relation to complexity in a 2003
interview while he discussed the epistemology of complexity, and provided that, “complexity is
generally related also to the arrow of time. What do you call complexity? Complexity is a
property of systems that for given boundary conditions have more than one possible solutions
[sic]” (p. 68, emphasis added).
Complexity, complexity science, and subsequently complexity as theory have since
evolved and expanded as ways to understand and explain the structure and behavior of complex
systems and problems, with a particular focus on the cooperative interactions of individual
components that give rise to unpredictable outcomes and events (Cairney, 2012). Consistent with
Prigogine’s original concepts, complexity theory suggests that we shift our analysis from the
individual parts of a system to the system as a whole. Through this lens, that system becomes a
network of elements interacting and combining to produce systemic behavior that cannot be
broken down merely into the actions of its constituent parts. Rather, the aim of complexity
theory is to identify what types of systemic output occur when system members follow the same
basic rules, and how sensitive the system is, or what small changes in rules will produce changes
in systemic behavior (Cairney, 2012). Complexity theory has received strong support in the
social sciences, being used to understand international relations, public policy and policy making
institutions, and has been used by think tanks, academics, and practitioners to recommend new
forms of policy making and leadership.
Despite this broad application, there is no unified or coherent framework for complexity
theory (Cairney, 2012; Cilliers, 1998; Morçöl, 2001; Mitchell, 2009; Snyder, 2013). To that end,
Morçöl (2012) observed that “complexity is partly in the eye of the beholder” (p. 24). While it
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can be argued that complexity theory has some fundamental definitional similarities across
authors, researchers and disciplines, there are just as many dissimilarities across the wide variety
of contexts to which it is applied, and agreement on a uniform definition isn’t possible. For
example,
•

Dr. Paul Cilliers (1998), former Professor of Complexity and Philosophy at
Stellenbosch University, South Africa, offered that, “Unfortunately the concept
remains elusive at both the qualitative and quantitative levels. One useful description
. . . states that complexity entails that, in a system, there are more possibilities than
can be actualized. This can hardly serve as definition, but perhaps one should not be
surprised if complexity cannot be given a simple definition. Instead, an analysis of
characteristics” might be attempted (p. 2, emphasis added).

•

Dr. Russ Marion (2008), Professor of Educational Leadership at Clemson University,
United States, asserts that “complexity theory is the study of dynamic behaviors of
complexly interacting, interdependent, and adaptive agents under conditions of
internal and external pressure” (p. 3).

•

Sean Snyder (2013), in an education working paper prepared for the Organization of
Economic Co-operation and Development, asserts that “complexity theory posits that
systems begin as collections of individual actors who organize themselves and create
relationships. These relationships form in response to positive or negative feedback,
though a degree of randomness is inarguably involved as well. New structures and
behaviors then emerge as the actors act and react to each other” (p. 11).

•

Dr. Paul Cairney (2012), Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of
Stirling, United Kingdom, describes complexity theory being “sold” in the public
administration context as “a new approach to science in which we identify (and then
explain) systems and processes that lack the order and stability required to produce
universal rules about behavior and outcomes” (p. 347).

Why does the illustration of these differences matter? It underscores just how far
complexity has traveled, appropriately, or perhaps more to the point, inappropriately from its
original, scientific roots. In contrast to Snyder, Marion, Cilliers, and Cairney’s attempts to
definitively frame it, Morçöl (2012) takes Cilliers’ suggestion further by asking that we
contemplate the characteristics of complexity in a new way.
However, even before Morçöl offered this suggestion, Mitchell (2009) was attempting to
nail down those characteristics in an excellent discussion on the challenges of defining
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complexity theory. She describes the difficulty that the faculty at the Santa Fe Institute had in
defining complexity: “If we can’t agree on what is meant by complexity, then how can there
begin to be a science of complexity?” (p. 94). She identifies six different definitions articulated
by complexity theorists, framing complexity and simplicity in terms of the nature of information
content:
•

Complexity as entropy or the degree to which a message is orderly;

•

Complexity as algorithmic information content which are the number of steps it takes
to describe a system;

•

Complexity as logical depth, which is the measure of how difficult it is to reconstruct
an object;

•

Complexity as thermodynamic depth, which is the amount of information required to
reconstruct an object fully;

•

Statistical complexity,” or the minimal amount of information about past behavior of
system that is needed to optimally predict statistical behavior of the system in the
future; and

•

Complexity as fractal dimension, which is the extent an object can be reconstructed in
fractal dimensions rather than discrete dimensions (Mitchell, 2009).

Similarly, Rescher (1998) notes that there are multiple “modes” of complexity and cites a
lengthy inventory of the definitions of complexity compiled by physicist Loyal, although he
suggests that “standards” might be a better characterization of Loyal’s inventory (pp. 2–3) and
not complexity.
Although both Mitchell and Rescher offer support for the contention that there is no
single definition of complexity, they do suggest that complexity is in the nature of the reality of
the sender who is sending information, and the receiver that receives and interprets it. The nature
of both the sender and receiver determines to what extent the information is complex, further
solidifying Morçöl’s contention that complexity theory truly is in the eye of the beholder and
embedded in context.
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The Epistemology and Ontology of Complexity
Kitchener (2011) provides that epistemology “is concerned with providing an account of
the justification condition—of when a belief or an action is warranted” (p. 84), and later notes,
“it could construct a completely philosophical theory of knowledge with no (or little)
dependence on any scientific fact” (p. 85). Comparatively, ontology can be described as the
branch of philosophy that is concerned with the study of being and the assumptions about what
exist that underlie any conceptual theme or theory, and so a philosopher’s ontology consists of
the views held about what is (Parkinson & Burke, 1988).
Rescher (1998) identifies “modes” (p. 9) of complexity in epistemic and ontological
terms. Within the epistemic mode, he identifies formulaic complexity as descriptive, generative,
and computational complexity. Within the ontological mode, he identifies compositional
complexity, which includes constitutional and taxonomical complexity (heterogeneity), and
structural complexity, which includes organizational and hierarchal complexity. Rescher asserts
that the best overall index and definition we have of a system’s complexity is the extent to which
resources (of time, energy, and ingenuity) must be expanded on its cognitive domestication.
Thus, Rescher finds that complexity is not something purely ontological or epistemic, but
involves both, and it “hinges on the relationship between minds and things—on the ways in
which the former can come to terms with the latter” (p. 16, emphasis added). This is relevant to
my research as a social scientist because I seek to understand the dynamics and textures of those
relationships and how, as noted above, the complexity within and around those relationships may
not only be characterized, but accommodated, rather than controlled.
Since it is clear that there is no unified theory or definition of complexity that is
embedded in a single epistemology or ontology, this leads to a variety of ways in which
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researchers draw from complexity (Loubser, 2014). Complexity theory does distinguish itself
from Newtonian science mainly by its epistemological assumptions (Morçöl, 2001), but some
view those assumptions to be less than certain. For example, aligning with Rescher, Israel (2005)
asserts that while a concrete definition of complexity remains unclear, its concept “continues to
wander around in limbo between epistemology and ontology” (p. 497). And, even though
Prigogine and others tried to define it as a concept, property, or characteristic of the real world, it
collides with empirical definitions like “reductionism,” as in, the whole is more than the sum of
its parts (Israel, 2005, pp. 479, 497). So, one might ask, why is the epistemology and ontology of
complexity even relevant in the context of the present research?
Let us unpack that. We know that the core epistemological assumption of Newtonian
science is that the knowing subject can be removed or separated from its object (Cairney, 2012;
Cilliers, 1998; Loubser, 2014; Morçöl, 2012). This allows the subject to test the truthfulness of
any piece of knowledge by empirically testing its correspondence to reality. To ensure that
knowledge corresponds to reality, scientists should separate facts, which are testable, from their
values, which are subjective. This objectivism makes Newtonianism possible and aligns with
Descartes’ notion that the mind should be separated from matter, allowing that matter to be
special and divisible, and studied using reductionism and quantitative research methods (Morçöl,
2001).
Morçöl (2012) offers that many, if not most, foundational assumptions in the social
sciences, including regulation and public policy, are rooted (as noted) in Newtonian science
situated in positivist world views and philosophies. Since it is argued that complexity cannot be
simplified, ideas which seem mutually exclusive are often united in the framework of reduction
(Loubser, 2014, citing Morin, 1992). And although complexity theory challenges those views,
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the epistemology and principles of classical science are still very much at work when researchers
are looking for the laws of complexity (Morin, 1992). For example, Cilliers (2008) offers:
The problem is, however, severely compounded when the methods of the natural sciences
are imposed upon, or even worse, embraced in a simplistic way by the social sciences and
humanities. The impression is then created that a traditional understanding of the truth,
which is problematic even in natural science, should be the criterion for proper work in
social science. (p. 53)
In the regulatory environment that is the subject of this research, those “traditional
understandings of the truth” are most commonly expressed through statutory and regulatory
construction. Policy serving as the basis for those frameworks is developed through an often
singular, objective lens of understanding, and developed in the rationalist and reductionist
tradition of bureaucratic theory. Championed by Max Weber more than a hundred years ago, the
theory holds that for government to function effectively and efficiently, it should be highly
structured and organized consistent with six principles: top-down control emphasized by rigid
hierarchal structures, labor specialization, strict rules, impersonal interactions, and organizational
specialization. It was argued that adherence to Weber’s formula would lead to predictable,
controllable outcomes in any organization. Most modern governments are based on this, or a
version of this theoretical design, including current governmental structures in the United States.
Yet, Weber’s theoretical design is reminiscent of Newton, Descartes and a “traditional
understanding of the truth.” This is why the epistemology of complexity is relevant and
important to explore here. Traditional understandings of truth have informed the macro
challenges of statutory and regulatory construction, or the mechanics of that construction which
is more focused on objective processes and outcomes. But that rigid epistemology does not
contemplate and may actually exclude subjective micro processes and outcomes that are

44
informed by values and human behaviors, such as social equity. These are often directly
impacted by objective processes.
In the context of cannabis legalization, the objective facts of the macro system and the
subjective values of the micro systems cannot be separated; they are inextricably entwined and
interact with each other. And these interactions cannot be fully and meaningfully explored from
an epistemological stance based in the empirical reductionism that complexity theory itself
proclaims to be critical of, because it ends up actually taking on those very objectives and
functions it claims are obsolete (Israel, 2005). So, turning back to Prigogine, if complexity is a
property of a system, then the epistemological stance must shift to understanding how complex
system properties, both macro and micro, coexist and collaborate by connecting a broader range
of knowledge to better understand the dimensions, dynamics, and properties of the systems.
Observing how those properties interact, and how those interactions lead to or can be guided to
evolution suggests that complexity is neither a mode of analysis nor a tiger to be tamed, but
rather, a characteristic to be explored in the context of how systems and the agents within them
interact.
There is a handful of literature pre-dating Cilliers’ 2008 reference to “traditional
understanding of the truth” (p. 53) in the regulatory and policy contexts, coming from the public
administration tradition. While public administration is sometimes described as the
implementation of public policy, it is also an academic discipline. The role of public
administration in support of governance institutions is essential to steer societies on chosen
development paths, and it can serve as an organizational pillar in changing, complex
environments (Puppim de Oliveira et al., 2015). Since this is one of the foundational contexts in
which this research is situated, this literature is relevant to the present discussion, and offers
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some exploration of what expression of knowledge, or embodiment, might mean if realized in
the public administration realm. For example, Farmer (2001) explored how public administration
theory and practice could seek understandings that result from recognizing more clearly that it
deals with people and relations between people, rather than a “stick figure” (p. 193),
representative of rational units of analysis. He offers that, “A living person can be separated for
analytical purposes from ongoing implication with her environment; ontological separation is
fatal” (p. 193). Agreeing with Farmer, Morçöl (2005) notes, “public administration theorists
should include the embodiment of human knowledge in their theories” (p. 1).
In other words, consistent with the review so far, and relevant to this work, contextual,
embodied knowledge presents significant epistemological and ontological challenges to
Newtonian beliefs, and those beliefs form the basis of most statutory and regulatory construction.
This research begins to question that long-held epistemological positionality in the context of
regulatory systems.
Complexity in Context
Linking Complexity to Leadership
As part of this analysis, and because this work will be nested within an overarching
context of change in complex regulatory systems, leadership literature was also reviewed. Israel
(2005) asserts that, “a number of persons quite candidly admit that there is a tendency to pull
complexity out of the hat whenever a difficulty of comprehension arises” (p. 497). Israel was
referring to Flood and Carson’s 1986 text entitled Dealing with Complexity, which is really more
about a general introduction, written for students, to one specific way of dealing with
complexity: to use ideas concerning a holistic approach, such as that described by the systems
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movement. This review suggests that some leadership theories linked to complexity may be
pulled from the same hat.
Reflection
I have been a public policy practitioner for more than two decades. In that capacity, I
have participated in “leadership” initiatives hosted by public agencies, including stand-alone
two-hour seminars on how to be a transformational, servant, authentic or some other type of
“leader.” These seminars typically touch briefly on leadership styles, but without offering
background on the origins of the theories, context, or limitations to their use in practice. Instead,
I received a checklist of things to do if I wanted to practice a certain brand of “leadership.”
As I advanced to positions of greater influence and began graduate studies, I searched for
leadership theories that might guide me in the work I was performing with respect to change in
the increasingly controversial, and indeed, complex bodies of policy I seem to be drawn to. That
work is not limited to just my organization and internal interactions. My stakeholder base ranges
from legislators and lobbyists to cannabis farmers, law enforcement, and convenience store
owners. Guiding change in this context requires a type of agility and the ability to pivot that did
not seem to be contemplated by, for example, transformational, servant or bureaucratic theories.
Enter complexity leadership theory (CLT). At first blush, it seemed like the answer I was
seeking. It was framed as the outcome of the “entanglement,” meaning the “dynamic relationship
between the formal top-down, administrative forces of an organization (i.e., bureaucracy) and
the informal, complexly adaptive emergent forces (i.e., CAS) of social systems” (Uhl Bien et al.,
2007, p. 298, emphasis original). This interaction would lead the agents of a complex systems to
the edge of chaos. Somehow, from that chaos would emerge new ways of thinking and perhaps
an organization’s best work. This section examines those assertions and the reluctant, and I
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would argue, artificial, metamorphosis of complexity from its scientific origins to being
appended to a leadership theory.
Complexity Leadership Theory
Complexity leadership theory (CLT) was introduced as the leadership answer to what
was characterized as the fluctuating, unpredictable and unsteady atmosphere that comprised
complex organizations of “the knowledge era” (Uhl Bien et al., 2007, p. 298). It was argued that
traditional forms of leadership based on top-down control were “hopelessly out of date” (p. 298)
and did not address the unique needs of complex systems. This was seated in the assertion that
modern-era life, at least in 2007, was exponentially more complex than it had ever been in any
other moment in the history of humankind. Proponents proclaimed that “complexity science
suggested a different paradigm for leadership—one that frames leadership as a complex
interactive dynamic from which adaptive outcomes (e.g., learning, innovation, and adaptability)
emerge” (p. 298).
Although Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001) relied on complexity as a framework for
leadership in complex systems by connecting it to the foundational logic of complexity theory, it
was not to engage the study of complexity, but to revive the study and research of leadership.
We can assume this because they argue that there was a period of disillusionment in the field of
leadership study at the turn of the millennium, and that approaches remained “heavily grounded
in the premise that leadership is impersonal influence” (p. 391). They further assert that
complexity theory offers a more holistic view of leadership by providing “linkages to emergent
structures,” and that “complexity concepts can augment (not replace) our existing approaches
and help move the field forward” (p. 391). While they argue that their research contributes to the
“evolving process of moving complexity study from the arena of metaphor to that of science and
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we operationalize the basic premises of complexity theory” (p. 410), they also “outline a
simplified structure for studying complex leadership” (p. 410, emphasis added). These assertions
speak to the early study of CLT and offer research pathways to extend the theory further. There
is a fundamental flaw, however, in the way that approach and those research pathways are
framed: by trying to simplify, Marion and Uhl-Bien slip into the very structure—the reductionist,
Newtonian approach—that complexity theory questions. A description of how one might
actually engage CLT in practice is not offered, nor is it clear how CLT moves from metaphor to
implementation, or how any of the basic premises of CLT are or could be operationalized.
Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001) also assert that,
In the simplest terms, complexity theory moves away from linear, mechanistic views of
the world, where simple cause and effect solutions are sought to explain physical and
social phenomena, to a perspective of the world as nonlinear and organic, characterized
by uncertainty and unpredictability. (pp. 389–390)
They fashion their argument on the idea that complexity theory focuses leadership on efforts and
behaviors that enable, rather than direct organizational effectiveness through the actions of a
single person identified as a leader. Citing Prigogine when describing the difference between
classical science and complexity theory, they note that the latter sees nature as too unpredictable
to be described by current simple models.
Shifting Scientific Complexity Thinking to Organizational Thinking and Dynamics
As CLT developed and evolved, Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) began to narrow and attempt to
connect CLT to what they observe to be its leadership potential in complex adaptive systems
(CAS). They define CAS as “a basic unit of analysis in complexity science . . . [consisting of]
neural-like networks of interacting, independent agents who are bonded in a cooperative
dynamic for a common goal, outlook, need, etc. . . . [t]hey are capable of solving problems
creatively and are able to learn and adapt quickly” (p. 299). This definition of CAS assumes that
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organizations are free of conflict, and that all individuals and groups within an organization
agree on a common goal. It also assumes that there are no superordinate goals that may cause
organizational division (Tourish, 2019), and that all individuals and groups within the
organization have the same access to knowledge, resources, and most importantly, that power
within the organization is equally balanced.
Even so, Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) introduce the argument that CLT adds a view of
leadership as an emergent, interactive dynamic that produces adaptive outcomes, and they term
this “adaptive leadership” (p. 299), expanding on work largely attributable to Heifetz (1994).
They continue to contrast CLT to previous leadership theories that focus on leaders as
individuals rather than the dynamic, complex systems and processes that they assert can
comprise leadership. Furthermore, they cite Cilliers’ 1998 observations that traditional
approaches to organization have sought to simplify or rationalize the pursuit of adaptation. They
assert that these strategies have led to structures that define fixed boundaries, compartmentalized
organizational responses, and simplified coordination and communication. However, discussion
of the difference between a complex system and a complex adaptive system is completely absent
from their argument for CLT other than asserting that a complex adaptive system is “a basic unit
of analysis” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 314) in CLT. The jump from introducing the basics of
complexity science to CAS is forwarded merely by comparing a CAS to a complicated system,
bypassing any development of parallels or alignment with complexity theory, and thus, CLT
does not sufficiently differentiate between complicated and complex systems. By selecting only
portions of complexity science that fit their model and asserting that CAS are unique and
desirable in their ability to adapt rapidly and creatively to environmental changes, there seems to
be no clear connection to complexity theory. Instead, only the elements of complexity theory that
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are convenient to and support CLT are applied to suggest a connection between CLT and
complexity science.
It is interesting to note that Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey’s 2007 work references
Stacey, Griffin, and Shaw’s text published seven years prior, entitled Complexity and
Management: Fad or Radical Challenge to Systems Thinking? A single reference to Stacey,
Griffin, and Shaw’s text is offered to support their contention that, “Without realizing it, the
inability to move beyond formal leaders and control inherent in traditional bureaucratic mindsets
. . . limits the applicability of mainstream leadership theories for the Knowledge Era” (Uhl-Bien
et al., 2007, p. 301). However, they ignore the multiple sections of text that are critical of
Marion’s positions on emergence and self-organization within systems, including a sub-section
that specifically questions his use of metaphor (such as the microcomputer industry) to describe
interactions between human entities.
The nature of those interactions prompted Stacey to develop a theory of complex
responsive processes (CRP) that focuses on patterns of communication and conversation
(Simpson, 2007). CRP is the first complexity-based theory written specifically about human
thought and communication, in contrast to other complexity theories based on natural or
biological sciences and applied to humans by analogy or metaphor. CRP is reflexive: a social and
psychological process of theorizing organizations as social and psychological processes
(Simpson, 2007). Central to complex responsive processes theory is the notion of relationship,
which is formed, sustained, and developed in responsive processes. Unlike approaches to
complexity that employ systems thinking, like Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey the individual
is not the prime agent of organization: “what organizes itself is themes in conversations” (Stacey,
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2003, p. 311). Organization unfolds in self-organizing processes of communicating. Under
certain conditions this will take the form of “free flowing conversations” (Stacey, 2003, pp.
379–380), which may generate creativity and novelty, and lead to innovation. This is particularly
relevant to my practice, since some of the engagement models I use are based on the
development of theme from dialogue between diverse groups of stakeholders. It is also relevant
to my research, since my methodology is dialogue based.
Simpson (2007) relies on Stacey’s CRP theory “to develop an understanding of how
complexity theory may be applied to an understanding of leadership and organizational
dynamics” (p. 465). This is one of the few case studies in this area of scholarship that
specifically examines how complexity theory informs leadership. Simpson conducted a case
study designed as an organizational simulation. He engaged participants
in a developmental exercise that was part of a two-day residential event using the
outdoors, run with a group of approximately 20 participants. In the exercise, the group
was required to form a temporary organization with the task of engaging a “treasure
hunt” in a range of hills over an area of 12 square miles. The task involved various
problem-solving activities that provided clues for destinations where sub-groups could
find further clues, eventually leading them to the “treasure,” which all members must
reach by a set time. (Simpson, 2007, p. 470)
The most intriguing feature of the simulation was
the manner in which leadership moved around the group. Whilst there were clearly those
who were more prominent as leadership figures, identifiable as “named” characters in the
story and in the formation of an HQ, an overriding characteristic of the group was one of
wide participation in decision-making and leadership. Leadership was exercised by
participants—who were embroiled in the moment-by-moment dynamics of the
organization whilst, simultaneously, able to stand back, reflect upon and then question or
challenge the emerging process. (Simpson, 2007, p. 475)
One of the major implications of the study and of CRP theory was that it is not possible
to develop prescriptions for leaders or organizational design that will guarantee novelty and
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innovation. The leader is a participant, not an objective observer, and must learn to engage in a
learning process as the organization emerges. Simpson (2007) provides that
There are those who wish to use complexity theory to promote the idea that leaders can
control emergence within organizations. Complex responsive processes theory challenges
us to work with awareness closer to that of Socrates, who famously claimed, “I know
nothings except the fact of my ignorance.” (p. 480)
This is critical here because Simpson points out another fatal flaw in CLT: if complexity is the
vehicle leaders use to “control” emergence within organizations, then it really is not complexity
at all. Control = power, and power over a system points us back to Newton.
The concept of controlling emergence as part of complexity in the public policy context
was part of an analysis prepared by Eric Hans Klijn (2008), a professor of public administration.
According to Klijn, complexity theory is really collections of five distinct areas of research. Of
those, the two most important to this review are CAS and dissipative structures. Klijn discusses
the dynamics of dissipative structures when exploring how complexity theories tend to
emphasize that systems are best characterized neither by linear dynamics nor by stable
equilibriums. He explains that dissipative structures refer to new structures formed when systems
move from stability to chaos. This speaks to the interplay between non-linear dynamics,
equilibrium, and emergent patterns. He asserts that concepts around the edge of chaos or
bounded stability are more frequently used in CAS literature emphasizing that systems seem to
be constantly adapting and self-organizing in a zone between order and chaos. He further asserts
that one finds the argument in organizational studies relying on complexity theory that
organizations are most innovative in a zone between order and chaos, while a state of
equilibrium implies death. He relies on Stacey (2003) for support of his position in the same way
that Simpson does.
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This idea regarding organizations being most innovative on the edge of chaos is extended
into the leadership realm. This was accomplished by the introduction of ideas around tension as a
driver of adaptive leadership within CAS which ultimately leads to adaptive organizational
change, although the literature really does not provide a full description of what adaptive change
is. Hazy et al. (2007) argue that because leadership is dynamic, it transcends the acts of
individuals, and is the product of interactions, tensions, and exchange rules governing changes in
perception and understanding. They assert that leadership is not an exogenous event, but rather
“an emergent event, an outcome of relational interactions among agents” (p. 2). With respect to
complex systems, this aligns with Waldrop (1992), Mitchell (2009), and J. Holland (2014).
However, the assertion that from a complex systems perspective, the “logic” of leadership theory
and research is based on an emergent event as opposed to a single person, and that leadership lies
within the interactions of individuals within CAS, including tension as a driver of change seems
to extend the argument in support of CLT. So does the assertion that a complexity view of
leadership suggests a form of “distributed” leadership that does not lie in a person, but rather in
an interactive dynamic, within which any particular person will participate as leader or follower
at different times and for different purposes (Hazy et al., 2007, p. 3).
Uhl-Bien and Marion (2009) explore and attempt to qualify their 2001 assertions
regarding CAS further by stating, “The value of adding a CAS perspective to leadership is that it
offers a paradigm for thinking about leadership from which we can more easily explore issues
that confound us from a traditional view—[including] issues of shared, distributed, collective,
relational, dynamic, emergent, and adaptive responses” (p. 631). Even though these issues are
raised, much discussion concentrates on adaptive response, reviving the assertion from their
2001 article that CAS “function quite productively and adaptively at the edge of chaos” (p. 640).
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More interesting, however, are broadly sweeping, unsupported assertions that adaptive leaders
“tend to have a keen sense of timing” (p. 640) regarding when to take action within CAS on the
edge of chaos, knowing when to leverage tension, inject ideas and information flows, all while
“embracing diversity and being comfortable with divergent and conflicting ideas.” This is one of
the first times that we see Uhl-Bien and Marion offer a hint, albeit vague, of what attributes or
characteristics embody CLT. This keen sense of timing suggests that a someone identified as a
leader has or will control direction of a system.
This directly conflicts with the Hazy et al. (2007) assertion that leadership lies in the
interactions of individuals as opposed to a single person because according to Uhl-Bien and
Marion (2009), only the “adaptive leader” can sense or see interconnectivity and
interdependencies in a system and know when to “inject ideas and information into the system
for it to mull and process” (p. 640). The operative word here is “it,” since this creates a bright
line between the leader and the system—not the individuals within the system. The leadership
activity, then, does not emerge from the interactions of those individuals, but how the leader
controls the system itself to move toward predetermined outcome, and here, that is the edge of
chaos.
Uhl-Bien and Marion (2009) continue discussion and exploration of the ways that
controlled chaos might encourage innovation through the practice of CLT. They assert that CLT
is a way to manage the fundamental tensions in bureaucratic organizations because it
incorporates the notion of “managed chaos” (p. 646) into leadership research by offering a theory
that they believe is grounded in complexity science—a science that they argue is based in
concepts of tension, chaos, and change. Thus, they believe that CLT helps address “a key
challenge for modern day organizational leaders: the need to loosen up the organization—
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stimulating innovation, creativity, responsiveness, and learning to manage continuous adaptation
to change—without losing strategic focus” (p. 646). This paper seems to signal a point in the
research stream where not only the boundaries around adaptation and adaptive leadership begin
to stretch, but CLT theorists are struggling to truly align complexity theory with CLT as a new
form of leadership as opposed to traditional theories of leadership, or management. This is one of
the initial indicators in the research stream suggesting that perhaps complexity has a place
somewhere in the study of leadership, but not as the foundation for a new theory.
From a practitioner’s perspective, this has implications in terms of practical application.
Managed chaos is a theoretical construct that sounds workable from an academic perspective:
there is some sort of invisible switch or spigot that allows someone identifying as a leader to
somehow monitor, gauge, or manage the flow of chaos by reducing the intensity when it
becomes too heavy or letting it expand when a person designated as a leader decides that the
members of a system are ready for it. In and of itself, this suggests that leadership is not really
distributed, as Uhl-Bien and Marion suggest, but there is one all-knowing leader who knows
when and how to do this, even though it is asserted that “leaders cannot control the future (e.g.,
determinism) because in complex systems such as organizations, unpredictable (and sometimes
unexplainable) internal dynamics will determine future conditions” (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001,
p. 391). Instead, “complex leaders need to influence networks” (p. 391).
In reality and practice, there is no way to predict or influence the outcome of systems
interactions. Attempting such a prediction is the diametric opposite of complexity and its
parallels to anti-reductionism. This is particularly true in governmental systems, and even more
so in regulatory systems where the outcomes of interactions within and between regulatory
systems are rarely certain. Consider the context of this research: while I-502 created the
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framework for cannabis legalization in Washington State, there was no way to predict with
absolute accuracy whether the regulations realizing those laws would result in a viable or
sustainable legal cannabis market. There was no way to know whether local authorities would
accept cannabis businesses. There was no way to know whether adolescent cannabis use rates
would skyrocket after legalization or if anyone issued a license to produce and process cannabis
would be successful. There was no way to predict the “green rush” which meant 7,000
individuals applied for a total of almost 2,000 total licenses available for issuance within a
thirty-day window. There was no way to know that cannabis price per gram would plummet after
the first three years of production, nor was there any way to know that arrest rates for Black and
Brown people would actually increase after legalization (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020).
In other words, lawmakers and regulators could not predict any of these outcomes, and to a
degree, still cannot even though federal legalization in the United States is a very real possibility.
This suggests that chaos and complexity are not managed but accommodated by lawmakers and
regulators, not individuals, to guide systems adaptation and change.
Complexity Implied, Not Applied
Trying to make complexity fit in leadership theory and practice was not limited to solely
to ideas around adaptation. Hazy and Uhl-Bien (2014) aptly entitle their piece “Changing the
Rules: Implications of Complexity Science for Leadership Research and Practice” and use it as a
vehicle to introduce complex systems leadership theory (CLST). Relying on their previously
described foundations of CLT, they define complex systems leadership as systems processes that
change the rules of interaction and do so in specific ways that form human interaction dynamics
(HID) into a complex adaptive system in a manner analogous to how physical and biological
interactions are understood as systems. It is unclear how leadership is a part of this definition.
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They theorize, as in their previous work, that just as complexity has become an overarching
theoretical paradigm in the natural sciences, it is also serving as the basis for a paradigm shift in
the social sciences, particularly in the areas of leadership and organizational studies. By shifting
the focus from the individual to the organizing process itself, “a key value of complexity is its
strong implications for practice” (p. 710).
However, there is nothing offered in this piece that connects any of the assertions to
practice, and this seems to be how CLT is framed to this point in the literature—it is implied but
not applied. The authors do distinguish CLST from CLT by framing how organizations evolve
through variation, selection, and retention over many generations, and learn to adapt within a
single organization. Hazy and Uhl-Bien (2014) offer that under certain exogenous constraints, a
changing system of “fine-grained interactions can cause the emergent coarse-grained properties
that are observed to undergo a qualitative transformation in coarse-grained patterns and
structures” (p. 713). They further offer another natural science metaphor—the phased transition
of liquid to gas—as an insight for leadership researchers and conclude by asserting that there are
implications for practice, but that “the magnitude of the challenge is daunting” (p. 727),
bypassing filling in the blanks on what those implications are or could be. Interestingly, CLT is
only briefly discussed as a research lens.
The behavior of a complex system is inherently difficult to model because there are so
many dependencies, competitions, relationships, or other types of interactions between their parts
or between a given system and its environment. In contrast, and as noted above, a complex
adaptive system is more concerned with the interconnectedness of the systems. It is a model of a
special case of a complex system: one that exhibits the capacity to change and learn from
experience. This is achieved through the interaction of agents that learn and adapt “in response to
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interactions with other agents” (J. Holland, 2014, p. 8). It’s important to highlight here that
although agents are recognized as part of the system, discussion of agency itself is not part of the
narrative. I examine this absence more deeply in Chapter V. These elements, or lack thereof in
the case of agency, can be directly linked to the complexity of regulatory environment that
frames this research. The interactions and behaviors between the multiple parts of the
system—the competitive market, dependencies between producers, processors and retailers, and
the relationships between these entities and regulators—are difficult to model because they are
unique to each legalized state and new as an overall regulatory structure. These relationships,
interactions and interconnectedness, and their evolutionary process cannot be described or
reduced by a metaphor of liquid to gas. Perhaps that metaphor could be broadly applied to macro
level activities of the system. However, it completely ignores—and I will argue below that this
comes from a place of epistemological privilege—micro level activities. This is critical to the
present research because this is where social equity starts to become drowned out by privileged
discourse.
The Limitations of Complexity Leadership Theory
This “new science” of leadership where complexity leadership found itself was connected
to the notion that the world is more complex than it has ever been, demanding leadership that can
navigate wicked problems and unprecedented turbulence in non-traditional ways. Uhl-Bien
(2021) suggests that in this extraordinarily complex era, these problems become “adaptive
challenges” or “complexity pressures” (p. 1401) although the description of such problems bear a
striking resemblance to Rittel and Webber (1973) and Crowley and Head’s (2017) definition of a
wicked problem:
Complexity begins in organizations as pressures, often in the form of an adaptive
challenge—a problem for which a) there is no known solution, b) people must work
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together in new partnerships who haven’t worked together before, c) these partnerships
are characterized by conflicting views (i.e., high heterogeneity), and d) agents have high
interdependence such that, in extreme cases, they must adapt together or they will die.
(Uhl‐Bien & Arena, 2017, underlining added)
When COVID‐19 hit we saw these complexity pressures everywhere, in the need to
socially distance, pressures on governments to lock down, forced school and restaurant
closures, safety concerns driving employees to work from home, and healthcare systems
around the world scrambling for limited resources, including testing kits, ventilators and
personal protective equipment (PPE). (Uhl-Bien, 2021, p. 1401, italics original)
The elevator speech was that organizations of the time were somehow falling short and
needed to remain competitive in what were deemed to be increasingly competitive global
markets, fast-moving information streams, and interconnectedness in ways never seen or
experienced before. Absent from these assertions, however, is any statement of fact or evidence
to support the position that we experience the world more complexly than we have before. It is
fair to assert that every theory used to understand human organization has been based on
ontological and epistemological assumptions that at the same time reflected and informed
challenges at each historical period. While current challenges may be different, the question of
whether they are truly more complex is ignored in the literature. Tourish (2019) contends that the
rhetoric of complexity leadership is not evidenced and offers that “[i]t is the conceit of each new
generation to imagine that the problems it faces are more challenging, more rapid, and more
complex than those who that rose in earlier times” (p. 225). Indeed, Grint (2022) provides that
the divisions made by problem categories, such as tame and wicked, are dependent on the
categories that made a wicked problem wicked. Arguably, this logic could be extended to the
assertion that we experienced or are experiencing a much more complex world during the
“knowledge era” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 299), and citing Hitt (1998) “we are on the precipice
of an epoch, in the midst of a new economic era” (p. 299). If that is true, we have collectively
been holding on for almost 24 years.
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Additionally, emergence does not appear to be the result of the process of interactions,
but takes place during the process of interactions (Schindehutte & Morris, 2009). Going back to
Newton once again, reductionists can explain the interactions on the part of individual agents but
not the whole, which on one hand limits epistemological emergence (Waldrop, 1992), and as
noted previously, do so without paying attention to agency. Epistemic emergence is the idea that
some systems cannot be described, as a matter of practice, in terms of their component units
because of the limits to our knowledge, or in other words, our inability to obtain all relevant
information and to do the math (Van Gulick, 2001). In contrast, systems thinking’s holistic
paradigm downplays the role of intentional action between individual agents and can only
explain activity on a global level (Schindehutte & Morris, 2009).
These limitations, and the preceding brief analysis moves us to an assessment of how
complexity theory informs—or fails to inform—leadership theory.
Theoretical Critique
Three distinct themes emerged in evaluating how complexity theory informs leadership
theory. They are:
1. Reliance on metaphor as evidence.
2. The practice of complexity leadership is implied but not applied.
3. Critique of epistemological privilege.
Each of these is discussed in the following sections.
Reliance on Metaphor as Evidence
Waldrop (1992) offers wisdom from his interview with Brian Arthur, one of the founders
of the Santa Fe Institute, that
If you truly have a complex system . . . then the exact patterns are not repeatable. And
yet, there are themes that are unrecognizable. In history, for example, you can talk about
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‘revolutions,’ even though one revolution might be quite different from another. So, we
assign metaphors. It turns out an awful lot of policymaking has to do with finding the
appropriate metaphor. Conversely, bad policymaking almost always involves finding
inappropriate metaphors. For example, it may not be appropriate to think about a drug
‘war’ with guns and assaults. (p. 334)
But it was that very drug “war” that led to the disproportionate incarceration of Black and Brown
people, and that metaphor was used as the foundation for statutory and regulatory frameworks
for cannabis legalization, as in a “tightly” regulated system. Indeed, even referring to problems
as “wicked” suggests something either completely fabulous or entirely dreadful. Which side of
metaphoric interpretation one falls on depends largely on worldview, and yet it is that very
interpretation that can result in policy and regulatory success or abysmal failure. In context of the
present research, the war on drugs has been the latter.
Let us step back for a moment and touch on worldview because it is important here. This
literature review has not discussed or explored it until now, because a philosophical discussion of
worldview could have veered the present analysis toward a long (and likely irrelevant) detour.
However, “many of the papers Hazy and Uhl-Bien cite as empirical studies in support of their
view do not actually rely on complexity theory as an underlying argument” (Rosenhead et al.,
2019, p. 17), and instead, they rely on complexity as metaphor. To understand the wobbliness of
that reliance, and how that informs the direction of the present research, I look to Pepper’s 1942
root metaphor theory, which is grounded in worldview. Rosenhead et al. (2019) distill the rather
conceptually large root metaphor theory in this user-friendly way: “people, including theorists,
use metaphors to fundamentally shape the way we interpret empirical data and therefore see the
world” (p. 18). Rosenhead et al. (2019) also aptly defines CLT as,
A stream of research which generally claims to study leadership based on consequences
arising from the science of complexity theory itself or developed with complexity theory
deployed as a root metaphor to drive a shift from a world hypothesis based on the
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dominant integrative/ analytic mechanistic Weltanschauung [worldview] towards one that
values integrative/synthetic organicism. (p. 21)
Indeed, Stacey famously offered that “For us, the complexity sciences are a source domain of
abstract relationships from which we believe it is possible to derive insights about human
interaction by way of analogy (Stacey et al., 2000, p. 191). In other words, the CLT relies on
complexity science to justify its opposition to reductionism. At the same time, CLT relies on
complexity science as metaphor to frame a “simplified” (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 410)
leadership formula that if followed, will reduce or eliminate organizational instability, even
though Stacey et al. (2000) and Pollitt (2009) warn us that complexity concepts should either be
carefully applied or not applied at all in theories of organizational change. Neither mentions
leadership.
These factors suggest that Prigogine’s definition of complexity—that it is the property of
a system—may better serve to inform and nest the present research in its attempt to qualitatively
enhance “the richness and vividness of complexity and indeterminacy faced by organizational
subjects practicing leadership” (Rosenhead et al., 2019, p. 20).
The Practice of Complexity in Leadership Is Implied but Not Applied
The literature reviewed here lacked solid linkage between CLT and the actual practice, or
the actual action of leadership. This is true where complexity is implied in public administration
scholarship as well, where Pollitt (2009) notes, “What is missing . . . was an identification and
elaboration on the specific causal processes or mechanisms” (p. 227). Previously I described
realities concerning the instabilities and chaos that are part of day-to-day governmental
regulatory practice. However, the literature suggests that practitioners can manage that instability
and chaos in a constructive way with the previously noted “keen sense of timing” (Uhl-Bien &
Marion, 2009, p. 640) that will lead to innovation. There are no verifiable instances of decisions,
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practices, policies, or structures that are demonstrably different from what they would have
otherwise been (Rosenhead et al., 2019). There is additional literature that was not reviewed here
that may represent “illustrations” of complexity thinking, but the behavior studied, and
experience analyzed is used “retrospectively as anecdotal validation for the relevance of
complexity theory at work” (Rosenhead et al., 2019, p. 19). Pollitt (2009) refers to these as the
“paper tigers” that are often set up to compare an older theory with one that is newer that is being
offered as “obviously superior” (p. 223). This is true of McKelvey’s 2010 retrospective analysis
of former GE (General Electric) President Jack Welch. To briefly summarize, McKelvey paints a
rear-view mirror portrait of Welch’s leadership style as that of an unwitting complexity scientist,
even though it ultimately lead to GE’s demise (McKelvey, 2010).
This absence of any observed application of complexity leadership theory situates the
present research as it relates to the actual practice of leadership in complex regulatory systems.
Do these leaders truly possess the extraordinary qualities that complexity leadership scholars
assert are necessary to lead a complex system or organization? This research puts that assertion
to an empirical test.
Critique of Epistemological Privilege
From my perspective, the undertone of privilege pervaded much of this literature review.
I offer a critique of that privilege because it plays a foundational role in situating the present
research. To illustrate how this theme is realized in both leadership and governmental contexts, I
turn to the 1996 South African Constitution. It has been opined that this document is based on
the legal philosophy of “the conqueror,” or the “so called right of conquest” (Ramose, 2018, p.
338). I would also note that it is argued that a similar philosophy formed the basis of the United
States Declaration of Independence, as well (Hannah-Jones et al., 2021). This right of conquest
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means that an outsider dominates or conquers the original inhabitants of a land or space, and I
would argue that this extends beyond just tangible, or physical space. In South Africa, the
dominance of this paradigm led to the total exclusion of Ubuntu philosophy, or the idea that a
common bond exists between all people and through this bond, through interaction with other
human beings, people discover their human qualities (Ramose, 2018). I view this conqueror
paradigm as a dimension of epistemic injustice and assert that it demonstrates how the
assumption of epistemological privilege by a handful of individuals in power can and does
subordinate the values and beliefs of, in the case of South Africa, the majority of the indigenous
population. Ramose (2018) offers that continuing epistemicide feeds on the delusory racial
superiority experienced in South Africa. I believe this is true in the United States. I recognize
that the assertion of this belief may cause some reader discomfort. I believe, however, that this
discomfort is long overdue when contrasted to the centuries-old tradition of racism in the United
States which formed the basis of, among other things, Jim Crow laws and practices. If we look
closely at those laws and practices, the term “Jim Crow” that is relied upon to justify them is a
sanitized name for apartheid (Hannah-Jones et al., 2021; Wilkerson, 2020).
I will not attempt to ease that discomfort because it speaks to how we might examine
epistemic privilege. I will, however, offer that one consider the context in which the present
research exists, because doing so begins to chip away at long-held beliefs and the perception that
some are entitled to epistemic privilege. For example, cannabis legalization, framed by
privileged, and enjoyed largely by white, well-capitalized males, was designed to regulate a
previously illicit and weaponized substance that disproportionately impacted communities of
color. The victims of that weaponization did not participate in regulatory formation, nor were
they offered the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the profits of legalization.
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Furthermore, the cultural aspects of how the substance was traditionally used—including
medicinal and spiritual applications—were largely extinguished after legalization as the product
became pharmaceuticalized in white owned production, processing, and retail facilities. In
simple terms, cannabis was whitewashed after legalization, resulting in Black and Brown
exclusion from the regulated market because privileged white producers were able to strengthen
barriers to market entry. In other words, they came, they conquered, and it can be argued that
they generally appropriated an industry that existed in communities of color and in the medical
cannabis space for years.
To extend this concept further, the common purpose in championing complexity to
inform leadership has parallels to that of the conqueror paradigm: a leader is believed to have an
ability to determine the best course of action in an environment deemed to be “complex,” but in
doing so, is free from acknowledging any power dynamics, human interactions, or human value
recognition. Such a leader assumes that the agents within that complex system experience the
system it in the same way the leader does. Such a leader also assumes that the agents within the
system share, without question, his/hers/their worldview. There is no discussion of knowledge
democracy. There is no mention of diversity, inclusion, social equity, belonging, or the inherent
tension and power dynamics between leaders, followers, or any other part of the system.
I now turn this critique toward myself because this section would be incomplete without
acknowledgement of my own epistemological privilege. My personal and professional
experiences influence the knowledge I hold, why I hold it, and whether I am receptive to new
forms of knowledge and differing perspectives. In this sense, epistemic privilege describes the
knowledge I have that others might not. In contrast, consider the concept of epistemic humility,
which speaks more to what we don’t know consistent with the Simpson (2007) reference to
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Socrates above (as in, all I do know is that I know nothing). While I can appreciate and
acknowledge the privilege I hold, it is by virtue of that privilege that I turn to epistemic humility
to conduct this research. That pivot is critically important to this work. If I do not honor and
recognize the epistemic privilege of the marginalized groups interviewed as part of this research
and those that I may not have the opportunity to interview, particularly those impacted most by
the war on drugs, I run the risk of overwriting narratives and stories with my own or other voices
that traditionally dominate these narratives. This is not a new phenomenon, and I will discuss the
tension it creates more fully in Chapters V and VI. This recognition, however, reminds me to pay
equal attention to all the voices telling the story of cannabis legalization as part of my reflexive,
critical research approach described in the next chapter.
This backdrop helps to further position the present research by forming the basis of
exploration around the contours of cannabis regulation, drawing out and further examining what
role and to what extent epistemological privilege played in the creation of regulatory frameworks
for cannabis, with an emphasis on the overall impact that privilege had on creating, or not
creating socially equitable conditions.
Conclusion
This review offered a multidimensional, textured analysis of the ways that complexity is
experienced, implied, and theorized. It was then contextualized for this research.
To that end, the literature identified what wicked problems are in the realm of public
policy and regulatory systems. There was an absence of literature, however, suggesting strategies
to resolve or abate wicked, complex problems, including problems of equity. This absence
situates the goals of this research, and points to implications for further exploration that are
realized in one of the overarching research questions of this study: how complexity is engaged
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and experienced in regulatory systems from the perspectives of practitioners on the front lines of
cannabis regulation. This research may contribute to a better understanding of the ways that
complex problems—such as regulating cannabis—are practically addressed. It takes that
question one step further by adding dimensions of social justice inquiry in an effort to better
understand how complex regulatory construction can lead to socially equitable conditions.
Additionally, literature speaking explicitly to what complexity is and how it is
experienced by practitioners or organizations was largely absent from this review. In other
words, it is unclear how one might “do” complexity (Pollitt, 2009). Complexity was abundantly
theorized as a leadership approach in which “a very few special people resemble super-heroes”
(Tourish, 2019, p. 40). These are heroes, however, who complexity scholars heartily and robustly
assert are not practicing heroic leadership because the modern age of rapid information transfer
and knowledge moves too fast for such an antiquated approach. In this way, it is offered as both
an add-on or compliment to other leadership approaches. It is also offered stand-alone answer to
dealing with organizations, people, and systems identified as complex, but needing guidance to
become less complex . . . at least temporarily while some managed chaos is somehow added to
the mix. This is then linked to the various notions of control expressed in the literature, which are
the antithesis of complexity itself, but offered in the literature as an explicit, yet ambiguous
feature of complexity leadership.
This literary backdrop nests the present research in its exploration of the dimensions of
complexity, including its epistemology and ontology, and supports the idea that complexity is a
characteristic, rather than a construct or something to be controlled. It also situates the research
question concerning what the practice of leadership looks like when engaging with complexity or
complex systems. The answer to that question contributes to the absence of empirical research
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around whether complexity can be applied as a leadership construct as suggested—but never
demonstrated—in the literature, whether it is a system characteristic or something else entirely.
If it is a characteristic, the present research will begin to explore the dimensions and textures of
the ways that individuals identified as leaders interact with it.
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CHAPTER III: METHOD
When both scientific and alternative ways of thinking reach a limit in their capacity to
fully comprehend complex social situations, participatory action research can offer a
methodology that opens up new insights and strategies for change.
—Thomas Stern, Participatory Action Research
and the Challenges of Knowledge Democracy
This chapter describes a participatory action research method that supports both research
objectives described in Chapter I. Aligning with the epistemological position of this work, this
method allows exploration of the ways complex macro and micro systems coexist by connecting
a broader range of knowledge as described in Chapter II. The method accomplishes this by
creating a unique framework that will help me to craft a “jointly told tale” (Kleiner & Roth,
1996) of cannabis legalization through the lived experiences of two regulatory agencies. At the
same time, that mutually crafted story will help to describe the characteristics and contours of
change in complex regulatory systems.
Learning history is defined as a participatory action research approach designed to
explore and foster learning in organizations (Bradbury et al., 2015; Kleiner & Roth, 1996; Roth
& Bradbury, 2013). The learning history methodology operates with an epistemology that is
“quite different from normal science,” in that it includes an initial layer of analysis focused
solely on iterative participant reflection, and a secondary layer of analysis that includes
“enfolding of theory” (Bradbury, 1998, p. 61). For these reasons, the learning history approach
has significant potential for this work since it is focused on both capturing experience and
enhancing theoretical understanding of complex regulatory systems.
In this chapter, I will begin with a background on learning history as a research model.
Then I will explain why it is the most appropriate research method for this work, followed by a
description of the research design. I then move to situating myself as a researcher in context
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because my relationship to the subject matter is unique, and I conclude with a brief discussion of
limitations.
What Is Learning History?
Learning history is a type of action research that is “well adapted to complex issues”
(Gearty et al., 2015, p. 46), such as cannabis legalization and the subsequent creation of
frameworks to regulate it. Action research engages participants and stakeholders as
co-researchers often through cycles of action and reflection, so that all involved can contribute
both to the questions that will be addressed and to the actions that inform the research (Gearty et
al., 2015).
Since the early work of Lewin (1951), action research projects have typically been local
and often intensely focused on small groups of actors, or single projects generating a response to
a convening problem. However, when issues are complex, “local responses” do not necessarily
have application in a broader context (Gearty et al., 2015, p. 47). Gustavsen (2003) offers that we
broaden the singular project research view and look at a number of projects simultaneously to
compare, add, and learn from differences. Learning history accomplishes that in a unique and
customizable way.
Learning history is an action research practice that is both a process and a product
(Bradbury et al., 2015; Roth & Bradbury, 2013). The learning history methodology facilitates
integration of both action and reflection (Bradbury & Mainemelis, 2001; Gearty, 2009; Gearty et
al., 2015). The goal of learning history is to capture and share what an innovating group, or
collection of groups have learned (Bradbury et al., 2015).
Bradbury and Mainemelis (2001) offer that the content and process design of the learning
history is drawn from several theories. These include theories of learning that emphasize the
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importance of integrating reflection, action, and social construction of reality. These also include
theories that emphasize the importance of history as an informant of organizational awareness,
learning, and preferred action. Roth and Bradbury (2013) have built on those theoretical streams,
and offer four elements that create the design criteria, regardless of whether the learning history
is bounded (closed) or unbounded (open):
•

Multiple stakeholders design around “notable” accomplishments. In my context,
“notable” means noteworthy, or significant outcomes important to the organizations.

•

Insider/outsider team members lead reflective interviews in a way that combines
practice and scholarship with practitioners (e.g., managers or local leaders) and as
appropriate, working with consultants/change agents, and collaborating researchers.

•

Distillation and thematic writing/presentation completed by the researcher (referred to
as the Learning Historian)

•

Validation and diffusion with original participants individually and in the presence of
others (Roth & Bradbury, 2013).

In combining these elements, the learning history exemplifies many of the dimensions that action
researchers find important: it is participant driven, it is collaborative, it leads to change and the
improvement of practice, not just knowledge itself, and it is context specific.
Gearty (2009) described how learning history brings narrative and participatory
approaches together in a new way to “articulate a fresh methodological approach that has
relevance for learning in any field of connected organizations” (p. 7). This resonates with me
based on the interconnectedness of the regulated cannabis market, regulators, and others,
overlaid by the complexity of guiding statute and regulation. Of importance here is the assertion
that, “the impediments to change lay not with the technology [being studied] itself but with a
complex interlock of human, organizational and systemic factors” (p. 9). This aligns exactly with
my research goals: to understand the dimensions of systems interactions beyond the systems
themselves. One point of departure, however, is that Gearty sought to embed herself in the
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organization she studied. In contrast, I am already embedded in the organization that I wish to
study, and this presents some challenges I will explore later in this chapter.
Gearty (2009) further expands on interconnectedness by offering that learning history can
help researchers “to understand how more connected learning between innovative projects might
occur at the systems level” (p. 12). And, while reiterating the reflective process of learning
history, Gearty focuses on the later stages of the process that pay attention to the “pragmatics of
working with that history with participants to maximize learning from it” (p. 12). This is
important, because she notes that the process seeks to “re-humanize” action research, but
cautions that by virtue of the human element, the outcome of a learning history may not be
predictable. Yet, it is that very element of learning history that makes it “action research’s
answer to case study” (Gearty, 2009, p. 15). “Whereas case study will analyze an event in an
objective way, learning history revels in the messy human story of that event” (p. 15, emphasis
added).
Learning History, Collaborative Inquiry, and Cooperative Inquiry Compared
Learning history has much in common with other forms of research (Gearty & Coghlan,
2018), belonging to a “family of experienced based, action-oriented inquiry strategies . . . with
different names and slightly varying profiles” (Yorks & Kasl, 2002, p. 4). Learning history
builds on these strategies and to an extent, contains elements of each. For example, “cooperative
inquiry involves two or more people researching a topic through their own experience of it, using
a series of cycles in which they move between [an]experience and reflect together on it. Each
person is co-subject in the experience phases and co-researcher in the reflection phases” (Heron,
1996, p. 1). Similarly, Desmond (2019) offers that, “The fundamental aim of collaborative
inquiry is to develop new understanding with and by others that reflect the lived experience of
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participants in [a research] group” (p. 59). Like learning history, collaborative inquiry offers
learnings, rather than findings, along with participant reflection and co-creation. Like learning
history, the focus of both collaborative and cooperative inquiry is learning, and researching with
and by people, rather than on people. Even though collaborative and cooperative inquiry are
frequently identified as being the same and associated with each other, there are points of
departure, albeit nuanced and historically based.
Yorks and Kasl (2002) assert that they “chose the term collaborative inquiry in 1991 at a
time when many labels were being used for action research” (p. 4, emphasis original). Although
based on the then emerging idea of cooperative inquiry, they note that collaborative inquiry is
geared toward peers or groups of peers such as teaching professionals. According to Bray et al.
(2000), as cited in Yorks and Kasl (2002), collaborative inquiry is “a systematic process [for
learning from personal experience] consisting of repeated episodes of reflection and action
through which a group of peers strives to answer a question of importance to them” (p. 4). More
recent literature supports this notion, providing that collaborative inquiry continues to be framed
as “a multidimensional peer inquiry that crosses methodological boundaries” (Hanlin-Rowney et
al., 2006, p. 323), and can be used as a tool for knowledge generation and “empowerment for
those who expertise is often not recognized and validated as ‘proper’ knowledge” (Chowns,
2008, p. 568).
However, in cooperative inquiry, researchers are identified as the subjects of their
research, and the outcomes are typically answers to “real world problems that people face in dayto-day-living” (Hanlin-Rowney, et al., 2006, p. 322). Heron and Reason (2008) offer that
Cooperative inquiry is a form of action research in which all participants work together in
an inquiry group as co-researchers and as co-subjects. Everyone is engaged in the design
and management of the inquiry; everyone gets into the experience and action that is being
explored; everyone is involved in making sense and drawing conclusions; thus everyone
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involved can take initiative and exert influence on the process. This is not research on
people or about people, but research with people. (p. 366)
In contrast, learning histories were developed to capture, assess, and diffuse learning and
change initiatives with more of an organizational focus (Roth & Bradbury, 2013). The goal of
the learning history is to capture what an innovating group has learned that can be transferred to
other groups and organizations. The process involves convening salient stakeholders, and
sometimes outside participants, and is generally conducted by “outside learning historians who
work with insiders in an organization, developing their inquiry skills and establishing processes
that enable and support organizational reflection” (Roth & Bradbury, 2013, p. 350). learning
history also produces an artifact that can be used to diffuse learning and help the organization
change and grow. I discuss the importance of the artifact and my unique position as an insider
learning historian later in this chapter.
Origin of Learning History
As previously noted in Chapter I, the early 1990s found a group of researchers at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Center for Organizational Learning interested in
learning from experience. Bradbury et al. (2015) note that, “Their efforts were focused on
supporting organizational development” (p. 3), and in fact, Roth was one of these original MIT
researchers. Initially, learning histories were used within “business units” (Bradbury et al., 2015,
p. 3) to memorialize innovation, and manage organizational knowledge. Those learning histories
were then shared throughout an organization, and eventually with other organizations. These
organizations became to be identified as “learning organizations,” defined as places where
“people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and
expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspirations are set free, and where
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people are continually learning how to learn together” (Senge, 2006, p. 3). Thus, the learning
organization was the original context for learning histories (Bradbury et al., 2015).
The shift from learning within individual business units to cross or multiple
organizational learning also produced a new understanding of learning histories that
distinguished bounded, or closed systems from unbounded, or open systems learning histories
(Bradbury et al., 2015, citing Gearty, 2009; Gearty et al., 2015). For example, Bradbury’s 1998
dissertation describes how closed learning history was used to study the leaders of a Swedish
environmental organization called The Natural Step, creating some of the initial contours in the
development of the learning history methodology. Speaking to the way that the methodology
supports organizational learning, Bradbury offers:
A learning history is a tool whose goal is to help an organization become aware of its
own learning and change efforts (Roth & Kleiner, 1997). It does this primarily by
offering an opportunity for reflection to people whose work life does not allow this. Its
content comes from the people who initiated, implemented and participated in the
original change efforts as well as nonparticipants who were affected by them. The
learning history is a written document (or series of writings) which makes extensive use
of participants’ own narratives, as well as outsiders’ assessments of the story. (Bradbury,
1998, p. 51, emphasis added)
As Bradbury notes, the learning history culminates in an engaging document that does
not intimidate or alienate people who are not involved in academic research. This speaks to its
applicability in my context. While the process and outcome bears some resemblance to
consultative approaches in that it results an artifact that serves primarily to anchor active,
dynamic conversation, it is not designed to capture static truth. This fits perfectly with the
dynamic, multidimensional systems that are the subject of this research.
The Learning History Artifact
The artifact is a critical, distinguishing feature of learning histories. Bradbury describes
the initial manuscript of a learning history in two columns—one of interviewee narrative, and the
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other of researcher reflections and commentary. This approach follows “grounded theory
building” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) through “open” and “axial coding,” allowing “subthemes in
an overarching joint narrative” to be identified (Bradbury, 1998, p. 287). This also “offers a way
to contextualize” the “qualitative analysis so that it may avoid the appearance of relying on the
quotations that suit the researcher’s predetermined expectations” (p. 287).
It is at this point that the methodology departs from traditional case study and moves into
actionable learning because the initial manuscript is shared with participants, not only to validate
findings, but to promote research participant learning through reflection. In this way, the
methodology allows the learning historian to go beyond case study and move into actionable
learning that is co-created by participants. This jointly told tale does not stop at merely
describing and analyzing actions but dives more deeply into the thinking behind those actions,
and potential pathways forward.
Thus, learning history action research is designed to work with change. So, rather than
stopping at being the change, the methodology can actually move the researcher into doing the
change with research participants, in service to the tradition of participatory action research. This
aligns with the present research goals.
I conducted a learning history pilot project in preparation for this research. The pilot
allowed me to test the methodology in a limited way to determine whether it would achieve what
I hoped it would, and whether I had any skill or ability to use it. It represents the tale of how two
colleagues experienced the passage of I-502 and its subsequent implementation. I conducted
initial interviews that lasted about two hours each, followed by approximately two weeks of
intense distillation and finalization after participants reviewed interview transcripts. Validation
was conducted on an individual level as opposed to in a group. Wider learning, in the sense that
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wider learning meant I would share the artifact with the entire agency, did not occur since the
pilot did not dip as deeply into the subject matter as I knew my dissertation work would. For
these reasons, along with time limitations and a purposely narrow project scope, the learning
history artifact was abbreviated.
Even when tested in abbreviated form, I learned that this methodology is extremely—and
this is not in any way an exaggeration—powerful methodology that truly gets at the “messy” bits
of human experience in ways I did not expect. I also did not realize until I tried it that I had any
talent at all for the type of interviewing that learning histories require, and I completely
underestimated myself. My legal background (think, for example, deposition preparation and
attendance) coupled with years of stakeholder group facilitation in multiple venues was brought
to bear. I was reminded of attorneys I previously worked with who would “send” me in if they
needed a client to share bits of a story that were uncomfortable or embarrassing, or they wanted
something from opposing counsel that the attorney wasn’t able to obtain. This is not offered as
self-aggrandizement, but as a demonstration of the art and importance of interview as dialogue,
rather than interrogation. I learned and experienced that the former is one of the elements that
makes learning history work. If there had not been a deadline attached to the project, I likely
would have spent significantly more time on distillation and finalization because the interview
material was so rich, and more themes emerged than I anticipated.
The artifact produced as a result of this research is constructed similarly, and I expanded
the scope of the artifact in ways I was not able to in the pilot. For example, I did not specifically
ask pilot participants questions that would prompt discussion or reflection around social equity at
the time of legalization, even though participant world view was evident in responses. Similarly,
I did not concentrate on or ask questions that would prompt response on how the complexity of
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the regulatory structure, the authorizing environment, or anything else was experienced. Rather, I
added observations that I entitled “Through a Complexity Lens” under each significant
sub-section that focused more on the system as it changed rather than how the participants
navigated it. While this gave me a brief opportunity to apply some of the theoretical constructs of
complexity theory, it did not contemplate testing leadership theories based on notions of
complexity in those subsections. Here, I had that opportunity.
I want to highlight and underscore how social equity has impacted discussion around
cannabis equity reform since the time I conducted the pilot project. The word “marijuana” was
used throughout the pilot artifact. Since the time that document was prepared, WSLCB and
others across the nation have acknowledged the derogatory, racist connotations of the word. In
fact, as I write, Washington State’s Governor, Jay Inslee, just signed House Bill 1210 that
changes all references in Washington State law from “marijuana” to “cannabis.” Thus, even
though the pilot was merely a “practice run,” it serves as a real-time example of where we have
been, and how far we have come as a society since I began this work.
While the final artifact of this work in some ways resembles the pilot and its artifact, it is
truly much more dynamic, rich, and comprehensive. The difference between the pilot and this
work is that I was not restrained by a deadline or any other time limitation. I was able to
carefully tend to the story as it unfolded, in the time and with the attention it needed to be told.
That is the beauty of the method.
Methodological Fit
Bradbury (1998) asserts that learning history “[is] predicated on the belief that
methodological processes ought to be philosophically congruent with the study at hand” (p. 50).
I agree with Bradbury’s thinking as to methodological selection. That agreement also extends to
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three methodological imperatives “operating simultaneously in a learning history: the research
imperative which seeks to be loyal to the data; the pragmatic, which seeks to be loyal to the
audience who will hopefully seek to create or improve their own practice; and the mythic, which
seeks to be loyal to telling a compelling story” (Bradbury, 1998, p. 52). Why do these
methodological imperatives matter here?
In discussing methodological imperatives, Danziger (1985) offered that “[if] we enjoy
contemplating science as though it were a finished edifice, we can limit ourselves to its theories
and observations. But if we regard it rather as an ongoing work of construction, we cannot really
ignore the scaffolding of procedures” (p. 1). In the research context, scaffolding, or
methodological procedure, produces observation. And methodological procedure can also serve
as a “repository of explicit and implicit theoretical assumptions” (p. 1). Consequently, it is
possible for the relationship between observation and theory to be facilitated by methodological
assumptions. If those assumptions are designed only to test theoretical claims, then researchers
may not be able to dramatize a theory to explore its implications. It is within that dramatization
that the unexpected can emerge (Hunt & Vipond, 1991). This is important to the present research
because it explores the characteristics of regulatory systems. In the context of cannabis
legalization, this method will allow me to dramatize, or in other words, attempt to adapt and
apply complexity in that field and unpack its implications, while at the same time co-creating a
story of how that complexity was experienced.
From a practical perspective, learning history suits the present research because the
artifact can be used for policy, as well as for regulatory development and growth. This is of
critical importance to US States who have just joined the ranks of cannabis legalization. These
States continuously look to early adopters, such as Washington and Oregon, for guidance and
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assistance. Since it is likely that the United States is only a few years away from removing
cannabis from the list of Schedule I drugs, the artifact may serve a useful purpose in that effort.
The Open Systems Approach
Learning history practice provides both a philosophical and methodological basis for
addressing issues related to how organizational learning is captured, shared, and acted upon.
With respect to the present research, “Open systems learning histories follow stories than extend
beyond a single organization and move into action and systems issues, structured by the network
of relationships between multiple constituent organizations, agencies and individuals” (Bradbury
et al., 2015, p 3). This differs from the bounded learning history approach where the organization
being studied is “bounded by the network of relationships from which the original [research]
project arose” (Gearty et al., 2015, p. 46). Gearty et al. (2015) offer the following table (Table
3.1) contrasting the characteristics of bounded and open systems learning history approaches:
Thus, “the location of learning in the ‘open system’ contrasts with the bounded learning
history in that it is explicitly at multiple levels—within the originating organizations of the
learning histories and also within the ecology of organizations and networks that relate in some
way to the subject at hand” (Gearty et al., 2015, p. 51). This aligns with both the context and
overarching goals of the present research.
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Table 3.1
Bounded and Open Learning History Approaches

Note: From Gearty, M., Bradbury-Huang H., & Reason, P., 2015, Management Learning, 46(1),
p. 52. Copyright 2015 by SAGE Publications, Ltd. Reprinted with permission.

Applicability
From a functional perspective, Kleiner and Roth (1996) and Gearty (2014) offer that
learning histories are labor intensive and can be expensive. Even though a small project can be
captured with two- or three-days’ worth of interviewing, the distillation and validation process
can take a significant amount of time. This was the case with my pilot project, and occurred here,
as well. Even so, the process results in a history of practices and experiences that goes beyond
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"best practices" to show not just what people did, but what they were thinking, what assumptions
they made, how they came to their decisions, what others thought about their actions, and how
they expect to move forward. Instead of merely copying the best practices of others, people who
read learning histories can be equipped to develop their own best practices, and the process itself
can build or continue to build actionable knowledge among organizations. This is so relevant
here because the actionable knowledge of Washington, Colorado, and Oregon can not only serve
to inform and set direction for each states future regulatory direction, but may also inform the
regulatory efforts of states entering the legalized cannabis space.
This method aligned perfectly with my research interest and applies to the context of this
research in at least three ways:
First, the learning history model extends and expands on some of my existing stakeholder
engagement models by helping me tease out, understand, and make space for agencies and other
to share—in their own words—how people within or connected to specific organizations engage,
or interact with complexity and complex systems in cannabis regulation. The model will allow
these entities to describe how they experienced change in practice that captures personal,
interpersonal, and impersonal knowledge. This is accomplished by “connecting up collective
learning and learning histories from multiple organizations, within a more spacious
inter-organizational field and beyond the open system” (Gearty et al., 2015, p. 46). Open systems
learning history incorporates the production of several lighter, less rigorous learning histories
(Gearty et al., 2015). This is a goal of the present work: to take what is harvested and culled from
conversations, and not re-writing it or homogenizing it, but finding the similarities and shared
experiences that tell the story.
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Second, I seek to overcome what Bradbury et al. (2019) refer to as “the chasm between
expert knowledge and stakeholder participation” (p. 5). Bradbury and Lichtenstein (2000) termed
this “the space between” (p. 551) and note that it is “the essence of [Martin Buber’s 1970
dialogue] work . . . that points to the relational perspective that self and other are not separable,
but are, rather, coevolving in ways that need to be accounted for in our organizational research”
(p. 551). This was one of the reasons I was not interested in reliance on a mode of knowledge
production, such as narrative inquiry, that might suggest movement toward an absolute “yes/no”
outcomes, and “privilege[s] individual observation and sense-making related to the ‘measurable’
external world in the belief that it is possible to be independent from what is observed”
(Bradbury et al., 2019, p. 6). In this way, the learning history encourages collaborative action and
knowledge creation while describing a history of something that can lead to change in the future,
inform and guide decision making, and then continue to do so.
Third, learning history offered a way for me to approach my work from the perspective of
what could be, or “yes/and . . . ,” and provides a living document that will keep me and my work
in open dialogue long after this dissertation is completed. This approach begins by recognizing
my place within the research as an expert practitioner who truly understands the complexity of
this context, and at the same time understands that I must also shift to a researcher’s perspective
in helping those with a stake in my topic to walk through their experiences and act based on and
through their shared learning (Bradbury et al., 2019). To accomplish this, I relied on Gearty’s
2014 open system learning history model, that “…outlines five [process] stages where the first
four stages relate to the front-end production of the learning history and the fifth relates to the
back-end post-production learning stage” (p. 6), presented here as Table 3.2:
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Table 3.2
The Five Stages of a Learning History Project

Note: From Gearty, M. learning history, in Coghlan, D. and Brydon-Miller, M. (eds.), The SAGE
Encyclopedia of Action Research, pp. 494. Copyright 2014 by SAGE Publications, Ltd.
Reprinted with permission.

I describe each phase of the learning history methodology in context below.
Planning Phase
Participants from Washington, Colorado, and Oregon were identified based on their role
in early cannabis legalization from several perspectives. The first was at the agency level, such
as agency directors, followed by individuals supporting or assisting those agencies, such as
attorneys general, and those generally involved in some aspect of legalization either as a

85
stakeholder, a legacy market member, or involvement in organized cannabis legalization
initiatives. I introduce these participants in Chapter IV. Additionally, there were some unique
advantages discussed below, as well as some challenges related to participant identification that I
discuss more fully as limitations in Chapter VI. These are based largely on my position as an
inside action researcher and the nature of that position.
I drafted two main questions and added several sub-questions in an effort to encourage
participants toward thinking reflectively, broadly and deeply. These questions began to emerge
during unrelated discussions with these and other individuals over the past few years. From that
perspective, participants had an early, and unforeseen role in the co-design of my study. I did not
anticipate or expect that each and every interview question would be answered since the process
of reflection and iteration was driven by each participant. I viewed these questions as prompts
that will lead to additional probing. I offered the following:
1. Please describe the extent of your involvement and your experiences in the initial
implementation of enabling legislation to legalize cannabis, including but not limited to
external and internal stakeholder engagement.
2. What was the extent of your knowledge around cannabis before it was legalized in
Washington (Colorado or Oregon)?
a. What influenced that knowledge?
b. What concerned you most about legalization? Least?
c. If you were involved in prosecuting cannabis related offenses before legalization,
what was the extent of your involvement?
d. What was your understanding of cannabis legalization and decriminalization?
3. Was there a key moment in implementation that was personally significant to you? Why?
a. Where and when in the process of implementation did that moment occur?
b. Who else was involved, and to what extent were they involved?
c. What were the challenges and triumphs that made this a key moment for you?
d. Did that moment influence your perspectives and understanding of legalization?
How?
e. If you could go back and guide yourself through that moment (or those moments
if there is more than one), what advice would you give yourself?
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4. How did you navigate varying stakeholder perspectives, such as those from citizens who
did not vote to legalize, and those who did?
a. Who had the loudest voice? Who had the quietest voice?
b. Looking back, who had a quiet or no voice?
c. Did any of those voices influence the way you approached your work?
d. Were you involved in any statewide stakeholder meetings? To what extent?
e. Did any part of the development process scare you or cause concern? Why? What
did you do to mitigate that concern?
5. As you look back on your experiences during the formation of the initial regulatory
structure, which hold the most prominent space in your mind?
6. What was your role in creating regulation?
a. Did you feel like you were heard?
b. Did you think the rules were too strict or not strict enough? What concerned you
most?
c. What were the most hotly contested parts of rule? The least?
d. What was your perception of stakeholder comment on draft rules?
e. Did you think the rules aligned with the intent of enabling legislation? Why or
why not?
f. Do you think there was a general understanding of why rules were needed?
g. Who pushed back the hardest, and why?
h. Who were supporters, and why?
7. What was it like to enforce regulation?
a. Did any of the rules have unintended consequences? How so?
b. How did you feel when a licensee found a loophole in a rule?
c. Do you think the rules did what they were designed to do? Why or why not?
d. Can you recall the first administrative violation the agency issued?
i. What did that feel like?
ii. How did the licensee react?
iii. What was the outcome? Was it satisfactory to you?
iv. Is there anything else you think I should know?
Since I am imbedded in one of the agencies involved with this research and had worked with
other state agencies tasked with cannabis regulation, I was able to identify insider and outsider
protagonists quickly. Invitations to participate were offered once ethics approval was received
and invitees quickly accepted.
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Interpretation (Data) Gathering Phase—Learning History Dialogue
In general, this phase of learning history research is referred to as data gathering but I am
more inclined to call it interpretation gathering as Kleiner and Roth (1996) do. It is my belief that
categorizing what is gathered from interviews as “data” seems to immediately dehumanize it. For
that reason, in the spirit of rehumanizing action research, I interviewed participants who were
selected as noted above from the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board, the Colorado
Marijuana Enforcement Division, the Oregon Liquor Control Commission, along with others
who either worked with these agencies or did not have any connection to these agencies but were
involved in the legalization movement. These are the protagonists of this story.
Participant Engagement
These interviews occurred during the late summer and fall of the first full year of the
COVID-19 pandemic. For that reason, all interviews were conducted through Zoom.
Interviewees received questions at least one week in advance, along with consent forms and a
general overview of the interview structure. Some interviews were scheduled for two hours and
others for one hour depending on availability and on comfort in sharing experiences and
reflection. All interviews were recorded with interviewee consent.
Ethical Considerations
Prior to interviewing, I provided each participant an informed consent form and requested
that it be signed and emailed back prior to our scheduled interview. Once the interview began, I
reiterated the context of the interview in broad terms and requested permission to record the
interview. I offered that I was not seeking a particular answer or position, but the participants
honest reflection. This resulted in deeply reflective, as opposed to, superficially reactive
responses because our context typically only allows for the latter. This underscores some of the
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sensitivities and political undercurrent present in my role as both a learning historian and a
practitioner in this research environment. I discuss this dichotomy further below.
Distillation and Production Phase
The goal at this phase was not to seek generalizable results, or attempt to prove or
disprove a theory, but rather to use the reflections of participants in their own words because
these would construct the story. As co-researchers, we wove a story about how cannabis
legalization was experienced, what was learned from those experiences, and how those
experiences might inform the participating organizations and others in the coming years.
This phase began with transcription of recorded interviews. I used a transcription service,
supplemented with field notes. Participants were provided with the transcripts to assure accuracy
and allow for corrections, and once that was complete, I began the process of analysis. True to
the method and the extraordinary richness of the data, this phase was lengthy and intense.
While I am already familiar with the practice of thematic analysis from previous
experience, this systematic process required arranging original text into summary sentences, then
into keywords or categories representing those themes. What I began to see emerging from this
distillation process was a chronological timeline, so to explore further, I loaded complete
narratives associated with timelines to look for common words and phrases that might add
distinction to each phase of legalization. The categories or themes were then collated into overall
categories or themes. Again, staying true to the method, I did not “prune away the lived
experience” (Gearty et al., 2015, p. 46) looking for repetition. Generally, I would pull out the
variances in lived experience because this is part of what I might share back with participants.
However, as I note in Chapter IV, despite these states having entirely separate statutory and
regulatory systems, the experiences were very similar with some interesting and illuminating
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variances that I speak to in Chapters IV and V. That sharing was achieved through individual
follow up meetings with individual interviewees and will be shared more broadly through
workshops attended by all interviewees, or a combination of the two.
Consistent with Kleiner and Roth (1996) and Bradbury (1998), I began by preparing the
learning history two-column format, with sidebars and full text hoping to support that. These
columns served to present a sense of the whole story in a thematic way, but not to undermine the
narrative by assessing the situation (Bradbury, 1998).
However, I soon realized that this needed to be modified because the content culled was
not only voluminous, but so extraordinarily rich, multidimensional, and textured that I could not
accurately capture, organize, and share data just using two columns with sidebars. Instead, I used
this format as a tool to develop themes. Then, I broke this down even further by a time stamp, or
a significant moment in the history of cannabis legalization. The final table is attached to the
final learning history artifact as a guiding analysis for the work. I relied on this approach to
assure that the project remained within a reasonable scope, and the material contained in the right
column will be incorporated into the final learning history. See Appendix G.
Validation Phase: Reflective Feedback
This phase included quote-checking to assure that participant quotes were accurate, allow
for revision where needed, and assure participant comfort in sharing the content before anyone
within the organizations or elsewhere reviewed the material. Validation protected anonymity at
this phase and helped to build another level of perspective as participants considered their and
other statements (Kleiner & Roth, 1996). It also signaled a part of the process where I began to
determine how the learning history would be most useful.
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During this phase, I shared the learning history artifact and data table document with all
participants and met with those who wished to meet individually to review. It was during this
phase of both the pilot study and the actual research project that expected, unexpected, and
poignant responses and reactions emerged. Participants were surprised by how similar their
experiences had been, what they learned about each other, and we discussed how we might use
what they learned in future interactions. I also began to consider my role in moving the agency I
work for toward broader policy change in the sense that I became more of a consultant, rather
than a colleague. This ability to detach from my role as a practitioner was critical to this work,
but at the same time, helped me to know what to pay attention to so that I could tease out pieces
of the story of cannabis legalization that often go unnoticed or are left out of most discussions. I
accomplished this through the process of interpretive analysis, where I was able to contrast
common narrative that I have grown accustomed to viewing and hearing over the past several
years, contrasted to narrative I was not familiar with. These narratives included, for example, the
very personal accounts of medical cannabis patients and the harm suffered during prohibition. I
discuss this more fully below.
The validation process allowed participants to use their history to inform direction in
future policy development. My role in this part of the process was to guide and explore with
participants, and it is where the notion of the “jointly told tale” was fully realized. I guided
participants toward clarification and acknowledgment of both accomplishments and areas of
challenge that could be leveraged to inform future work and actionable future efforts. This
included organizational change, regulatory development, and other elements that emerged during
the interviews. Thus, the quotes provided in the learning history served to not only to tell the
story, but to punctuate and authenticate it.
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The learning dialogue that occurs between participants and the historian (or researcher)
during this phase can be illuminating, profound, and powerful. That was experienced here as
conversations took detours that began to reveal the complexity of not only the regulatory
environment, but the cultural textures and dimensions of cannabis legalization. The beauty of
this part of the process was that no participant had “the answer;” rather, their experiences were
viewed as the seeds added to the community garden from which new ideas and future direction
can be discussed. It is also the phase at which I finalized the actual learning history artifact that
reflects the collective learning of the first states involved in cannabis legalization.
Diffusing and Learning, or Wider Learning
The learning history artifact and data table were shared with all research participants as
part of the iterative learning process, and to encourage and make space for continuous learning
within the agency in the spirit of Kleiner and Roth. Some participants were not available based
on scheduling conflicts, the legislative cycle, and current events, such as emergency public
health concerns around the rapid expansion and presence of impairing, unregulated and untested
substances derived from hemp in the general consumer marketplace. This speaks to the unique
circumstances of the present research, the authorizing environment in which it occurred, and the
social magnitude of drug policy reform with respect to cannabis. It also speaks to the pace at
which change occurs in this area of regulatory oversight, how the market continues to rapidly
evolve, and the challenges state legislatures and regulatory agencies encounter in trying to keep
up with it.
Additionally, the content of the data table and the learning history artifact informed
findings related the overarching research questions posed in this work, described and
demonstrated in Chapter IV.
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Situating Myself as a Researcher
Becoming a Learning Historian
I am part of the lived experience that I researched. For that reason, I handled research
objectives and positionality carefully. I situated my research approach from the perspectives of a
both a practitioner, and as an emerging learning historian. I sought to align these perspectives in
a way that highlighted and leveraged the strengths of these positions, while at the same time
seeking to balance each through reflexive practice. My goal in doing so was to achieve the type
of empirical outcome that went beyond contribution to scholarship generally, but challenged
existing theory, long-held social construction, and generated knowledge around whether
regulatory construction is “simply a social product or whether it is based on objective truths not
affected by the social world” (O’Leary, 2007b, p. 251). For that reason, I relied on a
constructivist approach to this research.
In the simplest terms, constructivism is based on the belief that human behavior and
action are based on experience, and that humans construct reality based on their understandings
of the truth and their unique perspectives, rather than a single reality (Della Porta & Keating,
2008; Creswell, 2013). Leaning into a constructivist approach meant that as a learning historian,
I accepted that the “jointly told tale” I was co-writing with my participants described a social
phenomenon they each constructed based on their experiences. At the same time, the findings
gleaned from that story allowed me to deconstruct existing theories related to complexity and
leadership, compare my research findings, and then reconstruct knowledge describing the
phenomenon in a different way. This was possible through “levels of self-reflection” (O’Leary,
2007a, p. 223) and “reflexive levels” (R. Holland, 1999, p. 474) or reflexivity, that allowed me to
reflect on how my positionality as a practitioner might influence the construction of new this
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new knowledge. In other words, my interactions with the research had the potential to shape both
the process and the outcome. Applying a reflexive approach provided a way for me to recognize
this dilemma and work toward authentic interpretations of the story and data collected and the
story I co-wrote that considered the impact of my relationship to the work as a researcher
(O’Leary, 2007a, p. 224). This is reflected in the learning history artifact, in my analysis of
complexity leadership theory in Chapter V, and in my conclusions and recommendations
described in Chapter VI.
Through the process and practice of reflexivity, I recognized that I needed to attend to
and pay close attention to the rigor of this research to assure that I might be “taken seriously as a
theorist” (McNiff, 2017, p. 92). I attribute this to my unique positionality related to the research.
For example, based on my positionality, I was able to draft research questions from situated
knowledge. I took great care in designing questions that did not underscore what I already knew,
and instead laid a framework for deeper understanding of social and political, rather than a
structural or procedural phenomenon. In doing this, I was able to honor and harmonize the
boundaries between my role as practitioner and a learning historian. The approach allowed me to
think about the substance and depth of my overarching research questions rather than focusing
on for instance, understanding the intricacies of statutory and regulatory construction, and
legislative and regulatory process. Understanding those processes first might be the research path
for an outside action researcher. In other words, I was able to fully focus this research and my
emerging skills as a both learning historian and a reflexive researcher on the social interactions
and phenomenon of cannabis legalization, and whether systems change is a social product, or
whether it is based on objective truths that are not impacted by the social world (O’Leary, 2007a,
p. 224).
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The “Doing” of the Learning Historian: Constructivism and Reflexivity in Practice
As I engaged in the stages of the learning history process, I consistently “attend[ed] to
and inquir[ed] into” (Gearty & Coghlan, 2018, p. 470), both my practice and research
recognizing that knowledge production in both realms can often be “inherently political” (p.
470). Understanding that made the act of continual reflection necessary throughout this process
to assure honesty, but also was “vital in helping the researcher to question his or her choices and
to explore his or her own perspectives and prejudices” (Gearty et al., 2015, p. 15).
Acknowledging this apparent tension, I visualized myself as sort of a helicopter pilot, hovering
over my role as practitioner and dipping into that role when and if needed during investigation.
Doing so allowed me to write myself out of the narrative when the situation called for it, instead
telling the story from the distance that is required of my researcher role, while at the same time,
writing myself in when the facts suggested it. This helped me to align the political and personal
dimensions of telling the story so that it flowed in a careful way and allowed me to check in and
interact with my own agenda (Gearty & Coghlan, 2018).
From more personal and practical perspectives however, this also meant was that there
was little separation between who I am as an individual and practitioner juxtaposed against who I
was becoming as a learning historian relative to the research I was undertaking. For me, the
meaningfulness of this research more closely aligned with a value to be enacted rather than a
problem to be overcome by the research design, meaning that I hoped to expand my work
beyond the confines of abstract knowledge to include personal meaning and social
conscientiousness (Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000).
Thinking about and positioning my research in this way allowed me to specifically
explore the contours of social justice and social equity in context for the purpose of theoretical
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contribution. That contribution depended on my ability to manage and harmonize the effect of
my presence as a researcher and learning historian on the investigation, particularly when that
investigation included self-feeling (Mead, 2009). To that end, my research, and its meaningful
theoretical contribution “depended on the reflexive interpretation on [my] experience together
with the experience of others” (Lafitte, 1957, p. 21). Combining reflexive interpretation with a
constructivist approach allowed me to approach the research with some prerequisite knowledge,
recognizing that each time I reflected on the data and with my participants, I might bring
something to light that was not known or explored before, allowing me to construct realities
subjective to each of my research participants, and generate new knowledge.
Limitations and Conclusion
The learning history has both strengths and limitations that “echo those of its
methodological ancestors (anthropology, action research, and grounded theory; Lyman & Moore,
2019, p. 479). Although learning histories have many valuable traits, including a
first-hand account of organizational learning, and bridging theory and practice by generating
practice-based theories that can be tested through further research, the method relies on
participant memory to tell the story. Those memories may be both biased and unreliable. It is
also possible to attempt to over-generalize findings from a single learning history. This particular
project, however, is the first of its kind concerning leading change in complex regulatory
environments. While there are not similar histories available for comparison, the application of
this methodology in this context demonstrates the flexibility and customizable possibilities of
learning histories.
As Bradbury notes, current unsustainable times require action-oriented research for
transformations. These transformations are fundamentally about experimentation, learning, and
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doing something that has never been done before, requiring constant attention and reflection on
what is being done to uncover unrecognized assumptions (Bradbury, et al., 2019). The legal
status of cannabis in the United States will likely experience transformation in the coming years.
My aspiration is that this research can help to inform states and hopefully others who are or may
be considering participation in that transformation.
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS
The war on drugs has contorted us as a nation. It has taken what it means to be an
American, to live in hope, to live in dignity, to live in freedom, and has turned it on its
head.
—Alison Holcomb, Evergreen: The Road to Legalization
This study has a three-pronged purpose: to explore the extent to which leadership theories
have any practical application; to understand what the best way might be to approach complexity
including social equity dimensions; and to memorialize the history of cannabis legalization and
subsequent regulation in the United States through the voices of who were at the forefront of
legalization and subsequent regulation. As described in Chapter III, the learning history action
research method supports this purpose, as well the stated research objectives and epistemological
position. This chapter describes findings based on observed themes emerging during co-creation
of the learning history artifact that pertain to the purpose of this research.
This study included participants representing and reflecting the authorizing environments
in which cannabis legalization initially occurred in the states of Washington, Colorado, and
Oregon. These are the state where regulations were first implemented, and where both medical
and adult use cannabis products continue to be regulated. Participants included agency directors
and staff, policy advisors, and stakeholders involved in the legacy cannabis market, meaning the
quasi-commercial market that existed prior to adult-use legalization. Since the majority of the
participants were active government employees, great care was exercised to protect their
identities. For this reason, participants are identified by a unique code assigned at the time of
initial interviews. To provide an overview of the participant continuum, each is identified below
in Table 4.1 by general terms.
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Table 4.1
Participant List
Participant
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
P10
P11
P12

Relationship to Legalization
Attorney
Regulatory agency
Stakeholder
Attorney
Regulatory agency
Attorney
Regulatory agency
Regulatory agency/public health
Stakeholder
Regulatory agency/enforcement
Regulatory agency
Regulatory agency

Interviews averaged one and a half hours each, and second interviews occurred for two of the
participants before drafting the learning history artifact. There were fewer participants from
Oregon and Colorado than there were from Washington state based primarily on participant
availability and access to publicly available resources. These interviews generated over 425
pages of transcript that was supplemented with additional material, such as publicly available
recorded interviews and press releases, both in print and video; video documentaries such as
“Evergreen: The Road to Legalization” and “Protestival: Seattle Hempfest, a 20 Year
Retrospective.” These additional materials added dimension, depth, and texture to oral
interviews, and to the stories collected during that process.
The learning history artifact review and validation meetings averaged one hour each,
resulting in two revisions. The learning history artifact was then shared with agencies as a living
document that could be modified to not only continue to memorialize history, but a way to use
that history to inform future efforts and areas of focus. In this way, the methodology was
customized to meet the needs of participants and align with research goals of this project.

99
Situating Learning History in These Findings
As provided in Chapter III, the learning history research methodology is a tool that can be
customized to achieve the unique goals and objectives of a research project. As Uhl-Bien and
Marion (2009) noted, leadership researchers need to explore methodologies that allow them to
gather rich, dynamic, contextual, and longitudinal data that focus on processes rather than static,
decontextualized variables. This method accomplishes that by distilling gathered data—
interviews and other related materials—to identify key themes and storylines rather than
attempting to generate some sort of simulation or model (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009). Here,
because learning history was used as both a tool to create an actionable learning artifact and to
explore specific research topics, the distillation and thematic development phase followed two
separate but interrelated tracks.
The first track pertains to an identified purpose of the present research: to create an
artifact that would achieve the goal of capturing the history and learning of multiple
organizations involved in the first efforts to legalize cannabis in the United States. This was
realized through co-creation of the learning history artifact, located in Appendix F generated
during the distillation and production phase. The artifact contains a series of themes that emerged
during that phase. These themes help to frame, arrange, and guide the “jointly told tale” of
cannabis legalization, highlight shared experiences, and draw attention to significant moments in
time. These themes pertain specifically to the story of cannabis legalization.
The second track pertains to the exploration of complex regulatory systems and
leadership in a more general sense, with the overarching goal of addressing the following topics:
•

To understand how complexity is engaged and experienced in complex regulatory
systems and understand what the practice of leadership looks like when engaging
with such complexity.
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•

To describe how the history and story of cannabis legalization told from the
perspectives of regulatory pioneers can help us to understand the ways in which that
complexity was navigated, including an exploration of social justice dimensions.

For these reasons, the distillation and production phase of this process also resulted in
themes and subsequent findings related to these topics. Since participant interviews were not
focused on questions specific to complex regulatory systems or complexity, these additional
themes emerged based on their connection to theory and serve to frame the findings presented in
this chapter.
Gathering Data: Reflections
As discussed in Chapter III, insider action research uniquely positions the researcher for
several reasons. Primarily, participants for a project are generally known to the researcher based
on professional affiliations and relationships. I discussed my reflexivity as an insider action
researcher and a practitioner in Chapter III. I found that my reflexivity, meaning the two-way
street between the subject of this research and my relationship with it, presented another layer of
challenge when seeking ethics approval to begin this work. This underscored my dichotomous
position both within and outside of the research. As a result, I was acutely aware of the extra care
needed in my approaches to interviews, data preservation, distillation, and confidentiality.
As colleagues, participants trust that we can share ideas and thoughts in our professional
capacity and in an environment that can be characterized, generally, as objective and
task-focused to “get the job done.” There is little time or need for personal reflection or a walk
down memory lane when deadlines are short, legislative bodies need answers, and stakeholders
demand immediate action. These elements are constant in the fast-paced, often reactionary
regulatory environment.
In the present research, personal reflections and experiences were both enthusiastically
and voluntarily shared with me in my role as a researcher outside that environment. While this
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was humbling, I found it to be laden, and rightly so, with great responsibility and a sense of
heightened duty to preserve and protect collected data. The significance and truly, the weight of
my position in both worlds accentuated that duty to my colleagues, but also to the integrity of
this research. These responsibilities cannot be understated, and I did not take any of them lightly.
I mention these aspects of my positioning here because these elements of insider action
research are not widely discussed in literature. For me, this position influenced how data were
collected, stored, analyzed, and how they are shared here. For example, my understanding of the
political landscape, history and context of the subject heightens my awareness of what material is
appropriate for this work, and what may not be. In other words, I hold and cherish the stories that
feel gifted to me as if I were a guardian of the history. I very much lived this research through
and with my participants while conducting it. I felt their concern, outrage, frustration, pride, and
exhaustion before, but more profoundly during this project as they shared their stories. I did not
anticipate and was not prepared for the depth in which I would begin to understand what the end
of cannabis prohibition really meant in these states, nor did I anticipate that I would be living and
reliving it with my participants in the way I did. I offer this here because true to the method,
learning history gets at the “messy human parts” (Gearty, 2009, p. 15) of change and storytelling
in a way that allowed me to experience both with participants in profound ways. I explore and
reflect on this experience more fully in Chapter VI.
While these findings are representative of observed themes, they are also very much
reflective of the breadth and depth of the human experience of change in complex regulatory
systems, messy parts and all.
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Research Findings
Findings are presented in a structured way and with features consistent with learning
history. As discussed in Chapter III, the third phase of learning history is identified as distillation
and production. It includes reviewing interview transcripts for key storylines, themes, and
illustrative quotes, and to establish patterns and connections between shared or common
experiences. This resulted in an initial table cataloguing themes, illustrative quotes, and
associated field notes. Consistent with the method, actual quotes were relied upon to assure that
the storyline and themes remained anchored in participant voice and experience. This table was
then further refined to build the learning history storyline, including significant events, points of
reference, and connections to theory. This iteration of the table informed the chronological order
of the learning history artifact, and clearly established that the three phases of cannabis
legalization—pre-legalization, legislative implementation, and future direction—were as distinct
to participants as they had been to me in terms of creating historical markers to guide
storytelling.
As noted in Chapter III, to further, but informally, validate this structure, I loaded only
illustrative quotes into Wordle by historical marker to informally explore word frequency. This
confirmed not only the significance of the phasing structure but highlighted the focus of each
phase. Ultimately, these confirmed phases formed the framework for the learning history artifact
and served to inform findings presented here. Through this iterative process, I was able to further
facilitate necessary reflexivity in my approach to and interpretation of these data.
I now turn to the substance of these findings.
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Empirical Reductionism Versus Empirical Emergence and Why It Matters Here
Looking back to Chapter II, I discussed problems related to reductionism, and the
epistemology of complexity. To connect that discussion with the findings offered in this chapter,
I note there that the interactions between the systems being researched in this context cannot be
fully and meaningfully explored from an epistemological stance based in the empirical
reductionism. Complexity theory itself proclaims to be critical of such reductionism because it
may end up actually taking on the very objectives and functions that complexity theory claims
are obsolete (Israel, 2005). This approach is situated among several that avoid reductionist
findings.
Under that premise, findings presented related to research questions are not necessarily
“answers” but instead frame and align themes with broader research topics. As a result, my focus
moves away from “answering” a specific research question or questions and instead provides a
range of responses reflective of the breadth and depth of the participants’ experiences as those
experiences relate to complexity. In other words, these findings do not follow the path of
empirical reductionism designed to maintain traditional understandings of truth. Rather, these
findings seek to offer what I will refer to as empirical emergence. While empirical reductionism
may produce generalizable findings, such an approach does not better our understanding of how
complexity is experienced by people identified as leaders of complex regulatory systems, nor
does it capture the realities of practice. More importantly, it may not improve the precision of
knowledge expression and may restrain knowledge democracy. Both are foundational to my
research, and essential to the form and content of Chapter V concerning what I learned about
complexity.
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Additionally, in the spirit of anti-reductionism and as a symbolic but demonstrative
gesture, I have not reduced or tried to paraphrase the majority of participant quotes offered in
these findings. From my perspective, and to stay true to the methodology, reducing participant
narrative to sound bites or broken pieces of thought that make reading this dissertation easier
significantly and profoundly minimizes the power and authenticity of participant voice. Part of
my purpose in conducting this research was to give voice where it had not been focused before.
Indeed, one of the goals of this research is to get at the human side of change. If we are to begin
to better understand how change happens, we need to pay attention to the whole, rather than
curated, conveniently situated narrative. In taking this approach, I hope to inspire and encourage
deeper thinking by sharing—unfiltered and unvarnished—full quotes.
Themes and Subthemes
With all of that as a backdrop, I turn to the three major themes and associated subthemes
which emerged from this process:
Theme 1: Complexity is both a property and characteristic of systems.
•

Change occurs based on the properties and characteristics of systems and
collective systems behavior. (Emergence is discussed in Chapter II).

•

Systems with complex characteristics self-guide by and through communication
and collaboration.

•

Collaboration and communication within these systems occurs at the systems
level by building interactive trust.

Theme 2: Complexity is not a behavior, characteristic, or action of “leadership” or
“leaders” in complex regulatory systems.
•

Change, emergence, and innovation in complex regulatory systems is not the
result of the actions or behaviors of a “leader” or the practice of “leadership.”

•

Tension in complex regulatory systems can be engaged as a dynamic and driver
of change, but “leaders” do not control over the level or flow of tension, even
when embedded in the system.
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•

Collective action connected to purpose guides complex regulatory system change.

Theme 3: The interplay between social justice and social equity is complex and has been
oversimplified.
•

Oversimplification is a pervasive barrier to achieving social equity goals.

•

Social justice initiatives must occur before social equity can be realized.

•

Cannabis-related bias is multi-dimensional and pervasive.

Each of these themes and their accompanying subthemes are discussed more fully below.
Theme 1: Complexity Is Both a Property and Characteristic of Complex Systems
This was one of the first and most obvious themes to emerge during this research. Rather
than discovering this theme during the distillation and production phase, I began to detect it
during interviews. Properties and characteristics are constructs of systems and systems thinking,
and part of the language of complexity theory. For example, there are a handful of traits
generally attributed to complex systems, such as feedback loops and the ability to be adaptive.
Meadows (2008) refers to resilience as a “recognizable systems property” (p. 74) and offers that
“The most marvelous characteristic of some complex systems is their ability to learn.” (p. 76).
Similarly, Ostrom (1990) refers to system “characteristics” (p. 33) in the context of common
pool resources. As I began to unpack this further in the cannabis regulatory space, it appeared
that there were additional properties and characteristics, specific to these systems, that influenced
and impacted participant experience and systems interactions.
Systems Are Distinguishable by Properties and Characteristics
As I went back to review field notes between interviews, I could see a pattern beginning
to develop in the way that participants described not only the various stakeholder groups and
their affiliations within the authorizing environment, but also the properties and characteristics of
those groups. This included describing the traits and features of the group to which they
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belonged or self-identified with, and to which they did not. To explore those observations, I
prepared a comparison table that allowed me look more closely at the substance of illustrative
quotes. I based the design of this table on my discussion of complexity’s epistemology in
Chapter II. That is, traditional understandings of truth inform macro challenges of statutory and
regulatory construction which is more focused on objective processes and outcomes. However,
that rigid epistemology does not contemplate and may exclude more subjective micro processes
that are informed by values and human behaviors, such as social equity. This approach allowed
me to sort content in a way that assisted me to more closely examine whether the quote seemed
objective or subjective. Under each illustrative quote, I added a “Historian” note. These are my
Learning Historian field notes that associate the quote with one or the other column, but also
serve as a prompt for additional discussion here and in Chapter IV. That table is offered in
Appendix A.
It is worth noting that some of the identified characteristics and properties appear in both
columns. For example, participants recognized marginalization as a both a property and
characteristic. It also worth noting that these properties and characteristics may be exclusive to
the complex systems that are the topic of this research, and certainly, this speaks to the
contextual nature of complex systems. This table is built out more fully, including theoretical
analysis, alignment, and contextualization in Chapter V.
More notably, several participants identified power dynamics or their perception and
experience of where power existed within these systems. For example, a participant offered that
members of the legacy market felt or experienced a loss of control once legalization occurred.
Comparatively, three participants noted that “the power seemed to be held by ‘the suits,’” which
is generally a negative reference to corporate entities or governmental agencies. These appear to
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be references that align with the shift from an unregulated, informal cannabis market to a formal,
regulated market.
Additionally, and with respect to power dynamics, subject matter expertise (specifically
concerning the legacy market) was identified as more of a human value characteristic, while lack
of subject matter expertise was identified as a property of connected to process or outcome.
Although participants did not directly connect knowledge or expertise regarding cannabis
production to power dynamics, this concept reappears in the description of initial stakeholder
listening sessions following legalization. In both instances, knowledge appears to have been
leveraged for power in various ways and degrees with mixed outcomes.
Change Occurs Based Not Only on The Properties and Characteristics of Systems, but Also on
Collective Systems Behavior
Collective systems behaviors are things that systems might do together that they would
not do alone. For example, in this context, systems with properties that are process and outcome
based are comprised of federal, state, and local governments, law enforcement, and specific to
this subject matter, the judicial/legal system. Generally, the legal/judicial system would be
assumed to be included in reference to federal, state, and local governments, but its role in
cannabis legalization has been and continues to be prominent and critical, and for these reasons,
it is spotlighted here. Taking a bold concept, such as moving cannabis from its status as a
prohibited substance to a commodity produced, processed, and sold in a “tightly regulated
system” cannot be achieved by the actions, direction, or influence of any one individual within
this collection of systems. The traits and attributes of these systems, specifically those focused on
observed objective processes and approaches to achieve particular outcomes such as passing an
initiative, are not embodied in or directed by an individual leader, a subsystem within it, or a
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partial collection of those subsystems. Instead, they occur based on the behavior of the entire
system. Participants offered further substantiation of this finding:
Colorado has been successful in part because the regulator has generally been at the table
helping shape legislation. (P2)
It’s not determined by what a particular, any one legislator says, or even the sponsor
necessarily says. But it’s supposed to be the intent of the legislature in case of the
initiatives, the intent of the people. (P4)
Buried within these illustrative quotes is rich context that I will explore more deeply in Chapter
V. For purposes of these findings, however, it is important to note the power of citizen
initiatives. Here, the behavior of the largest portion of the outcome-oriented system—the citizens
of Washington, Oregon, and Colorado—was based on the property of objectivity and focus on
process (voting on an initiative or proposition), that resulted in an outcome: cannabis
legalization. No one legislator, citizen, or anyone in between caused that to happen.
In contrast, systems with subjective values and human-based characteristics did not
appear to engage in the same type of collective action or coordinated response. Instead, these
systems seemed to demonstrate more individualized traits that focused on subjective individual
experience, such as a sense of fear of the unknown, distrust in the structure and form of
government, and fear of exclusion experienced as marginalization. Strength was expressed in the
form of subject matter expertise about how to grow and sell cannabis. These characteristics were
described in ways suggesting that people within these systems felt impacted by the properties of
objective systems. These impacts were perceived and expressed as limitations to opportunity and
the ability to act independently as they had pre-legalization. In other words, the ability to make
decisions about how their businesses would be conducted and their free choice to do so was
absolutely impacted by either perception of or experiences with the objective system.
Additionally, the lack of cohesion, or interconnectedness and organization in both the legacy and
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current markets resulted and continues to result in an apparent absence of coordinated subjective
systems response to issues like legalization, subsequent legislation, and future direction:
There didn’t seem to be really much organized opposition to it. (P4)
we didn’t have a well-funded opposition campaign. (P1)
we were not as organized . . . we were not as legislatively astute. (P3)
I think there’s a real lack of creativity and initiative to organize collectively. (P7)
[I]nitiative 502 publicly had almost zero, opposition. No one really came out in any sort
of big way to oppose the thing. (P7)
we were also less developed as an industry in terms of understanding the
way to wield political power. (P9)
These are interesting observations given that these systems were truly more driven by individual,
subjective characteristics rather than objective, arguably collective behavior.
It is also important to note, however, that there were hints of subjective characteristics
embedded within the objective system. For example, a participant who identified as a member of
the system with objective properties indicated sensing marginalization based on membership
within that system. While this may seem a small, insignificant outlier, it is one of the more
profound findings of this research, and I discuss this more fully in Chapter V.
Although participants identified system members or agents when discussing systems, the
systems behavior was not attributed to the individual member or agent. Rather, the individual
was mentioned in the context of their participation in or contribution to a process or action of a
system, or their membership or position within the system. In other words, individual agency
seemed to be subject to and described by systems properties and characteristics. I explore this
more deeply in Chapter V, as well.
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Systems with Complex Characteristics Self-Guide Through Communication and
Collaboration
Although this finding pertains to systems, the importance of communication and
collaboration on multiple levels was a recurring theme throughout interviews. This specific
finding requires some scaffolding to adequately present the nuanced data collected. I draw
attention to it because it is important to framing findings here, as well as the section that follows
pertaining to leaders and leadership.
The first “plank” of our scaffold speaks to a characteristic of all participants in this
research: experience and knowledge of cannabis prior to cannabis legalization. This is one
element of contextual subject matter expertise. Without exception, participants who were more
involved in regulation and legislation indicated that they knew little about cannabis before it was
legalized in their states, although some had varying professional experience:
The more interesting thing is I think the lack of knowledge I had before cannabis was
legalized. (P9)
I on a very personal level was . . . quite the cannabis novice, didn’t really know anything
about cannabis. (P1)
I was not involved in cannabis. (P3)
I’ve had some exposure to the medical side. Beyond that, not much. (P5)
My involvement was primarily again, taking phone calls that would come, almost always
from patients who had experienced some kind of adverse event. (P6)
I was on the street and arrested people for simple possession of marijuana and found
marijuana and pipes on searches. (P2)
my first real experience with cannabis came through the observations of individuals who
were being arrested for cannabis offenses and representing them in court. (P1)
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In contrast, participants who were closer to the legacy market, medical cannabis patients and
their advocates, and many others, were well-versed in the existing state of unregulated cannabis
commerce:
it was an industry. I mean, it was vibrant. It had rules and there was hierarchy and there
was structure and all of that. (P3)
Cannabis culture in Seattle was strong and very much influenced by Vivian McPeak and Seattle
Hempfest, which was viewed as “the expression of the people who were using cannabis, it was
part of their culture” (P3). But the expertise seemed to be largely connected to the product,
culture, and an underground system.
The second “plank” of our scaffold also concerns subject matter expertise of a different
kind. Although subject matter expertise is generally not requisite to drafting or being able to draft
legislation, to implement statute, or to engage with government, cannabis legalization presented
new challenges. As noted throughout this dissertation, cannabis had never been legalized for
adult use before. No other state, or country for that matter, had ever attempted to legalize and
regulate it. For these reasons, the states to legalize first were going where no one had gone
before, even though they knew how to build the legislative and regulatory frameworks.
Participants from regulatory agencies or working with regulatory agencies acknowledged this:
None of us know what we’re doing. (P5)
I remember the first time I got online, and I saw this equipment that was being used for
production, and I’m like, what? You know. Where did all this come from?
Just really kind of surprised at how much I didn’t know. (P8)
we were on the cusp of doing something that was going, that could potentially change,
not only policy in Washington state, but across the country and around the world because
really it—it wasn’t legal anywhere. (P1)
there was no jurisdiction in the world that had legalized and regulated production of
cannabis for any purpose. (P1)
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For us, we didn’t have a regulated medical program. Our people were not licensed or
permitted, and so we had to start from scratch. (P11)
It was, it was if you consider that the initiative passed in November of 2012, and we did
not hear from the Federal Government officially until August of 2013. All that time, we
were flying blind. (P7)
This need for knowledge exchange presented an opportunity to regulators—the collective
“government”—to reach out to the legacy market for guidance, and ultimately, collaboration.
This scenario underscores the uncertainty of building statute and regulation where it had
not existed before: no one knew or could predict how the unregulated system would respond to
regulation, whether the federal government would shut businesses down, or if the entire
experiment would be a massive failure. And yet, participants expressed a desire to “do it right,”
I felt a responsibility like I think a lot of people did to be able to do this right and to be
able to demonstrate that we as an agency and the state, we’re gonna do it right and defy
the tons of people within the industry who said that we’re going to screw it all up. (P7)
even though a characteristic of the system pervaded (and continues to pervade) that relationship
with an undercurrent of mistrust and uncertainty:
And so, they don’t trust, you know, the systems that are set up that are, you know,
whether they be medical systems or governmental systems or whatever it is. There’s a,
there’s an inherent mistrust that kind of permeates everything because of the way they
personally been affected. (P3)
Even so, subject matter expertise was leveraged, and used to engage with the legacy market and
others under the premise that if communication was open and transparent, the possibility of a
positive outcomes might increase:
[I] wanted it to be a success. And I felt like the more I could talk with people, the more
input I could get from them, um, that the better chance we had of this working. (P5)
It is well document here, in the media, literature, and multiple other places that
engagement across and between the systems impacted by cannabis legalization, at least in
Washington state was challenging at best. However, never mentioned in that narrative is the goal
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of engagement, which is central to this research: by hosting these engagement opportunities,
regulators were trying to “do the right thing” by being fair, smart, listening and adjusting as
needed:
We, we held an event. We were charged by legislation to come up with recommendations
to the legislature on what a merging the system could be like what a medical market
would be. And, we had one of our public events held at St. Martin’s University in Major
Event Center. So, there's a lot of room and it was just like a circus, you know, people
came in and they, it was organized. REDACTED was one of the organizers and bussed
people in, and they just got up there and didn’t have a whole lot of constructive things to
say, but an awful lot of nasty things to say and stuff. And so, that kind of stuff can
motivate you from a negative point of view, too, because it pissed me off. But, that was
part of it and that’s part of being a regulator is you make a lot of people upset and, but I
think that what we tried to do was to be fair and to be smart and to listen to people along
the way and be willing to adjust. And that, I can say, definitely happened. That gives you
purpose. If you’re doing that as your job, you feel like you’re doing the right thing. (P7,
emphasis added)
These four elements—being fair, smart, listening and being agile—describe some of the
dimensions of collaboration and communication evident in this system. Those dimensions were
realized by providing the opportunity for cross-pollination in the following ways:
Direct invitation:
Well how you going to have the expertise? How you gonna get it done?” I
said “We can get it done because you’re gonna help us do it! We’re going to
engage you to do it. That’s how we’re going to do it. (P12)
Formation of workgroups or committees:
And so, we formed the rules advisory committee, which is always a part of our
rulemaking processes and it was a very economical you know, cities, counties, law
enforcement, marijuana folks, balanced group to recommend to me, how to do the rules
and then I recommend to my commission. (P12)
Creation of opportunities and forums for cross-systems engagement, interaction and knowledge
exchange:
And so the first thing we did is we held forums across the state, and within the—we’d
spent a day in Spokane, for example, and what we would do in the morning is we would
meet with—morning and afternoon, we’d meet with stakeholders, we’d meet with elected
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officials, the Mayors and City Councils, we’d meet with the prevention community and
public health, and we’d meet with law enforcement. In the evenings, we held long
sessions in community colleges and large venues where hundreds, if not a thousand
people, would come and hear how we were gonna layout, mostly again now, sharing the
timeline for setting the program up, the program up, when growers and processors, the
applications would begin to be taken and when that might go into effect, and when the
retail market might open. That was a small piece. Really, the bigger piece was, tell us
what you’re gonna—how you’re gonna regulate this product. And so we would take
hours of testimony, mostly from people who are in the business, in the medical program,
who had been in the illicit program, who are looking at wanting to be licensees. So really,
the public that was present in the evening of those meetings was really the people that
wanted to get into the program and were giving us feedback, when we write our
regulations, this is what you need to be aware of. (P11)
but just standing and talking to people and eventually is, well, come and look and we’ll
show you what we do. (P5)
But it took patience to get to the point where those conversations could happen in a constructive
way. For example, there was a cavern between the interests of the legacy market and public
health and prevention:
the vitriol that was spewed at any prevention people who had the nerve to get up and
speak. They would be shouted down, they would be, um, you know, they’d usually be
sitting toward the back of the room, but they’re in the midst of all these people. One
person spoke in Olympia, we had the public hearing at St. Martin’s. And she got up and
spoke and they were yelling at her and she tried to say, you know, you’ve had your
chance to speak, she stayed very calm. I’d like to have mine. And when she sat down,
somebody sitting by her said, “I hope you get pregnant and have a baby and it’s
deformed. . . . When she was leaving, somebody you know, basically kind of spit at her.
And another person . . . walked her to her car. (P8)
Similarly, there was a divide between the legacy market and the WSLCB:
You had groups or people were really excited because they had won the lottery, so to
speak. You know, they are on the list to get a grow license or to open a store to be a
processor. You had people in the medical community that felt they were being excluded.
So they were angry. Um, really angry at times. In fact, there was one meeting at Saint
Martin's College and somebody threw a shoe at the board. (P5)
There was also a divide between law enforcement, local jurisdictions, and the WSLCB:
They were so against the idea that we would call this recreational marijuana. So they
were angry. I went with our chief of enforcement at the time and they were mad at him,
and the deputy chief. They’re mad at both of them because they were supposed to be a
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law enforcement, and here we’re letting this thing happen. And I kept reminding them,
we didn't let anything happen to the voters who voted it in. Yeah, so let’s try and make it
work the best way we can for everybody involved. Um, so you had that group of people
that were mad. You got people where stores are going to be located that were mad. (P5)
And there was interest—and a divide—between Washington, Colorado, and the rest of the
world:
we had international, many international news organizations come in from around the
world with you know, translators from China and Japan, France . . . all those guys
coming in and spending a lot of time with us and they were fascinated by it. And you
know, it was a fascinating subject creating something that didn’t exist anywhere else and
something that people were familiar with, right? (P7)
So we met with, um, Central and South American Representative, country
Representatives in Denver, Colorado. We put together this meeting, with people from all
those other countries that were absolutely furious. Both us and Colorado . . . because for
years the United States had forced them to participate on the war on drugs. And now here
we are simply opening up. There had to be in at least a dozen or 15 countries in there. We
had headphones on because there were different languages being spoken. There's English
and Portuguese and Spanish. So, you know, we’re wearing headphones as if it was a UN
meeting. But you can tell when somebody was talking at us that they were not happy
even way before it got translated . . . that was a tough meeting. (P5)
In contrast, states legalizing after Washington and Colorado tried a different approach.
Following a coordinated campaign entitled, “What’s Legal?” that front-loaded legalization
information, Oregon relied on a similar forum model for engagement that served as a way to
inform a broad range of stakeholders, and resulted in less conflict:
So, we did go around the state, we had these listening sessions, you know, we got four
hundred, five hundred people . . . I think we went above that in a couple of places and
then other ones in rural, maybe a little smaller but we would do our presentation, we had
PowerPoint, we would talk about the issues that we thought were important for people to
think about, that we were thinking about and then we'd open it up and take dialogue and
we would literally exhaust everyone who had a question and so, these were hours, long
sessions and very extensive. And, the reality was that actually gave us a huge advantage
and concurrent with the beginning of a legislative session. What we thought we needed
the legislature to consider, to put in place, to move forward. So, we had like fifty
recommendations . . . some of them were recommendations we endorsed, some of them
came entirely out of the process only itself, right? from the public that we had heard in
and that turned out to be invaluable guidance to legislature test to the process going
forward and really form the basis of the legislative consideration.
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So, early on, we entered this world with a ton of credibility, clear recommendations and
we had this great start based on [that]. (P12)
Despite growing pains and difficulties, participants generally noted that stakeholders and
regulators eventually found a way to collaborate and move forward:
I think everybody at some point in time agreed to try and make it work. There were a lot
of disagreements, but we worked through them. (P5, emphasis added)
But the fact that there was having that voice and being able to contribute and being part
of that discussion, I think was, was probably the biggest piece of that. It wasn’t just, well,
you go over here and do your education and we’ll do the rest of it. We were, we were all
there. (P8)
Perceptions of Communication and Collaboration
Even though agency participants generally indicated a belief that all voices were heard,
some participants did not necessarily share the same perception of those interactions. For
example,
there was definitely some outreach initially to the medical business owners but then they
did not feel like it was useful in the end . . . Whereas they felt like they were gonna be
collaborators and it didn’t come to pass that way. (P3)
I mean, I don’t think anybody was listening to any of us. I mean we were trying . . . I
would say in the beginning, there was little to no stakeholder engagement. I mean, i—if
you talk about engagement, I mean, I’m sure that there were a lot of opinions given,
whether or not anybody was paying attention, I doubt, but then again, we were also less
developed as an industry in terms of understanding, um, the way to wield political power.
(P9)
And sometimes, even though processes were in place for final decision making, governmental
officials, such as legislative bodies, sometimes forged ahead without collaborative consultation:
Well, when we had the edibles conversation, everyone at that time was, “Are we gonna
have edibles? or we're going to delay them? Are we going to take some more time till we
figure it out?” But they were signed up with the marijuana committee saying, “Yeah,
we’re going to have edibles”” and there was no alternative voice that really got heard in
that process . . . that decision, that’s the kind of thing where you saw that the absence of
maybe, consideration? That was a perfect exhibit. At the time I was like, “Really?
There’s not even a speed bump between them and the decision there.” Because we don’t
know about this stuff . . . give us six more months. We need a little more time to think
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about that and everyone was . . . they were clear about what they wanted to do. And we
really didn’t hear another voice of caution. (P12)
Collaboration and Communication within These Systems Occurs at the Systems Level by
Building Interactive Trust
Many of the illustrative quotes above pertain to this finding, but there were specific
quotes and observations that suggested how participants leveraged diversity of opinion and
expertise to create coalition or partnerships across the entire constellation of stakeholder groups
and entities that formed the authorizing environment:
so we were very open about the process and that was also part of, you know, that mix of
gaining that interactive trust as the regulator or dealing in an unknown world of
marijuana regulation. (P12, emphasis added)
“Interactive trust” was a critical element of successful communication, and combined with the
expertise of each system, resulted in positive collaboration. Processes borrowed from
long-standing, well- functioning regulatory systems were built into legislation to leverage the
strength of existing interactive trust. This encouraged cross-agency and cross-state collaboration
and demonstrated how policy and strategic expertise supported pathways to build strong
relationships:
[W]e tried to borrow a lot at the language from the liquor control act so that it would be a
little bit easier for LCB to undertake the rulemaking. (P1)
that structure also helped ensure all of our state agencies were at the table. The
Department of Public Health and Environment was a key player and supporter. The
Department of Agriculture was there which over time took on even more importance as
hemp emerged as another key area of policy development. The Department of Public
Safety. I will say that one lesson learned from my perspective was that it’s not sufficient
to only have the department heads or cabinet level appointees at the table. There was
huge value in having principal or key state staff at those meetings as well. (P2)
Colorado also legalized adult use in 2012. And so both—both of us embarked in a
journey where we shared much of the knowledge and information we’ve received. A lot
of it came from Colorado, who was the only state at that time, that had a functionally

118
regulated medical system, which—we had a medical system in our state, but it wasn’t
regulated. (P11)
Another area of coordination was around law enforcement. In the early days of
legalization that was really critical. One thing that MED did well and because I came
from a law enforcement background, I helped promote a law enforcement coordination
meeting of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. (P2)
Additionally, collaboration occurred at the federal level. After Washington and Colorado
passed legalizing legislation, there was concern that neither state would ever get to the point of
full implementation based on federal preemption. This meant that because cannabis (marijuana)
was still classified as a schedule I controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances
Act, and its production, processing and sale was considered a criminal activity, neither state
would be able to issue licenses because the federal government would shut down programs
before they ever started. However, Washington had collaborated with the author of their enabling
statutes and the federal government while drafting conceptual regulations:
And so the Cole memo was a really pivotal point in legalization. It was that day, that that
was issued and then we knew because we had been in discussions with the US attorneys
in Washington, both of them. They were looking toward and in fact . . . wrote it to reflect
what . . . would be of concern to the US attorneys and to the federal government,
knowing that it was creating a program that was illicit federally. Then the Cole
memorandum came, those 3 enforcement priorities are actually 8 enforcement priorities
embedded within the memo. But the 3 big ones, how you going to limit youth access,
how you going to keep the criminal element out of licensure cartels and the like, and
then, how are you going to keep it from being diverted out of the state? Really those
were, those were covered in our regulations and so it was at that point . . . there was a
belief for a moment, okay . . . the system that we've set up is very consistent with those
enforcement priorities. (P11)
finally, a couple of years ago I actually got to ask James Cole to give a presentation at . . .
[a]conference in Maryland . . . I had our picture taken with him and I—I asked him and
he said, yeah, they had looked that up. (P4, referencing draft conceptual rules to
implement enabling legislation)
In summary, this particular set of findings speak to the nature of complex systems. Participants
described systems properties and characteristics, and the interactions of those properties and
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characteristics that suggest communication and collaboration were critical to building interactive
trust between and across systems. Participants made space for interactive trust to develop, but it
was not designed as “adaptive space” consistent with complexity leadership theory. Rather, it
was space created to bring multiple systems together, build relationships, share information, and
align purpose. The most important piece of this is that systems actions, interactions, and
subsequent emergence as new systems was not driven by any specific person. This parallels the
second theme emerging from interviews, and that is:
Theme 2: Complexity Is Not a Behavior, Characteristic or Trait of “Leadership” or
“Leaders” in Complex Regulatory Systems
Change, Emergence, and Innovation in Complex Regulatory Systems Is Not the Result of the
Actions or Behaviors of a “Leader” or the Practice of “Leadership”
Contrary to much of what is offered concerning complexity leadership theory, these
findings suggest that complex systems change is not connected to the actions or behavior of any
one individual identified as a leader, such as a director, executive, or any other person embedded
within these systems. One participant provided an elegant, simple statement that summarized
experience of change in complex regulatory systems:
I am a survivor, not a leader. (P12)
I contemplated concluding discussion here because this sentence seemed to accurately represent
what I learned from participants about their experience as “leaders” while creating regulatory
systems and subsequently regulating cannabis. It also caused me to think about the difference
between “leaders” and the practice of “leadership.” Do either really exist? More about that in
Chapters V and VI.
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Be that as it may, there are additional points to consider as part of this finding.
Participants did not state, suggest or claim credit for the direction of any group, entity or system
involved in cannabis legalization and subsequent regulation. As discussed more fully below,
participants recalled experiences in terms of group or systems activity, instead speaking more in
terms of “we” rather than “I.” As noted above, participants also willingly acknowledged that
legalization required them to create regulations for an existing area of then grey-market
commerce that they were unfamiliar with. How are these two themes related?
Participants were clear and resoundingly unified in their characterization of that
work as a participatory, inclusive process. Narrative illustrated that participants recognized that
systems had to work together in the early stages of regulatory construction, in a way that would
result in collective systems change, but the change had to be driven by the systems, not
individuals. For example:
We wanted it to, um, bring people out of the shadows. Let’s try and get them into the
light and make them as ‘real world’ as possible, you know, so that they’re not continuing
to operate in the black market, which would have been [more] competition for one thing.
But give them some credence to what they’re doing. That it is now okay in the state of
Washington to do this. I think one of the good sides [about I-502] . . . was [that it] tried to
include as many people as possible and bringing them into, you know, the legal
marketplace. (P5)
We hadn’t been as an agency involved in regulating cannabis in any shape or form when
it was medical. So the only thing I knew was the initiative that I read before it was
adopted by the people. There was not a lot of time or effort to look at how this was going
to work. We began to put teams together just as it became more clear that it looked like
the initiative would pass. But the extent of my knowledge was almost zero—as far as
how we would regulate the new industry. I mean we're all aware of cannabis, but as far as
how it would be regulated, none. (P11; this quote appears in part above, but bears
repeating in full here)
So, we were able to bring in representatives from the FBI, DEA, Postal Inspector, and
other federal agencies, as well as state agencies like State Patrol and the Colorado Bureau
of Investigation, and police departments and sheriff’s offices. Of particular value were
local agencies that had regulated marijuana in their jurisdictions. On a monthly basis we
would meet and held what we called the MILE meeting—or Marijuana Interagency Law
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Enforcement meeting. It was an effort to bring major law enforcement stakeholders
together to get information, and share information, at a policy level and operationally. I
think that went a long way in attempting to be responsive to law enforcement concerns
with the impacts of legalization. (P2)
Eventually, as the market began to mature and the idea of legalized cannabis became less
threatening to many, relationships evolved:
society and culture and public opinion on cannabis has shifted in the last decade and so I
think in some ways the problem is resolving itself in the sense that the MED is clearly
more focused on the regulatory side and it's not unfair to say that we clearly are in some
ways a partner with our industry, working together with our licensees. It doesn’t mean
that we aren't still taking enforcement action or taking administrative regulatory actions
routinely. But we're clearly working far more closely together than probably in those
early days when we were still trying to work through what that relationship would look
like. (P2)
Participants also recognized that the progression of those relationships was important to the
legalization continuum, noting that certain individuals had specific, but limited roles in that
continuum:
I think that I did what I was good at. And that it’s okay that that wasn't everything. But it
was a—you know, I think I did what—I think I played the role I was supposed to play.
(P1)
he was very much, uh, of a reasonable type of viewpoint . . . always been flexible. He
knows how to walk in the law enforcement world, but he also knows how to walk in the
broader picture world of what we do. And so he was the right leader, I think for division,
uhm, at that time. (P5)
To illustrate this further, Participant 1 spoke to change and emergence as a collective systems
dynamic. Note, however, that the focus of the quotes below are on the overall effect of an
initiative as a catalyst for change, rather than a specific individual leading that or “leadership”
being embedded in a complex system to bring about change. Instead, a handful of systems are
referenced in a foundational context that led to creation of a tool or a catalyst—Initiative 502—
that would impact the broader system, and ultimately, result in cannabis legalization:
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the word I use for 502 and—and what—what makes it so successful to me is that it was a
catalyst, that's what it was intended to be. It was a catalyst and it did that. And the more
poetic image that I have of it was when it came to me when I was . . . but—but it’s the
image that comes up for me is the diamond tip spear. So, I imagined cannabis prohibition
in the war on drugs in general is a very, very, very thick plate of glass. (P1)
And 502 is intended to be a diamond tip spear that hit it and started making cracks,
started making fissures and that it was going to be more and more work and more and
more pressure that was gonna break those fissures, make them longer, broader, et cetera,
until the pool wall came down. And that’s what it’s always been for me. It was never an
end point. It was always the thing that was supposed to capitalize on the momentum that
had already been built right. There had to be someone to throw that spear and that's like
going back to Seattle Hempfest being around for decades, going back to the medical
marijuana laws being passed. It was so much energy that was building in this direction to
be able to land that spear and start cracking it. But yeah, there's still work to be done
before the glass shatters. (P1)
Participants did not provide responses suggestive of a checklist of unique but requisite “leader”
or “leadership” actions or behaviors that were used during legislative implementation or
afterward. Instead, they relied on the tools and processes available to them and adjusted where
necessary. Turning back to a quote from above, “There was not a lot of time or effort to look at
how this was going to work” (P11). The inference that I draw from this statement and from the
general sentiment of participants is that no one relied on a theory of leadership to design their
approach to cannabis legalization, before, during or after legalization. No specific “leader” was
designated to coax or enable innovation. From a practical perspective, timelines were too tight to
do that, and this is the reality of public, governmental systems. If leadership occurred here at all,
and I explore that further in Chapter VI, there is no leadership theory that describes participants’
experience. Responses suggest that complexity did not have a role as a tool to guide people
toward directing emergence or innovation in cannabis legalization.
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Tension In Complex Regulatory Systems Can Be Leveraged As a Dynamic and Driver of
Change, but “Leaders” Do Not Have Any Control Over the Level or Extent of That Tension
Participants clearly knew they were walking into existing complex, yet informal systems
and formal systems that had yet to be built that they could not control. Transcripts tell us that the
word “control” appears only in one of three contexts. The first is in reference to the Controlled
Substances Act, or CSA, that describes drug scheduling previously discussed in Chapter I. The
second is in reference to language in I-502, specifically, “Takes marijuana out of the hands of
illegal drug organizations and brings it under a tightly regulated, state-licensed system similar to
that for controlling hard alcohol.” The third is in reference to the Washington State Liquor
Control Board or the Oregon Liquor Control Commission. However, participants recognized that
there were systems tensions that could impact or influence how systems interacted, and
ultimately, regulatory success. In other words, the authorizing environment was filled with
unknowns and instability. For example:
think about the difficulty of creating a policy that restricts, and you’ve already got all
these growers out there growing illicitly. (P11)
Other recollections included,
it was walking through a minefield, I guess. (P5)
It was unknown. (P11)
dealing [with] a unknown world of marijuana regulation. (P12)
there was always the thought that we, as the Marijuana Enforcement Division, even
though many of us, about half of us, were police officers carrying guns and handcuffs,
that we, ourselves, could be charged by the federal government under some theory of
complicity. (P2)
always walking that tightrope was part of the equation. (P5)
there are competing priorities for this kind of regulatory process, and you lose some. (P8)
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There was also tension with legislative bodies and regulators:
I think there was always this tension with the legislation each year. In some
circumstances we appreciated when the legislature would closely define in statute exactly
their intent; but with other issues they granted broad rulemaking authority to us and the
direction to us was to have a pretty robust conversation with our stakeholders. Candidly
the folks with the most to gain were licensees. That was the community typically with
their lobbyists and counsel. I don't think there's any question there. What I think MED
tried to do was make sure that we broadened that circle at rulemaking to make sure that
we had all of those voices at the table. (P2)
There was pre-existing tension between the legacy market and the initiatives and propositions to
legalize cannabis:
So right now it's a misdemeanor if you sell to a minor alcohol. The fact that you would
give a young person a felony at a young age for selling cannabis to someone underage,
just give you an example how strict the initiative was in order to get the, the support of
folks out there like law enforcement, for example. So just think the initiative was written
in a fashion to be rather conservative. With a high tax rate on it to generate revenue.
(P11)
So there were a lot of things that I can see now the initiative, but it also made it very very
difficult for the regulator coming in to have to deal with the conflicts that were
established by that initiative, of the only regulated marketplace out there and not very
regulated as you know, but medical and it was really we still, we still get the criticism
today of that initiative, not properly addressing the needs of medical patients. Even
though we've tried. (P11)
There was tension in communities over where cannabis farms would be located:
So, we had some residual sort of national lead and Washington dealt with this . . . whole
group which was sort of anti-drug . . .they had their reach into states and they had their
reach into Oregon. So, we had a lot of that overlook on our implementation from what I
would say was sort of the very, the conservative community . . . we had rural landowners
that didn't want to see their countryside overrun by marijuana growers, didn't want to be
next to them, they don't want them as neighbors, didn't want the water use or the conflicts
that even just farming . . . production would bring to them . . . so we had that in the mix,
and then the whole issue of taxation was not well-crafted inside the ballot measure and
now that was gonna need some reworking, everyone knew but everyone was concerned
about that. So, there was active constant resistance. (P12)
Almost all of the above narrative speaks to tension that exists beyond the regulators purview, but
that very much reside in the systems within the authorizing environment. For example, even
though measures to legalize the possession and sale of cannabis passed in the three states,
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passage margins were thin compared to other initiatives, underscoring the tension between
conservative and less conservative voters. There was existing tension between
prohibition-minded entities, such as public health and some law enforcement agencies, and
entities interested in removing prohibition, like the ACLU and NORML. Furthermore, that
authorizing environment is where regulations are created. Participants seemed to address this
tension head on, with in-person meetings or “road shows” as described in previous subsections
of these findings, to build relationships, seek common ground, build trust, communicate and
collaborate. In this way, participants were able to leverage tension to achieve a common goal.
Participants did not indicate that they had any control over the amount of tension applied
to a system, its duration, or its substance. As one participant noted, even though cannabis has
been legal in their state for over a decade by initiative, not by a singular agency action,
we still get the criticism today of that initiative, not properly addressing the needs of
medical patients. Even though we’ve tried. (P11)
Collective Systems Action Connected to Purpose Can Result in Complex Systems Change
Interview questions were open-ended, inviting participants to describe the “how” of
leading change in context. For that reason, while leadership was not necessarily the focus of the
question stream, participants described how they managed being at the “tip of the spear” in ways
that clearly demonstrated group involvement, and not a singular effort to lead change in the way
leadership theories seem to describe. This was evidenced by participants who might have been
anticipated to refer to their actions in directing or guiding systems behavior one way or another
continually referred to their actions in terms of “we” as opposed to “I.”
Although referenced previously, two quotes illustrate a perception and belie by those I
interviewed that unified purpose drives systems change.
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But, that was part of it and that's part of being a regulator is you, is you make a lot of
people upset and, but I think that what we tried to do was to be fair and to be smart and to
listen to people along the way and be willing to adjust. And that, I can say, definitely
happened. That gives you purpose. If you're doing that as your job, your feel like you're
doing the right thing. (P7)
I felt a responsibility like I think a lot of people did to be able to do this right and to be
able to demonstrate that we as an agency and the state, we're gonna do it right and defy
the tons of people within the industry who said that we're going to screw it all up.
And I felt the weight of not failing but in fact succeeding always and I think that, that
drove me and the time is just like a blur now, even those many years because it was so
much work. (P7)
I wish I would have kept a journal of who I saw and when, because it was a lot of
traveling, a lot of talking with people. But one of the key things for me is I wanted it to be
successful. I knew there'd be jumps and starts to this thing, and it wasn't going to be
smoother. It'd be bumpy to get it up and grow everything new was bumpy. But I wanted
it to get past that and be successful. (P5)
The story unfolded to indicate that even unified purpose can change over time based on a variety
of factors. Consider that in 2019, legislation was introduced and subsequently enacted that
changed the way WSLCB applied its regulations pertaining to enforcement and education.
Consistent with an assertion above, society has become more familiar with cannabis. Concerns
about its production, processing and sale, and as a result, concerns are beginning to diminish.
Simultaneously, political movement toward relaxation of originally restrictive regulatory
frameworks has gained traction, and much like the enabling legislation, WSLCB had an
opportunity to revise enforcement practices to flex with the market:
leading all the way up until the events of the last couple of years where we sort of
reorganize the purpose, and de-emphasized enforcement and more education came about
in some ways from reactions from the industry, who thought that some of their
Enforcement Officers, uhm, were too strong. (P7)
In summary, this collection of findings speaks to the way that participants described being part of
a monumental change in drug policy that was brought about by the will of citizens. They
described that change in a way that suggests that even though several were recognized as
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directors of agencies or directors within agencies, they did not “lead change” as much as they
participated in the process of change in complex systems. They did not describe leading
anything complexly or guiding any part of a system or the collection of systems. Rather, they
described working with the tensions of and between the systems as legalization and subsequent
implementation occurred, moving with the systems through change by building interactive trust
even in spaces that were not hospitable.
Theme 3: The Interplay Between Social Justice and Social Equity Is Complex and
Oversimplified
Oversimplification Creates Barriers to Realizing Social Equity in Cannabis
For purposes of these findings, it may be helpful to establish some understandings of
social justice and social equity. The following are offered as part of the learning history artifact:
Social justice is a communal effort dedicated to creating and sustaining a fair and equal
society in which each person and all groups are valued and affirmed. It encompasses efforts
to end systemic racism and all systems that devalue the dignity and humanity of any person
(John Lewis Institute for Social Justice, n.d.).
Social equity is the fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the
public directly or by contract; and the fair distribution of public service, and
implementation of public policy; and the commitment to promote fairness, justness and
equity in the formation of public policy (McSherry, 2013).
These definitions suggest that social justice may be more connected to a society in general and
more specifically to racism, while social equity may be more connected to the way in which
institutions serve the members of society. This distinction may be nuanced and small to some,
but in the present context, it is a difference that matters. The following explains why.
The first efforts to legalize cannabis in the United States—Washington’s Initiative 502
and Colorado’s Amendment 64—were rooted in criminal justice reform. As much as segments of
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the authorizing environment frown on that characterization, these measures were framed to begin
the conversation,
I think it's a great thing that people feel so comfortable now in pointing out the flaws with
502 because that means it worked. (P1)
and participants were clear that both were conservative approaches designed to pass,
It’s my opinion that the bill was written to pass, not to be good law, with the expectation
that as soon as it passed, the legislators could then manipulate it to make the changes
needed to make it good law. (P10)
and to be the first, not the last blow, to cannabis prohibition:
So, I imagined cannabis prohibition in the War on Drugs in general is a very, very, very
thick plate of glass. And 502 is intended to be a diamond tip spear that hit it and started
making cracks, started making fissures and that it was going to be more and more work
and more and more pressure that was gonna break those fissures, make them longer,
broader, et cetera, until the whole wall came down. And that's what it's always been for
me. It was never an end point. It was always the thing that was supposed to capitalize on
the momentum that had already been built right. (P1)
it was a catalyst, and that’s what it was meant to be. (P1)
but the hope is that we get a foot in the door and we start kicking the door open wider and
wider and wider. (P3)
For these reasons, these initiatives had to be narrowly tailored to make that first strike. The
political and cultural landscape at the time these measures were introduced played a significant
role in their underlying purpose.
So, Seattle gathered gleefully around the International Fountain at the Seattle Center
(home of the 1962 World’s Fair and the Space Needle) on legalization day December 6, 2012, to
light celebratory pipes, doobies, and bongs together. And, as Jimi Hendrix and Pearl Jam played
in sync to the lights of the fountain and the air filled with skunky musk, a medical cannabis
consumer could breathe a little easier, but probably for a different reason. While many believed
that I-502 made smoking weed in the streets possible (it didn’t), what they were actually toking
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to was one of the first successful cannabis prohibition harms reduction measures in the world at
that moment in history. Washington State made international news.
Multiple examples of the scope of that harm, along with the victimization of medical
cannabis patients and others were offered during interviews. I share these in their entirety
because to paraphrase these here would dilute the gravity, depth and truly, the terror of the war
on drugs:
I'm doing this for the people who are getting hurt the most by our current policies. So,
everybody who gets arrested, everybody who gets stripped searched when they are put
into a jail cell, experiences a trauma that is absolutely horrific. The shame of being
publicly charged as a criminal of having to show up for court appearances, that the—had
the way that that puts your life on a completely different trajectory once that's happened
to you is horrible for every single human being. There’s nothing good about the criminal
justice system for anybody that gets pushed into it. But for people with terminal and
medically debilitating conditions, that’s just not—that's just not an acceptable outcome at
all. So, at a minimum, we needed to deal with that. (P1)
It’s—it’s always been about the people at the core of the harms that, um, that have driven
me to do the policy work. (P1)
And that’s—that’s what medical patients were dealing with the time, is not knowing if
they would get raided being afraid to grow for themselves because they knew that would
be an even more serious than if they were just caught in possession of a personal use of
mount. But both were crimes both subjectively. And even if you had a doctor's
authorization, it was still only an affirmative defense, meaning all that piece of paper got
you was the opportunity to put on a defense at trial after you'd already dealt with all the
stress of being in the margins of the law. Maybe had your home raided. Maybe been put
in handcuffs. Maybe had to spend one or more nights in jail, gotten charged. Maybe
your—maybe your family deserted you because of the stress. Maybe you've lost your job.
All of these horrible things could still happen to you. That was absolutely okay, under the
law, as it existed. All that you got was, you know, once you got charged with a crime,
you could stand in front of the judge and or the jury or both, and explain “I have this
authorization” And then you would have to defend whether or not you've had a 60-day
supply, right? Because if you have more than 60 days ago, it didn't even matter. (P1)
We had patients who were actually victims of crime. And they had nowhere to go, they
didn't want to tell law enforcement or doctors, because if they told law enforcement about
the crime they experienced because they were trying to obtain medical marijuana then
they would then be subject to arrest so they would call and sometimes they needed
somebody to talk to. Um, some, some of them recognized that they were in a catch-22
situation and they just needed to talk to someone about the fact that not only were they
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being taken advantage of in contracts, but they were victims of crimes. I remember these
2 women who quite a few months apart, called me and, separately and, I don't think they
knew each other but they saw some information where they could get medical marijuana
or heard about it. So they met up with this person, at the REDACTED Counties area and
they became victims of rape by this person. (P6)
some of the dynamics in that space where that, you know, if a patient did to make a
particular coop owner, as we called them at the time, upset with them would be socially
ostracized. Not be able to come to that coop anymore. And wouldn't have anywhere else
to go because again, this was all, at the time, all of these coops were operating in this
gray area that had no actual legal structure around it, and were subject to the possibility
of raids at any time. So it was just a very—it was a very fragile environment for
somebody with a terminal or seriously debilitating medical condition to be navigating,
trying to secure something that provided them relief from pain and address other
symptoms associated with their conditions. (P1)
Of note in these reflections is what is missing. While participants offered responses from the
general underlying premise that the war on drugs disproportionately impacted communities of
color, observations and reflections of other harms associated with cannabis prohibition were not
connected to a specific race, but more to the medical cannabis community. This seems to suggest
that there was more political and cultural texture underlying initial legalization efforts than has
been acknowledged in the current narrative around legalization, and that as a social justice
(relying on the definition of social justice above) measure, I-502 may have quietly contemplated
dimensions beyond race:
if you have the space to just protect everybody from that kind of suffering, you should
just go ahead and do that. And that's what we realized is that the political—the political
winds shifted tremendously from 2009 to 2012 because we had, you know, the Ogden
memorandum come out and say that the federal government was not going to be spending
resources going after medical cannabis. (P1)
Additionally, the legacy market, consisting of unlicensed producers, processors, and retailers,
was unregulated. While there were segments of that market committed to staying within the
boundaries of law and the few regulations that existed pre-legalization, there were just as many,
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if not more, that were not. This was one of the reasons that there was no way to know how many
of those businesses were owned by Black and Brown people.
there's a lot of an awful lot of talk now about that system and what was owed to people of
color but that system merged because there was nothing in there that distinguished, a
black-owned business from a white-owned own business because most of them weren't
actually businesses. (P7)
Even if agencies were able to make that determination while early legalization efforts were
underway, how would framers identify pillars of social equity in cannabis and then align them
with social justice efforts when neither had been attempted before, and the political climate of
the time may not have been supportive of either element?
This begins to highlight the connection between cannabis’ history, social and racial justice,
and considering how we might consider creating socially equitable conditions moving forward. It
also moves us into the next finding.
Social Justice Initiatives Had to Occur Before Social Equity Could Be Realized
Participants provided eloquent narrative to link social justice and social equity in context:
The problem with trying to draft 502 from a social equity perspective is not just that that
was so far beyond where Washington State voters were in the conversation but also
because it's very difficult to do in one state, where you know that the federal government,
one of its primary concerns and letting you go forward, and this is exactly one of the
things that came out in the memo, you know, the Cole memo. I keep saying Coles. It was
Holder who did that medical marijuana when the Holder was also the one who advised
Cole on the factors, right? The eight factors that the federal government would look at
right. And cannabis is seeping across state lines. It was gonna be a real problem and not
having a lockdown system is going to have a real problem.
And so, when you have artificial market restrictions on a new industry so that
you're trying to control how much cannabis is being produced, you're trying to control
how many shops can be opened, trying to control, you know, how many retail outlets
there could be in the same way that the liquor control board established when we are in
state monopoly for alcohol. They chose how many there were, right. So, if you have that
artificially constructed marketplace, the people who are going to benefit are people who
already have access to capital and wealth and power. And this is a country that is built
on centuries of concentrating wealth in the hands of a few elite white colonists.
So, there’s no way that getting marijuana legalization and regulation passed in
Washington State in 2012 was going be able to create a socially racially equitable
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marketplace. That dynamic—the structure was just not there to do that. We also couldn't
because of our anti-affirmative action law passed. We couldn't have the state saying it
wasn't possible for the state to say we're actually going to give the licenses to people from
specific racial categories or some give them preference. We couldn't preference anything
in that way. Even if voters would have gone for that 2011–2012. So, yes, I think that
the—I think that the conversation right now is extraordinarily over simplified, um, and,
um, but that’s okay. What—what matters to me is that the conversation is happening.
(P1, emphasis added)
Our focus has been how do we ensure diversity and not erect barriers to color in the ranks
of licensees, particularly with equity ownership. That can be very challenging because of
the structure and history of American capitalism and how in an ideal world, social justice
would have been a theme around which Amendment 64 could have been wrapped 10
years ago. But again, I think, Amendment 64 was born in an era of federal prohibition,
with marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance, and there were other priorities.
There was not the same level of interest or understanding at the time so the special
challenge for pioneering states like Colorado is that we didn't have the opportunity or the
direction when we created the framework and the economy around the industry to
prioritize social equity higher. And so once that framework, and investments and
licensees are in place, it becomes challenging to modify later. (P2)
While these initial legalization efforts concentrated on beginning to tear down the walls of
prohibition by focusing on social justice,
much of the treatment of cannabis is largely race-based and you truly need to understand
that if you're going to really understand the concern about social justice and the right
responses. (P2)
the focus was not on social equity:
no one that I remember ever ever came forward and said, "What are you gonna do about
social equity within the system? It was all “How are you going to get this system up and
how soon? Because it should be up yesterday." And I talked to an awful lot of people and
an awful lot of reporters, representing an awful lot of people. I don’t remember a single
one ever asking me that . . . but, social equity in retrospect is really something that came
at a later date, when I think California and some jurisdictions in California, started taking
a look at that and that, that started I think a lot of conversations, including up here in
Washington. (P7)
Social equity can come in a variety of ways as we've learned. Now, unfortunately, the
initiative was silent on that. (P11)
We began only as we learned in California, New York, Michigan, Illinois. Massachusetts
that communities of color were rising with these new initiatives to legalize adult use.
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That they were saying, "Hey, wait a minute, there's more to this program than just
making it legal. You need to do what you can to create a social equity license.
In other words, giving preference or set aside for people that were harmed. And so we
had already issued licenses, our system is set up in our state is particularly problematic
because we have limits to the number of retail locations. So even when we passed our
social equity bill 2 years ago to allow for it, our system was already set up. So there’s
only a handful of licenses even today that are available, which for the—So the critics
look at that and say, you just throwing crumbs at a problem because it's already been
established. So we've been left out of the cannabis industry. There's some truth to that,
because if you didn't, if you weren't successful initially at licensure then you were left
out. (P11)
This highlights the overarching policy challenge,
And when we merge medical, we saw a bigger problem because there were folks who
were in the medical dispensaries community who, of communities of color, who said "I
lost my dispensary because you didn't allow for more retail locations than the number
that we had when we had medical dispensaries which obviously made them feel like
again, they have been purposely left out of the system. (P11)
and sets the course for the future:
And now we need to fix it. Now we need to, you know, we need to keep improving it.
And we need for social equity to become a centerpiece of the policy going forward and to
inform whatever the federal government decides if and when it changes cannabis laws at
the federal level. (P1, emphasis added)
While states have significant efforts underway to begin addressing social equity in cannabis
programs, there is much to do. Some options to support that work—to move statute and
regulation in a direction that supports socially equitable conditions, are offered in Chapter 6
based on these findings.
Yet, the more pervasive challenges, as noted by participants are the bias and stigma that
remains around cannabis.
Cannabis-Related Bias is Multi-Dimensional and Pervasive
There's quite a bias out there against cannabis legalization . . . It's, it's time to take the
bias away and the stigma that people have placed on cannabis for years, even those that
supported legalization. We still, we still deal with it today. (P11)
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That bias, however, is not always focused on the plant itself, who uses it, or the reasons they use
it. Some public health and prevention advocates have played and continue to play a significant
role in cannabis stigmatization by reliance on the failed policies of the war on drugs. Participants
recognized that youth have always had access to cannabis, regardless of its legal status. The
apparent refusal of many public health and prevention advocates to find common ground with
regulators, the regulated community, and others was recognized as a missed opportunity to offer
education, support, and engagement as a collaborative approach to legalization. Indeed, during
the 2022 Washington state legislative session, a white public health-focused legislator brought a
measure forward that would impact the way public health resources, education and outreach
were provided to communities of color on this premise that such efforts would work toward
achieving environmental justice in communities impacted by health disparities. However, the
legislator did not consult with any communities of color, or legislators of color that would be
impacted by such a measure before introducing it. This unspoken assumption of knowledge
supremacy and privilege is woven deeply into the fabric of measures packaged and sold to
support public health and prevention efforts. These measures are often directed at the agencies
tasked with implementing legislation to legalize, and with rulemaking authority to change rules
in response to market trends, industry growth, and as new information and best practices are
developed. Participants recognize this:
The public has a bias against it . . . I can't change reality. I can't, I can, I can recognize
that the bias is, is not healthy for the industry and that we should do everything we can to
remove it. But don't be so naive to believe that, that wouldn't be there. That will take time.
(P11, emphasis added).
What seems to matter is how energy is expended to move toward socially equitable conditions.
Currently, an extraordinary amount of negative energy is focused on regulators, even though the
agencies are carrying out the wishes of citizen’s initiatives and legislative mandates:
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Don’t rally against the regulator, or don’t rally against it, because the bias is there, of
course. We just recognize it . . . and then we address it as we can. (P11, emphasis added).
In summary, findings suggest that changing statute and rule alone will not lead to socially
equitable conditions. Efforts to begin the process of deconstructing institutionalized exclusion in
the form of cannabis prohibition is an iterative process that needed a starting point, and
legalization efforts were the first—not the last—of those efforts. By oversimplifying the history
of cannabis legalization, we lose sight of the reasons for legalization in the first place. I-502 and
Proposition 64 laid the foundation for conversations around social equity to be possible today.
Even so, cannabis stigma and bias are still very much a part of the United States narrative, and
like any significant social shift, will take time to change. In the meantime, lessons from the past
can be relied upon to inform the future and remind all of us that the more hands we have on the
spear, the greater our chances of achieving a fair and just society.
Conclusion
These findings suggested three primary themes that describe the ways that complexity is
experienced in regulatory systems. First, complexity describes both the properties and
characteristics of systems. Change occurs in complex systems based on these properties and
characteristics. These properties and characteristics seem to fall into two categories: those that
are related to processes and outcomes, and those that are related to subjective values and human
behaviors. Interestingly, there are some properties and characteristics that are similar. Systems
with these complex properties and characteristics are capable of self-guiding by and through
communication and collaboration, and this occurs at the systems level by building interactive
trust.
The second theme builds on the first by describing participants shared experiences which
suggest that complexity does not describe a behavior, or an action leading people or systems).
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Instead, systems interactions are guided by a range of participants with common purpose, and
this can result in systems change. Additionally, tension that is inherent in some complex
regulatory systems can be engaged as a dynamic driver of change, but an individual identified as
a “leader” do not control the level or flow of that tension, even when it is embedded in the
system.
The final theme is related complex interplay between social equity and social justice, and
participant observation that this interplay has been oversimplified. However, the propensity to
reduce complex issues may serve as a barrier in achieving social equity goals, and in some cases,
social justice initiatives must occur before social equity can be realized. It is part of an iterative
process that can be tied to a number of variables, including pervasive cannabis-related bias,
including but not limited to stigmatization and weaponization.
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CHAPTER V: ON COMPLEXITY
There is no more important task in a democracy than resolving the differences among
people and finding a course of action that will be supported by a sufficient number to
permit the nation to achieve a better life for all.
—Robert McNamara, In Retrospect
Complexity is a key construct of this research. In Chapter II, I provided a critical analysis
and synthesis linking complexity theory, research, and practice in both the public administration
and leadership realms. To add more depth to our understanding of complexity and contribute to
the call for consistency in the ways that complexity is constructed and applied in practice, this
chapter more deeply explores complexity and complex regulatory systems based on my findings.
To accomplish this, I have structured this chapter in a way that presents the two most
prominent concepts offered by this research in order of occurrence. I offer this type of
scaffolding not only because it is necessary to understand the breadth and depth of the content
offered, but also because these concepts progressively and chronologically build on one another.
In doing so, however, I take great care in providing detailed descriptions and analysis. I take this
approach to demonstrate that in oversimplifying complexity and complex issues, by privileging
checklists, how-to articles, and bullet points, we fail to understand, recognize, and acknowledge
the complexity of complexity, and how it might be better theorized in government, leadership,
and academics. In some ways, then, the form and substance of this chapter could be considered
as a version of my own learning history.
I pause to recognize that in Chapter IV, this research offers what I refer to as empirical
emergence, rather than generalizable findings. This is reflective of the authorizing environment
that situates this research, which I have noted can be characterized as ambiguous and unstable,
and for which problems may have a range, rather than a single, solution. It also aligns with one
of my research goals to seek yes/and solutions, recognizing that for some problems, solutions are
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more of a moving, amoeba-like target where a range of options and some flexibility may be the
best approach. Cannabis regulation and the challenges associated with it fall into that category.
I begin by discussing linkages between findings offered in Chapter IV and the elements
of complexity leadership theory. With this as a backdrop, I resituate and anchor complexity
theory beyond what was offered in Chapter II. Building on this, I then conduct a systems level
analysis that explores the properties and characteristics of the complex regulatory systems that
are the subject of this research. I rely on a theoretical blending of complexity and systems levels
to frame this analysis, contrasting complexity leadership theory’s treatment of complexity with
research findings. This framing is not only critical to better understand the nature and dynamics
of complexity, complex systems, and the dimensions of change in context, but to understand
what role leadership played in that change, how complex regulatory systems evolved during the
course of cannabis legalization efforts, and how participants engaged with complex regulatory
systems.
Linking Complexity Leadership Theory to Findings
To further connect research findings to the theoretical constructs of complexity, I focus
on two specific elements of complexity theory that underpin complexity leadership theory
(CLT). I explore these elements as they are applied in CLT and analyze whether there are
linkages between CLT and my findings.
As noted in Chapter II, defining complexity has proven to be a challenge. Despite this,
there are a collection of insights from complexity science and theory that are used to explain “the
function of human organizations and the roles of their managers and leaders” (Stacey et al.,
2000, p. 154). Among these are emergence and adaptation (Cairney et al., 2019; J. Holland,
2014; Kok et al., 2021; Morçöl, 2012; Mitchell, 2009; Waldrop, 1992).
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Emergence
CLT proponents assert that emergence occurs through a specific type of leadership that is
part of the CLT suite of three leadership types. Identified as “enabling leadership,” this prong of
CLT “not only fosters internal tension, it judiciously injects tension” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p.
311). Rosenhead et al. (2019) offer that “Studies that leverage the theoretical lens of emergence
are interested in understanding how ‘adaptive change actually happen[s] at the coarse-grained
level when human interaction is experienced and predicted at the fine-grained level” (p. 9, citing
Hazy & Uhl-Bien, 2014, p. 712).
From a more complexity science-based perspective, J. Holland (2014) offers that,
“emergence occurs when the generators for a generated system combine to yield objects having
properties not obtained by summing properties of the individual generators” (p. 69). As an
example, J. Holland provides the following example:
the characteristics of “wetness” cannot reasonably be assigned to individual H20
molecules, so we see that the wetness of water is not obtained by summing up the
wetness of the constituent molecules—wetness emerges from the interactions between
molecules. (p. 49)
This aligns with Prigogine’s (2003) assertion that “[a]lso in complex systems long range
correlations appear between components with very short-range local interactions” (p. 55).
Additionally, the New England Complex Systems Institute suggests that emergence might be
defined as “the existence or formation of collective behaviors—what parts of a systems do
together that they would not do alone” (New England Complex Systems Institute, n.d.).
In contrast, CLT does not provide a consistent definition of emergence or its implications
as part of the construct. Rather, it shifts in meaning that ranges from, for example, a way to lead,
the results of leadership, or a descriptor of the outcome of what is characterized as innovation.
Similarly, in other disciplines, like management and organizational development, emergence “is
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vaguely defined . . . [and] somewhat controversial” (Morçöl, 2012, p. 62), and often merged and
coupled with self-organization (Stacey, 1995).
From the public administration perspective, Morçöl offers that to understand emergence,
we should look to established theories of public policy related to macro and micro systems and
consider the major and minor persistent problems with it. Morçöl notes that conceptualizing
micro-level processes like individual behavior might be described by punctuated equilibrium
theory, and macro-level processes might be described by institutional rational choice theory. In
contrast, CLT does not extend its query, although it is possible that the fine-grained and
coarse-grained interactions that Hazy and Uhl-Bien (2014) reference might suggest
contemplation of some sort of connection to micro-macro systems, albeit insulated from the
messy parts of human interaction. I discuss such linkages later in this chapter.
While exploring the group of theories Morçöl suggests might frame exploration around
emergence might answer a different set of questions related to the present research, the micro
and macro systems level behavior Morçöl alludes to suggest a different approach. Systems levels
are more closely related to sociological or psychological theory, specifically the “micro-macro
problem” (Morçöl, 2012, p. 62). This “problem” is very much associated with this research and
runs parallel to another issue related to sociological theory that concerns the relationship between
agency and structure (Ritzer & Stepnisky, 2017). As I will describe below, this relationship is
also important to this research. These problems are identified in other disciplines like public
administration by different names, but leadership does not appear to be focused on it, although
many leadership theories involve these very relationships. What does any of that have to do with
emergence?
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Although the roots of these conflicts go back to Hobbes, Smith and others, the central
problem concerns “how the purposeful actions of individuals were connected to macrosocial
phenomena. How do the acts of individual political (and economic) actors lead to macro events
in politics and the economy?” (Morçöl, 2012, p. 63). Beginning to understand these acts—the
actions of individual humans that exist within and comprise these micro and macro systems and
determining whether there are corresponding structure and agency dimensions as sociologists
theorize—is critical in exploring the dynamics of complex regulatory, and possibly other,
systems.
Agency, Structure, and Emergence
Morçöl (2012) offers that complexity theorists’ answer to the agency and structure
problem is emergence. Indeed, CLT proponents imply that complexity thinking informs
emergence in social systems, such as organizations. For example, Marion and Uhl-Bien (2001)
assert that “the complex leader creates organized disorder in which dynamic things happen in
multiple locales” and such a leader “spawn[s] emergent behavior and creative surprises rather
than to specify and control organizational activities” (p. 406). Plowman and Duchon (2008)
suggest a “new reality,” where rather than leaders influencing outcomes, that “leaders encourage
processes that enable emergent order” (p. 143). Uhl-Bien and Arena (2017) furthered this
thinking by offering that “Successful enabling leaders use complexity thinking to catalyze and
energize networked interactions that enable emergence in an organization” (p. 17). They
indicate that such leaders better understand “how to read a system and watch signs for
emergence. Those who know how to apply it know how to use pressures, linking up, and timing
to anticipate, interact with, and channel emergence” (p. 17).
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These multiple perspectives and interpretations underscore the conflict within CLT
concerning whether emergence is something that an individual with special skills at one end of a
bureaucratic organization, such as a regulatory agency, might manage, or whether the action of
leading is the focus, as in “leadership is an emergent phenomenon” (Hazy et al., 2007, p. 2) at
the other end of the spectrum. Wherever one falls within that CLT continuum, the human side of
emergence does not appear to be a central focus.
Linkage to Findings
CLT literature indicates leaders leading complexly either are or should be able to
“recognize that emergence is only as good as its ability to translate into results…” and “mobilize
emergence . . . to tip it into the operational system for implementation as new adaptive order”
(Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017, p. 18). Uhl-Bien and Arena’s 2017 passage suggests that regulatory
leaders knew, know or should have known how to “enable emergence” and “mobilize” it, even
though emergence in this context was more of, as Boulton et al. (2015) note and the scientific
paradigm offers, a structural property that had yet to emerge. In other words, if agency directors
remained focused on results, which at the time were completely unknowable, and mapped an
existing operational system over the existing micro systems, a “new adaptive order” would
emerge.
Findings suggest that it didn’t quite happen that way. Participants indicated that a “new
adaptive order” did not “emerge” without human interaction that involved all participants across
all systems, before an operational, or regulatory, system was co-created:
And so we would take hours of testimony, mostly from people who are in the business, in
the medical program, who had been in the illicit program, who are looking at wanting to
be licensees. So really, the public that was present in the evening of those meetings was
really the people that wanted to get into the program and were giving us feedback, when
we write our regulations, this is what you need to be aware of. (P11)
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but just standing and talking to people and eventually is, well, come and look and we’ll
show you what we do. (P5)
Well how you going to have the expertise? How you gonna get it done? I
said ‘We can get it done because you’re gonna help us do it! We’re going to
engage you to do it. That’s how we’re going to do it.’ (P12)
The focus was not on “spawn[ing] emergent behavior and creative surprises” or “specify[ing]
and control[ing] organizational activities” (Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001, p. 406). Participants
focused on collaboration and engaging systems’ properties and characteristics (as noted in
Chapter IV) before new regulatory frameworks were created. In other words, the act or acts of
someone identified as a leader simply mapping or creating an overlap between existing systems
processes and outcomes, and existing systems values and behaviors were not described as much
as engagement and interaction with and between systems was described.
Adaptation
As noted in Chapter II and above, leadership theories relying on complexity theory are
replete with suggestions, advice, and discussion around how “leaders” tease out emergent order
in organizations by injecting tension into “adaptive space” to achieve particular outcomes in
complex systems. In some ways, this is similar to the way emergence is described in CLT. For
example, McKelvey (2004) offers that organizations designed for emergence are characterized
by adaptive tensions, by the presence of conflict, and the recognition of adversity. Thus, rather
than ignoring conflict and adversity, leaders practicing CLT use adversity to learn and grow.
Separately or together, neither of these features is necessarily negative.
For example, Plowman and Duchon (2008) suggest that “leaders are destabilizers who
encourage disequilibrium and disrupt existing patterns of behavior (p. 142). Lichtenstein and
Plowman (2009) follow by suggesting that this type of leadership behavior generates
constructive controversy and conflict, and it is within this space that new ideas occur. This
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happens or can happen through dialogue management, where “strategic leaders articulate their
visions by telling stories and promoting dialogue in which an organization’s past, present and
future coalesce” (Boal & Schultz, 2007, p. 426, emphasis added).
Wheatley (1994) offers that organizations and people thrive in a state of disequilibrium.
She offers that being or feeling out of balance is closer to our primal instincts, and therefore a
natural and comforting state of being that allows us to change and grow. Under this
non-threatening premise that CLT seems to suggest is possible, it is unclear how the humans on
the receiving end of adversity and conflict injections are attended to, or whether they are held in
adversity/conflict suspense for an indefinite period to force continual innovation because they
eventually adapt to it. It is also unclear whether the “dialogue management” that occurs through
the Boal and Schultz approach is influence-free, two-way dialogue, or if it too isn’t another way
for a leader to inject themselves into a conversation through a form of management designed to
achieve a specific outcome. Indeed, dialogue can be unifying, but it can also be the opposite, and
as Stacey et al. (2000) note, “Power relations determine which words can be used officially and
which can only be used unofficially” (p. 175). This is another example of leadership literature in
general, but CLT specifically, bypassing humans in complex systems. As I have noted, my
findings suggest that this is an important element in understanding complex regulatory systems.
It is through this thought stream that CLT incorporates the metaphor of chaos drawn
from complexity theory. From the complexity science perspective, chaos “is concerned with the
behaviour over time of certain kinds of complex systems” (Rosenhead, 1998, p. 2). Stacey et al.
(2000), offer that the specific metaphor of the “edge of chaos is a dynamic that occurs when
certain parameters fall within a certain parameter” (p. 146). CLT scholars extend the concept to
what is termed “managed chaos” which is offered as a tool in the suite of leadership resources
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that if “inject[ed]” (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009, p. 645) will lead to adaption and innovation (p.
646). Boal and Schultz (2007) assert that such “leaders play a crucial role in moving
organizations to the ‘edge of chaos’ and aid in organizational learning and adaptation by
influencing the tags that produce the structure of interactions among organizational agents” (p.
411).
However, in taking this approach, using as a metaphor for what happens in an
organization based on the actions of a leader, “they immediately collapse these parameters into
one of formal organizational structures, where it becomes a choice for managers to make”
(Stacey et al., 2000, p. 147). By providing these prescriptions for moving an organization to the
edge, they choose the dynamic for the system, directly conflicting with complexity itself because
“local interactions amongst agents producing emergent outcomes is lost” (p. 147). A manager or
leader choosing that dynamic demonstrates rationalist, Newtonian thinking, not complexity
thinking.
Linkage to Findings
Participants did not describe managing or controlling dialogue, moving their
organizations, staff, or stakeholder groups to the edge of chaos, or injecting tension it into an
adaptive space to force innovation. Rather, participants suggested that adaptive space was more
like a playing field equalized in a way that leadership theories relying on complexity do not
appear to explain or contemplate. I focus on each of the essential findings here.
Tension
In context, the adaptive space or playing field was already rife with tension, uncertainty,
and conflict. Participants did not describe injecting additional tension into such spaces or any of
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the interactions between regulators, the legacy market and others as much as they described
seeking to work with it:
We wanted it to, um, bring people out of the shadows. Let's try and get them into the light
and make them as ‘real world’ as possible, you know, so that they're not continuing to
operate in the black market, which would have been [more] competition for one thing.
But give them some credence to what they're doing. That it is now okay in the state of
Washington to do this. I think one of the good sides [about I-502] . . . was [that it] tried to
include as many people as possible and bringing them into, you know, the legal
marketplace. (P5)
Rather than managing by tension, or injecting it, regardless of degree, participants
described systems interactions more in terms of engagement, meaning that the process of change
was a participatory, shared process where all who wished to participate, regardless of the
position within the overall structure, could do so. This was demonstrated in the mutual
participation and relationship building that occurred during initial and ongoing regulator and
stakeholder meetings and interactions. However, rather, than creating space to adapt to a leader’s
direction, the space participants created might be better characterized as interactive space (van
Wijk et al., 2019) where dialogue “among actors with alternate views of social problems” (p.
896) could occur:
And so, we formed the rules advisory committee, which is always a part of our
rulemaking processes and it was a very economical you know, cities, counties, law
enforcement, marijuana folks, balanced group to recommend to me, how to do the rules
and then I recommend to my commission. (P12)
And so the first thing we did is we held forums across the state, and within the—we’d
spent a day in Spokane, for example, and what we would do in the morning is we would
meet with—morning and afternoon, we’d meet with stakeholders, we'd meet with elected
officials, the Mayors and City Councils, we’d meet with the prevention community and
public health, and we'd meet with law enforcement. In the evenings, we held long
sessions in community colleges and large venues where hundreds, if not a thousand
people, would come and hear how we were gonna layout, mostly again now, sharing the
timeline for setting the program up, the program up, when growers and processors, the
applications would begin to be taken and when that might go into effect, and when the
retail market might open. That was a small piece. Really, the bigger piece was, tell us
what you're gonna—how you're gonna regulate this product. (P11)
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This concept of dialogue is important here, and I will discuss it further below.
Interactive Space
Participants described systems merging, rather than adapting within an interactive space
that honored the integrity and structure of these existing systems. Indeed, “Space [was] not an
empty dimension along which social groupings become structured, [but was] considered in terms
of its involvement in the constitution of the systems of interactions” (Giddens, 1984, p. 396,
emphasis added).
There are no findings to suggest that participants attempted to embed or map existing
macro structure—a bureaucratic regulatory framework—in these interactions to intentionally
result in meso-micro system adaptation or emergence. As noted in Chapter I, although
Washington state participants were directed by I-502 to fashion the new regulatory structure after
existing alcohol rules, initial contact with the legacy market was exploratorily framed. Rather,
the emphasis was placed more on ways to merge or unite with the legacy market to co-create and
co-construct a regulatory framework. Consistent with Simpson (2007) and as noted in Chapter II,
participants identified as “leaders” or placed in “leadership” roles in this context were active
participants rather than objective observers injecting “managed chaos” at opportune moments in
cross-systems interactions.
Building Interactive Trust
Participants acknowledged that initial engagement was challenging and sometimes
described as polarizing. From a complexity perspective, this type of tension is believed to result
in novelty, or the innovation that CLT suggests is possible as long as the three types of
leadership prescriptions are employed. However, that novelty occurs in an “adaptive space” that
is apparently a value-free, non-political sort of staging area where leaders skillfully insert
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conflict and adversity, practice three forms of complexity-inspired leadership, and innovation
that meets goals and objectives materializes.
Findings suggest that it didn’t happen that way. For example, participants were clear that
first, this was unknown space:
It was unknown. (P11)
dealing [with] an unknown world of marijuana regulation. (P12)
always walking that tightrope was part of the equation. (P5)
there are competing priorities for this kind of regulatory process, and you lose some. (P8)
Findings also suggest that tension related to what was not known was not used to encourage
innovation, force agreement, or manage chaos or tension, but as an indicator of how to build
interactive trust across systems levels in an interactive space by leveraging that very tension:
so we were very open about the process and that was also part of, you know, that mix of
gaining that interactive trust as the regulator and dealing a unknown world of marijuana
regulation. (P12, emphasis added).
They, you know, there were times they should have gotten up and walked out, I think,
and they didn't, they just sat there and they let people yell. Um, yet um, I mean, there
were times it just, you know, we had security at all of these events. (P8)
I think everybody at some point in time agreed to try and make it work. There were a lot
of disagreements, but we worked through them. (P5)
But the fact that there was having that voice and being able to contribute and being part
of that discussion, I think was, was probably the biggest piece of that. It wasn’t just, well,
you go over here and do your education and we’ll do the rest of it. We were, we were all
there. (P8)
In other words, participants did not “serve as a reference signal in that evolutionary process,
providing a significant selection force in the development” (Boal & Schultz, 2007, p. 427,
emphasis added) of new regulatory frameworks. Instead, participants focused on systems
interaction across system levels focusing on balancing competing interests while at the same
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time promoting community ‘‘interests and goals within the larger world and reaching out for new
opportunities and resources’’ (Room, 2011, p. 242). Participants did not “achieve innovation and
change by demonstrating [their] legitimacy and consistency with the past” (Boal & Schultz,
2007, p. 427) to replicate it.
This type of policy-making skill—building interactive trust—requires the development of
relevant management abilities premised on the awareness that there are limits to the capacity for
predictability and control (Kavalski, 2013). In this respect, findings “expose the extent to which
participants were willing to ignore the need to adapt (or change) failing governing practices in
new regulatory systems only to maintain the mode of business-as-usual” (Kavalski, 2013, p.
870). Rather, through collaborative engagement in interactive spaces that built interactive trust
through dialogue, systems merged in a way that maintained the integrity and structure of each
system but in new ways.
Creating the first set of cannabis regulations in the world was not, and would never be,
business as usual.
Empirically Emerging Concept 1
Complex regulatory frameworks can be co-created by collaboratively engaging complex
systems properties and characteristics. Such engagement occurs in an interactive space
through dialogue aimed at building interactive trust, resulting in systems merging rather
than emerging. This does not result in the collapse of one system into another, but rather
the alignment of systems in new ways.
For these reasons, we can reasonably conclude that participants did not rely, either purposely or
inadvertently, on CLT to lead change in complex regulatory systems. Instead, they engaged with
the complex elements of systems and the people who are part of the systems to guide change. To
better understand those interactions and complexity in context and based on my findings, I move
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toward establishing a consistent understanding of complexity to ground the remainder of the
chapter and center the discussion.
Anchoring Complexity in Context
The landscape of knowledge production has changed in the last forty years. That change
has resulted in a group of “new disciplines and methods that have flourished on the borders of
traditional disciplines” (Tukdeo, 2014, p. 1014), including systems, management, and
organizational studies, public policy, and leadership. Complexity theory has been applied in each
of these disciplines in different ways, each offering a type of “complexity theory-based
prescription” (Rosenhead, 1998, p. 5). However, the majority of the research introducing
complexity science as a construct from which we can draw implications for management,
organizations, and leadership, was generated by scholars, for scholars.
As I noted in Chapter I, this early and subsequent research has contributed to thinking
about how know the principles of complexity science might be applied beyond biology and
quantum physics. Yet, as I noted in Chapter II, virtually all the work extending complexity
science to the social sciences is by metaphor or analogy (Maguire & McKelvey, 1999;
Rosenhead, 1998; Rosenhead et al., 2019; Tourish, 2019). Literature would be “impoverished
without it,” (Rosenhead, 1998, p. 10) and from a natural science perspective, metaphors such as
Lorenz’s butterfly effect to explain chaos theory help us to understand certain phenomenon.
When applied to organizational or social systems behavior, however, chaos and complexity
theory metaphors lose their prescriptive force (Rosenhead, 1998).
Additionally, although some early research concerning complexity in organizational and
management studies contexts started to explore epistemological perspectives and considerations
(Allen et al., 2011), that inquiry has seen limited, if any, discussion in current literature. For
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example, Morçöl (2012) discusses the epistemology of complexity in the public administration
realm, deeply exploring determinism, uncertainty and context. Several scholars from other
disciplines, such as Tourish (2019), Rosenhead (1998), and Rosenhead et al. (2020) agree with
Pollitt (2009) when he offers that from the public administration perspective, complexity theory
“appears to lack epistemological unity and clarity” (p. 229).
Despite these limitations, consistent with one of the overarching research questions
offered here, how might complexity theory inform efforts to harmonize scholarship and practice
in ways that have not been explored previously? A good starting point is to recognize that we
still have much to learn and understand. As Uhl-Bien (2021) notes,
If there is any one lesson we can take away from COVID-19 and the complexity of 2020,
it is that we must do better in understanding that leadership and followership are a
complex social phenomenon of leaders and followers relating together in ways that
co-produce leadership and its outcomes . . . for better and for worse. (p. 1403, emphasis
added)
While I agree that the lessons learned from COVID-19 should encourage us to do a better job in
understanding complex phenomenon, I would offer that these understandings are difficult to
apply in practice when generated by “critics who locate themselves apart from the social
problems in question” (Lane, 2016, p. 11). Indeed, lessons learned from COVID-19 demonstrate
that existing understandings and applications of leadership combined with several other factors
may have resulted in a global pandemic. While complexity-focused leadership theories might
explain, at least in part, some of the responses to the pandemic, a different approach to
complexity thinking should be considered since current approaches, thinking, and arguably
“leadership” associated with that thinking brought us to this moment in history.
To that end, Cairney and Geyer (2017) opine that “complexity does force us to recognize
that scholarship is both a political and academic enterprise” (p. 461). Further, as Tourish (2019)
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notes, “[w]e need a consistent view of complexly constructed leadership in organizations (p.
233). To work toward both achievement of such consistency, and harmonization of political,
practical, and academic enterprise, I would offer that we start with a better understanding of
complexity itself. I suggest that we “take [complexity] more seriously and consider whether it
offers opportunities to develop new theoretical frameworks” (Room, 2011, p. 16) that are
observed and developed from practice. This has the potential to move us toward articulating a
theoretical framework where complexity theory is applied, rather than implied. To begin that
dialogue, I begin by taking us back to the origins of complexity science.
Prigogine’s Complexity
In Chapter II, I offered a close-up of Prigogine’s understanding of complexity in the
context of a literature review to frame my research. Here, I widen our lens to provide a more
panoramic portrait of Prigogine’s understanding. This broader view, when linked to my research
findings, form the basis and foundation of the analysis and assertions offered in this chapter. To
begin constructing that linkage, I turn back to the most relevant section of the full interview
between Prigogine and Ioannis Zisis, appearing in Prigogine’s 2003 final text. The section is
entitled, “Time in the Epistemology of Complexity:”
IZ [Ioannis Zisis]: Your work has opened up many directions in different disciplines. But
the main issue is the way of thinking: you seem to be very persistent and very innovative.
Many have spoken about the interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity of your work. On
the other hand, you reject a quick and easy synthesis. How do you see the synthesis of
different disciplines?
IP [Ilya Prigogine]: I don’t think we can make a synthesis because Psychology will
always be different from Physics. The only thing is to establish a non-contradictory view,
a universe where Biology is not in contradiction with Physics. Biology is an evolutionary
science while Classical as well as Quantum physics are deterministic and time reversible
sciences. Therefore there is a gap. You can say that this is because the universe is not
unified. You may even say that the universe is contradictory. My point of view was to
show that there is no contradiction. But I don’t want to identify Physics with Biology.
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IZ: On the other hand, complexity has enormously contributed to interdisciplinary
research.
IP: Yes, but that is part of the problem. Because complexity is related to the arrow of
time. What do you call complexity? Complexity is a property of systems that for given
boundary conditions have more than one possible solutions [sic]. Also in complex
systems long range correlations appear between components with very short range local
interactions. (2003, p. 55)
How might we break down Prigogine’s words to better understand the basis of complexity from
his perspective? First, he notes that disciplines, or branches of knowledge, cannot be synthesized
or combined because they will always be different, and provides examples of two: one that is
evolutionary, or related to gradual development, and one deterministic, meaning (generally) that
all events are determined by preceding events and therefore predictable. On this basis, and
thinking about current context, management, science, leadership, public administration,
chemistry, and other disciplines could be viewed as conflicting. However, Prigogine held that
although there are clearly distinctions, they are all part of a universe consisting of difference
branches of knowledge. How does complexity thinking contribute to that constellation of
knowledge?
Prigogine offers “that is part of the problem . . . [c]omplexity is related to the arrow of
time” (p. 55). Simply stated, the arrow of time is a concept holding that time flows one way and
is irreversible, although whether irreversibility is the basis of the arrow of time is “hotly debated”
(Weinert, 2005, p. 41). Under this premise, time could be a subject, possibly an object, unlikely a
process, or a behavior. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) offered that “the arrow of time is a
manifestation of the fact that future is not given” (p. 16), referring to the notion that we cannot
predict the future or try to predict or control outcomes through deterministic approaches. This
aligns with challenges to Newtonian thinking. The most critical thing to note here, however, is
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that this discussion and these concepts pertain to the physical sciences. Prigogine speaks to and
acknowledges the properties of systems, but he was referring to chemical systems.
Properties of Systems
How might we better understand his phrase, “properties of systems”? In the same way
that complexity does not have a universal definition, “system” generally refers to connectedness,
a set of elements or agents, within a boundary (Morçöl, 2012; Boulton et al., 2015). Cilliers
(2001) offers that a system can be simply defined as making a distinction between what is “in”
and what is “out,” presuming that there is something that separates a system from its
environment, and constitutes which is bounded (p. 141), and which is not bounded. Turning to
the word “property,” the essential, everyday meaning of “property” is “a special quality or
characteristic of something” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.-b, emphasis added). If we combine these
two definitions, this suggests that according to Prigogine, complexity describes the properties of
a thing, or an inert object or objects, like water, oil, or other matter. Indeed, similar substances
were the basis on which Prigogine built his Nobel Prize-winning theory of dissipative structures.
The theory was not developed from the study of psychology, organizations, management, or
leadership, or perhaps, even the study of systems.
Even so, Prigogine did not indicate that there were not other ways that complexity might
be considered. He offered that complexity exists within and across the knowledge universe, but it
applied to physics and biology differently than it might to management, organizational, public
administration, or leadership. These disciplines do not identify with physical sciences. Thus, we
can assume that there is a difference in the way complexity might be relied upon as a construct or
theory between its original scientific application and its broader implications in other disciplines.
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J. Holland (2014) confirms this assumption and expands Prigogine’s observation by
noting that as the study of complexity evolved, “it split into two subfields that examine two
different types of emergence: the study of complex physical systems (CPS) and the study of
complex adaptive systems (CAS)” (p. 6). CPS “focuses on geographic (often lattice-like) array
of elements, in which interactions typically depend only on effects propagated from nearest
neighbors” (p. 6) like atoms and machines. In contrast, CAS studies “elements that are not fixed”
(p. 7), referred to as agents who “learn or adapt in response to elements interactions that are not
fixed (p. 7). J. Holland offers an example of a commodities market where agents buy and sell,
adapting their “selling strategies as market conditions change” (p. 9). Critical to this discussion,
however, is J. Holland’s assertion about the application of CAS:
Solutions to some of the most important problems of the 21st century—enhancing
the immune system, making ecosystems sustainable, regularizing global trade,
curing mental disorders, encouraging innovation and so on—depend on a deep
understanding of interactions of adaptive agents in CAS. (p. 9)
Further, J. Holland (2014) asserts that in CAS, the elements are the adaptive agents, causing the
elements to change as agents adapt, resulting in the analysis of CAS to become difficult:
In particular, interactions between adaptive agents are not simply additive. This
non-linearity rules out the direct use of PDE [partial differential equation] in most cases
. . . [t]he difficulty is compounded because in most disciplines involving CAS, such as
the social sciences, there is no standard language for describing, let alone analyzing, the
interaction of agents. This lack is surprising because there are precise languages
describing other kinds of complex human interactions such as scores of music or the
choreographic notation used in ballet. (p. 11, emphasis added)
In other words, Prigogine and J. Holland tell us that complexity is not a theory designed to be
layered atop an ambiguous social construct, such as leadership, and it recognized elements,
rather than humans, as adaptive agents. It was designed as a theory to describe the behavior of
complex systems, both inert and living, in different ways. Indeed, as Pollitt (2009) notes, “The
ideas of complexity theory function more as a descriptive conceptualization of the backdrop to
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action” (p. 229, emphasis added). Boulton et al. (2015) agree, noting that “complexity represents
the world in concrete terms, as things, albeit things that can show differences between them, but
are connected by forces, albeit forces that are not in general linear” (p. 69).
I refer to this understanding of complexity theory as “Prigogine’s complexity.” With it as
a backdrop, I turn next to understanding complex regulatory systems in context.
Creating a Framework to Understand Complex Regulatory Systems
The next stage of this analysis moves toward unpacking the data presented in Chapter IV
as Appendix A. In my findings, I separated narrative data by property or characteristic based on
whether it was or appeared to be an objective or subjective participant observation. I sought to
better understand the association between these narratives and wondered if a system level model
might assist. For this reason, I explored how such models had been applied in leadership,
complexity, public administration, and other social science contexts. I mentioned this briefly
above but explore more thoroughly here.
Systems Level Analysis
Complexity’s extension from science and economics to the humanities and social
sciences brought reference to system level analysis to leadership and public administration
research and literature. From the public administrative literature, Morçöl (2012) offers that
systems are complexes of interdependent elements with macro properties that cannot be reduced
to the properties of their elements. Similarly, Uhl-Bien and Marion (2001) introduce their “logic
of complexity theory” through descriptions of “macrodynamic” and “microdynamic” forces in
relation to the emergence of systems dynamics (p. 392). Uhl-Bien and Marion later bring meso
arguments, dynamics, and a proposed model to complexity leadership theory (CLT), although
situating complexity within that model seems to wander around between the three systems levels,
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eventually landing on a “model perspective” of CLT: “Complexity Leadership Theory is a meso
model perspective that taps informal [complex adaptive systems] leadership behaviors within the
context of larger (bureaucratic) structures” (Uhl-Bien & Marion, 2009, p. 647). This appears to
be a precursor to fine-grained and coarse-grained interactions as noted above.
A few years later, Fairhurst and Uhl-Bien wondered if “there [are] separate “macro” and
“micro” levels of [societal, institutional, and interpersonal] context, or if there is just the ongoing
stream of behavior in which the [researcher-imposed] macro level of analysis locates itself
within the [researcher-imposed] micro level when considering leadership” (Fairhurst &
Uhl-Bien, 2012, p. 1046). They note that “Space limitations do not permit a full treatment of this
subject for the study of leadership, but they can be found elsewhere” (p. 1046). I make that space
here.
Multi-Level Modeling and Theoretical Blending
I noted above that macro/meso/micro system level references were offered in the
literature but did not seem to be further defined and explored. Indeed, there seemed to be an
assumption that the reader automatically knew exactly how these systems levels were embedded
and experienced in organization. For that reason, I turned to Bronfenbrenner’s 1977 ecological
systems theory to better understand the relationship between:
Systems properties that findings suggested were related to objective processes, such as
the environment in which laws and regulations are made, and
Systems characteristics that findings suggested were related to subjective human values
and behaviors, or the humans who are subject to and impacted by those laws and
regulations, and indeed, whose behavior and world view may be shaped by those laws
and regulations.
I selected this theory based on the multiple references to such modeling that I’ve noted above,
but also because I thought it might shed light on “[t]he changing relationship between person and
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environment . . . conceived in systems terms” (Bronfenbrenner, 1977, p. 513). In other words, I
thought it might serve to draw out the connections and symmetry that seemed to be emerging
between the micro/macro and agency/structure features I was noting in my findings. This
approach supported that effort by providing both levels of analysis and descriptors to categorize
and scale these systems. Figure 5.1 offers a visualization of the levels of analysis (macro, meso,
and micro) with contextual descriptors.
Figure 5.1
Macro- Meso- and Micro-Level Systems in Context

Pollitt (2009) suggests applying complexity concepts in combination with other bodies of
theory to investigate what they can contribute in a theoretical partnership. On that basis, I
combined Prigogine’s complexity with Bronfenbrenner’s systems theory to identify and nest
systems within the authorizing environment that frames this research. This approach highlighted
structural overlap between systems, creating a pathway for both closer examination of how those
overlaps changed over time, and deeper insight into the dynamics of complex systems
relationships.
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I continued this theoretical blending by establishing the following macro/meso/micro
level definitions. These are rooted in levels of social justice since the present research explores
how cannabis may be regulated in a way that leads to socially equitable conditions, while also
moving toward exploring the sociological aspects of change that seem to be absent from the
extent literature:
The macro level is itself subdivided into several layers. The highest layer is that of the
constitutional order of a society: its polity determining the (permitted) forms of
government and the ground rules, as well as scope, of ‘normal’ politics; its economic
regime, its social and legal systems, and the integration of its major institutions into one
large scheme. The next lower layer is that of concrete politics. Here, different social
groups compete for influence in the designation of particular policies concerning all
aspects of social life which can become a matter of political and legal regulation under
the chosen constitutional frame. And finally, there are the policies themselves, e.g.,
particular fiscal, economic, educational, welfare, etc. policies. The initial design of such
policies can have far-reaching implications for future policies because once a particular
policy structure or pattern is established in a given field, it tends to shape the public’s
expectations towards it and to lead to a certain degree of inertia, making radical changes
difficult and limiting the options available to future policy makers.
The meso level is the level of organizations. When considering organizations from
the point of view of social justice, it is useful to distinguish between types of
organizations according to the societal sector or social subsystem into which they fall,
e.g., business organizations belonging to the economic system, political parties belonging
to the political system, hospitals belonging to the health system, schools belonging to the
educational system, etc., because the various subsystems follow different logics of
operation, subjecting their organizations to separate ‘local’ rationalities which in turn
affect the ways in which these organizations (and their representatives) conceive of and
deal with ‘local’ justice problems. .. The problems are typically dealt with and resolved
by the respective organizations themselves. However, both the degree of local autonomy
and of local scarcity are subject to the influence of macro level decisions. Thus, the state
can mandate particular principles that must be observed in their handling (e.g.,
anti- discrimination laws) or it can refrain from doing so; it can issue rules for some such
problems but not for all of them, and these rules can be more or less determinate.
The micro level . . . concerns a separate societal level, namely that of interactions
between individuals in relatively unorganized social contexts. An example are families
and the ways in which they allocate the burdens facing them in their everyday life. It is
obvious that at least theoretically this level of decision making leaves the widest scope
for individual choice. However, in reality this scope is constrained by cultural traditions
framing the perception of appropriate choices, even though the traditions themselves may
undergo constant changes. Moreover, higher-level decisions can have a significant
impact on this micro level as well. (Schmidt, 2001, pp. 14338–14339, emphasis added).

160
With this analytical framework as a backdrop, I began the process of distinguishing the
differences or linkages between systems properties and characteristics.
Complex Systems Properties and Characteristics
Generally, the words “property” and “characteristic” are synonymous in the literature
reviewed here. However, I look back to Prigogine, and add to his observation concerning
problems in extending complexity theory beyond the scientific realm: the distinction between
complex systems properties and characteristics is another part of the problem related to
extending complexity into the social sciences. Based on my understanding of Prigogine’s
complexity, and leadership’s less than solid relationship with it, I would offer that these words
describe different elements in the context of understanding complex systems dynamics beyond
the elements of emergence and adaption discussed in Chapter 2 and above. Understanding this
distinction begins to highlight the macro-micro relationship and dynamics of living systems that
do not seem to be discussed or recognized in both literature and contexts where complexity
thinking has been implied.
Distinguishing Between Properties and Characteristics
A characteristic describes how something behaves, appears, or interacts. Characteristics
of systems can change (Boulton et al., 2015). In contrast, a property is the foundation of
something, and is considered to be more concrete. This aligns with Prigogine’s distinction
between the physical sciences and social sciences, and the ways complexity may apply to both.
Proponents of CLT refer to the “characteristics” of both systems and organizations, and
these words are used interchangeably, even though in context, and according to Prigogine, an
organization might not display the same properties as a system. For example, Uhl-Bien and
Marion (2001), describe “the uncertainty, unpredictability, and nonlinearity—the
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microdynamics—that characterize complex systems” (p. 396). Boal and Schultz (2007) offer
that organizations “can take on the characteristics of a complex adaptive system” based solely on
the presence and actions of a “strategic leader” engaging in a specific process (p. 426). In other
words, characteristics can be inherent to complex systems, but at the same time, the behavior of
an agent possessing certain characteristics can, by mutual interaction with other agents in the
same organization, help the organization take on the characteristics of complex adaptive system
in a way reminiscent of Adam Smith’s invisible hand, although CLT does not explain how that
happens. Thus, it is unclear from a CLT perspective how one might describe properties and
characteristics of systems or organizations.
In contrast, Prigogine’s complexity describes the properties of a system, as opposed to
the behavior of agents or a process used to move the system toward a goal, result or outcome.
Prigogine (2001) was aware of this, and offered:
There is a large difference between the behavior of inert systems and the behavior in
living systems. In living systems, even very simple ones, the behavior at a given time
is purely determined by memory and partly by the anticipation of the future. In this sense,
the future contributes to the present. (p. 225)
Boulton et al. (2015) note that in this passage, Prigogine is describing how thinking about the
future becomes part of the complexity of a situation, and I’ve discussed that to an extent above.
Prigogine’s point, however, is that living and inert systems are different, because living systems
have a sense of time. This is consistent with the idea of the arrow of time discussed above,
meaning that living systems don’t necessarily revert to a previous form or forms and may rely on
memory to create a new or different form. In contrast, an inert system such as the molecular
structure, or system, of water, does not possess such a memory. This is another reason that
complexity theory is not a one-size-fits-all concept easily lifted and shifted from one discipline to
another. It is also consistent with my finding that complexity is not a behavior, characteristic, or
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action of “leadership” or “leaders” in complex regulatory systems, but rather a descriptor of the
properties and characteristics of systems.
How does this apply to the present research? Recall that systems are complexes of
interdependent elements and have macro properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of
their elements (Morçöl, 2012). This is not a new way to conceptualize complexity and another
way to say that a complex system is greater than the sum of its parts. Yet, systems change. The
nature of the “relation among its remnants, their interdependency relations” (Morçöl, 2012, p.
55) are generally stable, at least for a while, otherwise those elements would constantly be in a
state of flux. While they are stable, “we can say they have a ‘structure” and structure signifies
stability” (Morçöl, 2012, p. 55). Cilliers (1998) offers that, “When we look at the behaviour of a
complex system as a whole, our focus shifts from the individual element in the system to the
complex structure of the system. The complexity emerges as a result of the patterns of
interaction between the elements” (p. 5, emphasis added). This is also the point at which CLT
scholars generally indicate that “leadership” emerges, but it is also the point at which the
distinction between complex systems properties and characteristics becomes important.
The Concept of Interactive Change
At this point in the analysis, my findings seemed to suggest something other than CLT’s
rendition of “adaptive change” had occurred, and perhaps what I was seeing was more in line
with what I will term interactive change. It was becoming apparent that neither complexity
theory nor CLT alone could explain the dynamic interplay between systems’ properties and
characteristics because that interplay involved human interaction and participation that occurred
through dialogue in an interactive space. As discussed above, the change that occurred—a new
regulatory framework—was not the result of adaptation, or a fight for survival, but more of a
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unified action where change happened with rather than to participants. For these reasons, I dove
more deeply into these dynamics using the structure of the learning history artifact as a guide.
Analyzing Systems Properties and Characteristics
In alignment with the learning history artifact and to further explore my findings, I have
broken this part of the analysis into two temporal phases, that are representative of both the
progression of cannabis legalization and of major shifts in the systems impacted by legalization.
I focus on Washington State because as noted previously, it was the first state to build a
regulatory system for the production, processing, and retail sale of cannabis products from the
ground up. These temporal phases are:
1. Pre-legalization: the period leading up to the passage of I-502 (November 6, 2012:
a. Systems properties and characteristics
b. Leadership observations
2. Post-legalization: the period between enactment of I-502 (December 6, 2012) and the
present:
a. Systems properties and characteristics
b. Leadership observations
I now turn to analyze the properties and characteristics of these complex systems through
systems level analysis, comparison to existing literature, and evaluating whether Prigogine’s
complexity or CLT explains my findings.
Pre-Legalization: The Legacy Cannabis Market
Prior to formal legalization, the cannabis supply chain consisted of a lightly regulated
medical market and an unregulated market. Participants (P3 and P9) and others associated and
familiar with these markets refer to these as legacy markets.
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Properties and Characteristics
The environment in which the legacy market was nested is best characterized as a
multidimensional, autonomous community. This was demonstrated in findings, media materials,
and an extremely small collection of literature. Descriptions painted a picture of a constellation
of intricate networks framing a complex, but closed environment with an informal hierarchy that
made space for committed activists to develop early legalization concepts:
it was an industry. I mean, it was vibrant. It had rules and there was hierarchy and there
was structure and all of that. (P3)
these dispensaries have pounds and pounds of marijuana coming in. You have marijuana
brokers, you have people who are gauging the quality of the marijuana, setting the price
for it like any other product. (Morton, 2013)
You have a large patient community that have their own interests that they have to look
out for. (Morton, 2013)
This self-governing, self-sustaining market had begun to establish forms of organization such as
the Coalition for Cannabis Standards & Ethics, an organization established when the City of
Seattle asked local cannabis businesses to establish a professional resource that the City could
approach with questions (Cannabis Alliance, n.d.). Additionally, national legalization
movements, such as the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML),
who “provided a voice in the public policy debate for those Americans who oppose marijuana
prohibition and favor an end to the practice of arresting marijuana consumers” (NORML, n.d.)
were gaining traction during this time. It was from this environment that varying perspectives
and degrees of system separation would later occur, influencing and informing cannabis law
reform and policy. This speaks to the systems properties of the pre-legalization legacy market.
With respect to systems characteristics, we look to human interactions generally
associated with micro systems. The legacy cannabis market offered an opportunity for
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unlicensed producers/processors and retailers to interact directly with consumers to discuss the
ways that different cannabis strains could meet the needs of patients with what were referred to
as “qualifying conditions,” (discussed in Chapter I), even though not all consumers sought the
product for medicinal use. As a result, and since cannabis is (and remains) federally recognized
as a Schedule I controlled substance, participation in the legacy market and membership in the
legacy community involved substantial risk:
So it was just a very—it was a very fragile environment for somebody with a terminal or
seriously debilitating medical condition to be navigating, trying to secure something that
provided them relief from pain and address other symptoms associated with their
conditions. (P1)
During this period, the legacy market could be identified as a meso system as defined
above, with additional levels or layers within it that included unregulated cannabis producers,
processors, and retailers. Informal methods of quality standards and control existed, although
these were not uniform. Medical cannabis patients and communities of color could be identified
as micro systems based on stigmatization, victimization, and marginalization beyond the
indignity of arrest as described in Chapter IV:
We had patients who were actually victims of crime. And they had nowhere to go, they
didn't want to tell law enforcement or doctors, because if they told law enforcement about
the crime they experienced because they were trying to obtain medical marijuana then
they would then be subject to arrest so they would call and sometimes they needed
somebody to talk to. (P6)
Additionally, and consistent with the definition of micro system above, these groups were
generally not as organized as the meso system, and they were greatly impacted by decisions of
higher-level systems, both macro and meso:
All that you got was, you know, once you got charged with a crime, you could stand in
front of the judge and or the jury or both, and explain “I have this authorization” And
then you would have to defend whether or not you've had a 60-day supply, right?
Because if you have more than 60 days ago, it didn't even matter. (P1)
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we were not as organized . . . we were not as legislatively astute. (P3)
At any time, the meso and micro systems could be impacted—and often were—by the macro
systems of both law enforcement and the judicial system. However, these systems did not
directly interact with governmental or regulatory agencies such as public health and prevention
in ways that might impact the structure of the system.
I offer a visualization of this system below in the way that I think Prigogine might have
sketched it.
Figure 5.2
Pre-Legalization System Visualization

These systems did not necessarily contradict each other as Prigogine offers, but at this point, the
legacy market identifies with its subsystems, as opposed to governmental or bureaucratic
systems, even though the legacy market demonstrated its own brand of bureaucracy. Although
there was interaction between these systems, participants did not describe those interactions in a
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way that suggested a particular style of leadership. Instead, interaction was described in a way
that aligned with Schmidt’s meso and micro systems level descriptions above, such as
I really saw, I really saw a strong and deliberate and intentional effort by the people that I
was working with and surrounded by to understand what was happening to influence
where they could and comply so they could be successful. But then, all kinds of external
forces came into play that they were not even prepared for and that runs the gamut from
other associations with much more political power and resources. (P3)
Note that the visualization depicts legacy market system interconnectedness with very
few connections to governmental systems. This illustrates the separateness of these entities
pre-legalization, where the only point of connection was likely either through a straight line to
law enforcement or the judicial system. Therefore, these systems are depicted as squares and the
legacy system are represented by circles of varying sizes based on reported their prominence,
placement and power within the collection of systems. For emphasis, the sharp edges of the
squares suggest rigidity while the circles are more fluid and easily overlap.
Pre-Legalization Leadership Observations
Findings did not suggest that leading and leadership were part of the legacy market and
community focus or narrative. To the contrary, agents were collectively considered to be the
“wind in the sails” (McPeak, 2011, p. 7) of the legacy community, and Hempfest was viewed by
the community as “the expression of the people who were using cannabis, it was part of their
culture” (P3). There was no suggestion or indication that any individual within that market,
community or both acted independently or individually to guide or direct any part of the system
toward legalization. Efforts to organize were centralized, characterized as grass roots, and
consistently gaining momentum, like Hempfest along with early, yet failing, efforts to
decriminalize cannabis. Indeed, Hempfest was “made possible by a huge community of
individuals who have at one time or another made the sacrifice necessary for it to happen . . .
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thousands of people . . . made significant contributions to the event, the organization and the
community . . . I am not aware of a more grassroots event” (McPeak, 2011, p. 7). There was also
organized activism through NORML.
While exploring grass roots leadership and the foundations of activism, including the
power of local organization, may be a subject for future research in complex systems, findings to
this point seem to support Grint’s (2000) assertion that “what counts as a ‘situation’ and what
counts as the ‘appropriate’ way of leading in that situation are interpretive and contestable issues,
not issues that can be decided by objective criteria” (p. 3). Based on this, CLT does not describe
how leadership was experienced in the legacy market.
With respect to other elements of the system, it is fair to assume that traditional,
bureaucratic forms of leadership were still very much a part of the law enforcement, judicial and
legal systems (all part of the macro system) narratives and experiences. The macro system
approach to cannabis and cannabis prohibition remained firmly rooted in power and control as
realized by the war on drugs: incarceration, severe penalties, stigmatization, and marginalization
even after legislation to create medical programs was enacted and subsequently implemented:
Maybe had your home raided. Maybe been put in handcuffs. Maybe had to spend one or
more nights in jail, gotten charged. Maybe your—maybe your family deserted you
because of the stress. Maybe you've lost your job. All of these horrible things could still
happen to you. That was absolutely okay, under the law, as it existed. (P1)
This aligns with Weber’s (1947) thinking as discussed in Chapter II and is consistent CLT’s
multiple descriptions of autocratic leadership. These findings regarding pre-legalization systems
behavior, along with studies and other reports that examine the macro systems described here,
provide a window into how interactions with the meso/micro systems resulted in
disproportionate impacts, including arrest and incarceration in communities of color and medical
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cannabis patients. These studies concentrate more on the social impacts of cannabis prohibition
rather than systems dynamics.
Complexity, Leadership, and Initiative 502
I focus on the significance of I-502 because in context, it was a moment in time that
quite literally changed everything. To be clear, I-502 did not legalize adult use, “recreational” or
medical use cannabis. I-502 created a system for regulating commercial cannabis activity,
regardless of the intended use of the product (Holcomb, 2015). Even so, it is generally referred to
as “legalization” even though cannabis by its legal name, marijuana, is still a federally prohibited
schedule I drug.
I-502 was a harm reduction measure and remains a harm reduction measure until voters
or the Washington state legislature decide otherwise. It created a system to frame commercial
activity in a way that would allow for the production, sale, and possession of small amounts of
cannabis and result in reduced incarceration rates, increased revenue through legal product sales,
and increased public education efforts. It was not designed solely to support small,
predominately white-owned business in Washington State as is vigorously asserted by some, nor
did it create a duty for the state or any regulatory agency to support commercial cannabis
businesses at the expense of public health and safety. Why is it important to highlight this here?
Oversimplification of complex issues distorts meaning and history, and by extension,
understanding. It is also an example of why recognizing the arrow of time, as Prigogine and
Stengers note, is important. We have seen the effects of this oversimplification phenomenon play
itself out in several ways, particularly since the 2016 United States presidential election, the
COVID-19 outbreak, and more recently, the January 6, 2021, insurrection at United States
capitol. These are extreme examples but they illustrate how embedded oversimplified,

170
reductionist thinking pervades national discourse in the United States, and the profound,
sometimes fatal, but generally ill-informed, myopic outcomes such thinking promotes. In other
words, consistent with a quote my mother often relied on, those who forget the past are doomed
to repeat it.
Conversely, however, oversimplification can be an indicator that a change initiative
worked, as P1 noted: “I think it's a great thing that people feel so comfortable now in pointing
out the flaws with 502 because that means it worked.” This suggests that some change efforts
may be part of a strategic, iterative effort, designed to bring about incremental, rather than
broadly sweeping, massive change. To that end, I-502 might be considered as more of a joint
effort or “a catalyst” (P1) designed to be the first, but not the last blow against the war on drugs
(Morton, 2013). To wit, former law enforcement officers and prosecutors, public health workers
and addiction specialists, attorneys and legislators, and various organizations “banded together as
the sponsoring committee of I-502” (Morton, 2013). Although the initiative had a collection of
primary authors, those individuals did not conceptualize or promote the initiative in a vacuum
and did not purposely engage with or follow any specific construct for “leading” a complex,
statewide change effort or even an organization in the way that McKelvey (2010) asserts former
General Electric (GE) CEO Jack Welch apparently did. Although Mr. Welch’s “unwitting”
practice of CLT was touted as an “incredible success” in that he “replaced old-style, top-down
‘management by objectives’ with ‘management by tension.’ This is complexity leadership at its
best!” (McKelvey, 2010, p. 29, emphasis original), it did not ultimately result in long term,
positive outcomes (also see Tourish, 2019).
It took the efforts of many across several organizations and systems to move the initiative
to the Washington state ballot in a coordinated campaign that led to a vote. This raises the
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question of whether the campaign itself might be viewed through a CLT lens. Surely the
campaign director played some part in influencing behavior through management of people,
complex networks, resources, and interactions. This is what opponents of I-502 believed was the
case: “Why people think this whole thing is about legalization, I don’t know. It seems like an
obvious scam to me” (Morton, 2013). CLT might offer that such influence could be viewed as an
example of a leaders enabling a certain outcome, in alignment with the adaptive component of
CLT.
Did the ACLU rely on complexity thinking when drafting I-502? My findings suggest
that if the organization did, it was not intentional, but we cannot assume that this was an
inadvertent demonstration of CLT at work. Alison Holcomb, the campaign director of New
Approach Washington offered, “We’re not simply saying the war on drugs has failed and let’s
give up. What we’re saying is the war on drugs has failed, and here’s something that might work
better.” (Morton, 2013). Another participant offered, “the hope is that we get a foot in the door
and we start kicking the door open wider and wider and wider” (P3). In other words, I-502 was
not designed to be the answer to the war on drugs in Washington state, but an incremental,
collective, strategic approach to changing and dismantling failed drug policy. This “new”
approach aligns with Catron’s (1981) ‘preferred directions’ rather than ‘optimal solution’ [when]
one focuses on coping with problems rather than solving them (p. 13) as cited in Chapter II.
From a CLT perspective, this fact pattern might be characterized as confirmation that the
staff of the ACLU collectively engaged the enabling leadership function. However, I cite Marion
(2012) to illustrate that this is not what happened here:
Enabling leadership functions to foster conditions in which complex dynamics can
emerge . . . Formal leaders . . . are particularly well-positioned for this role because of
their access to resources and authority, although one cannot assume that all positional
leaders are capable of performing the enabling function. (p. 468)
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This passage seems to suggest that under CLT, “formal leaders” of the ACLU, such as the
campaign director and the authors of I-502 somehow influenced staff in the organization to not
only the create the content of the initiative, but possibly, based on their “leadership,” the
outcome of the campaign and subsequent election, “because of their access to resources and
authority.” There is nothing in the findings, or through any other source suggesting this approach
was used by the principal organizers or the director of the campaign.
Instead, a complex organization, the ACLU, engaged and interacted with existing, but
unrelated complex systems using a voter initiative as catalyst for change “…and that’s what it
was meant to be” (P1). These interactions are not identified as being connected to or directed by
formal leaders intending to drive change, but rather, as the organization identified with
suggesting change, initiating interactive change. Statute, or law, guides the process of that
activity, and a framework to support that democratic process remains in place to allow
Washington State citizens to vote on it. This aligns with my assertion based on findings in
Chapter IV. Specifically, complexity resides in the collective behavior of a complex system’s
parts that “represent the world in concrete terms, as things, albeit things that can show
differences between them, but are connected by forces, albeit forces that are not in general
linear” (Boulton et al., 2015, p. 69). This does not align with a socially constructed way of
“leading” that can be described or “decided by objective criteria” (Grint, 2000, p. 3). Indeed,
“…leadership involves the social construction of the context that both legitimates a particular
form of action and constitutes the world in the process” (Grint, 2005, p. 1471).
Post-Legalization: System Change
The magnitude of the shift from an illicit to regulated market cannot be understated,
notwithstanding the enormous policy shift—a fundamental drug policy change with social justice
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implications—it represented on a global level. From a complexity theory perspective, this type of
change could be characterized as evolutionary consistent with Prigogine as noted previously. To
refine and further contextualize this evolution, “the dimensions of a problem change, and there
are changes at the micro level, such as new entrants or new features to some of the population of
existing agents. This is called structural change, and there will be new emergent properties at
both the micro and macro levels” (Boulton et al., 2015, p. 77, emphasis added). It is this
co-evolutionary process that affects the environment in which the system operates. Here, meso
and micro system fractures and reformation occurred resulting in new systems competing against
each other where they had not before, or some becoming obsolete. The ways in which systems
also merged or collapsed into either a larger or smaller systems is more fully described below.
Post-Legalization Systems Properties and Characteristics
To unpack systems relationships and dynamics as participants described them, and to
examine the properties and characteristics of these systems, such as whether emergence occurred
as a result of adaption or during interaction, I grouped these as described by participants into
macro, meso and micro buckets consistent with Schmidt’s descriptions. These are presented in
Table 5.1 below.
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Table 5.1
Macro, Meso, and Micro Systems

To create these groupings, I evaluated each system based on Schmidt’s systems level definitions
described above, participant observations, and on my current understanding of the authorizing
environment. Note that I connected the meso and micro level systems but did not collapse one
into the other, but rather, they merged while still maintaining their structure. This distinction is
important to maintain because the micro system had the least leverage across the spectrum of
systems and subsystems, and that leverage significantly decreased after legalization. These were
systems identified as having virtually no voice in any of the systems changes that occurred
following legalization. (“Um, the quietest group, I think, were the people that didn't have a clue
about what the government process was” (P5), referring to micro level legacy market consumers,
some vendors, and others). Of the three levels, however, the meso and micro systems are the
most closely related, and this is consistent with the literature review, system levels descriptions
and findings.
I pause here to offer a caveat on bias. This categorization was accomplished, at least in
part, based on my professional experience and extensive working knowledge of the overall
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authorizing environment. While participant observation took precedent over my own
understandings, I relied on some of my institutional knowledge to guide and refine systems
placement in these buckets. It is worth noting that during the validation phase, participants
indicated that they had not considered authorizing environment relationships with this level of
detail and found the categorizations to be accurate, somewhat surprising but thought provoking
as presented.
To compare the pre-legalization and post-legalization systems structures in a meaningful
way, and going beyond simply bucketing the new systems structure, I updated Figure 5.2, and
created Figure 5.3 to provide a visualization of each system’s observed power and control as
reported by participants, within the overall systems structure. This is represented by the size of
each object in the visualization. It also includes new entrants to the system, such as local
governments, the banking system and the Washington state legislature.
Figure 5.3
Post-Legalization System Visualization
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What does this figure tell us? The most significant feature is that the legacy cannabis
market broke in two based on the way that I-502 was written: the adult use market was displaced
but merged with the regulated cannabis market. However, the medical market did not, although it
was still tangentially connected, with clear connections to medical cannabis patients, and
unregulated distribution and sale. Unregulated processors, producers and dispensaries voluntarily
merged with the newly regulated cannabis market or maintained space in the unregulated
distribution and sale subsystem. New entrants to the regulated cannabis system, such as the
WSLCB, the Washington State Department of Revenue, banking systems (composed in
Washington of a handful of credit unions rather than banking institutions guaranteed by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, and these entities would not participate in cannabis
banking or lending based on federal illegality), the public in general, the Washington State
legislature, local jurisdictions, and the anti-legalization movement were interconnected but had
varying levels of prominence within the overall system. The federal government also entered the
system in a more prominent way, but primarily connected to public health, banking systems as
noted previously, local jurisdictions, and the WSLCB. Public health and prevention previously
held a space outside the legacy market, but moved to a more connected place with WSLCB, the
federal government and local jurisdictions. Finally, based on the legalization of possession of
small amounts of cannabis, law enforcement and the legal system shifted from a disconnected,
but prominent part of the system, to a lesser, more removed part of the overall system.
It is important to note that this diagram captures the period of time before the 2015
passage of Washington State Senate Bill (SB) 5052 that was characterized as a merger of all
medical dispensaries, or the remaining legacy market, with the adult use system. There were only
a few hundred available retail licenses created as a result of the legislation, and existing legacy
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medical cannabis dispensaries that did not join the adult use market, many of which were
minority owned, were shut down because they were unlicensed. Some of the owner/operators did
not qualify for licenses based on, among other things, the presence of a criminal history,
amplifying the impact of the war on drugs. The implementation of SB 5052 is extraordinarily
complex, and given the scope and gravity of that complexity, was not included in this research to
keep the project within reasonable bounds.
There are two additional points to recognize concerning this system evolution. First, note
the movement of communities of color from a close and interconnected relationship to the legacy
market, to virtually an outlier more closely connected to the legal system than any other system.
This was the impact of the construction of I-502 and the creation of a closed system. I discuss
this more fully below. Second, note that previously, pre-legalization systems were relatively
tangential with clear separation between what could be considered as governmental systems and
the legacy market. Post-legalization, these systems all became connected in one way or another.
This systems’ reorganization both impacted and influenced relational and hierarchal
dynamics between systems in ways that legislation could not anticipate or predict. The observed
property and characteristic changes are discussed below.
Systems Properties and Characteristics Through Multi-Leveling Modeling
Applying Systems Levels
Through the learning history validation process, categorized comments were presented in
Chapter IV as Appendix A. I have taken that table and added multi-levels to closely analyze
interactions, explore linkages between them, and whether those linkages might reveal anything
about relational or hierarchal dynamics and complexity. Column headings are updated to reflect
systems level designations, historian notes are updated to reflect these level designations, and
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re-presented in Appendix B.
By integrating these systems level designations, we can begin to better understand how
the subjective values and human behaviors, such as distrust in government, perceived loss of
autonomy or fear of such loss, and lack of interconnectedness within the legacy market and
community fit within the meso/micro systems designation. These dynamics manifested
themselves in a variety of ways, but most notably as animosity and distrust in government
generally. This animosity and distrust was targeted at regulators specifically, even though
regulators were implementing a voter initiative that mandated the creation of a framework for a
new adult-use, regulated cannabis system. We can also see that regulators were managing
conflicts that are inherent in working with a well-established legacy market that had never been
regulated by before, consistent with macro level systems designation. This was manifested as the
appearance of wielding power and heavy handedness by some of the meso, but all of the micro
systems. In other words, the macro system was perceived to constrain human action displayed by
the micro/meso systems (Giddens, 1984). This seemed to suggest that individual human agency
played a larger role in systems dynamics than extent literature suggests. This dynamic resulted in
extraordinary tension between these systems. However, it was this very dynamic that the macro
system recognized and sought to neutralize through engagement with, rather than structural
control over the micro/meso systems. For example, findings describe the neutrality of that
engagement:
We, we held an event . . . [b]ut, that was part of it and that's part of being a regulator is
you make a lot of people upset and, but I think that what we tried to do was to be fair and
to be smart and to listen to people along the way and be willing to adjust. And that, I can
say, definitely happened. That gives you purpose. If you're doing that as your job, you
feel like you're doing the right thing. (P7, emphasis added)
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Is that dynamic or leveraged tension explained by CLT? To an extent, I explore that
above. However, to dissect it further, I looked back to Prigogine’s recognition of the distinction
between complex inert and living systems above, Newton’s mechanistic, reductionist worldview
described in Chapter II, and the macro-micro and agency-structure debate. Although CLT
continually refers to leadership in complex “organizations,” and the literature recognizes such
organizations as CAS, it only recognizes that there might be agents who are humans within those
systems, never exploring the agency of those humans. “[I]ronically, complexity leadership often
seems to imply that there is no role for human agency in the world of complexity because focus
is on the systems and the contexts over and above individual leaders” (Rosenhead et al., 2019, p.
14).
Agency is the ability of individuals to act intentionally (Bandura, 2001). CLT seems to
assume that human agency to be either embedded in systems or organizations or stripped out of
the discussion to support the theory even though this is contrary to a basic tenet of complexity:
systems are not machines. Yet, the CLT machinery only seems to function if systems or
organizations are recognized as inert and agents are without or lack agency.
It was at this point in the analysis that I began to realize that systems properties,
characteristics, and multi-level distinctions might actually be more integrated and linked than the
reviewed literature suggested.
Synthesizing Properties, Characteristics, and Systems Levels
As noted in Chapter IV and above, there are properties and characteristics of these
systems that were similar: subject matter expertise, and the other a sense of marginalization.
These similarities are critical to understanding complex regulatory systems dynamics in context
for two reasons.
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First, it suggests that the systems involved in this research demonstrated both inert
properties and living characteristics. This does not necessarily appear to conflict with
Prigogine’s statement that there is a difference between the behavior of each. As Stacey et al.
(2000) note, “Prigogine casts his theories in terms of entities resonating with each other and
evolving as collective ensembles” (p. 164). Here, if the regulator’s emphasis on implementation
of I-502 had only been on macro system supremacy, the regulatory outcome might have been
different. Turning back to Chapter II, the objective facts of the macro system and subjective
values of the macro system became inextricably entwined—interdependent—following the
formation of a dialectical relationship built on interactive trust that occurred without imbedding
macro understandings of truth in those systems.
For example:
we’ll show you what we do (P5)
I think having somebody that they felt was actually listening to them and cared about
what they had to say, that's what I tried to convey to the people I talked to and met with,
was I care about what you're saying and it is important to me. And I think once that got
around that, that was where I was coming from and everything that I was doing, I think it
made people really comfortable and allow them to open up more than they would have
opened up, and allow them to open up without being angry, which—which I think helped
us accomplish a lot more. (P5, emphasis added)
I think the best part of the navigation was to, at times, just shut up and listen what were
they dealing with, what were they angry about, what did they think of solution was, so
that we could take all of that back and have a discussion. Does this idea even work? Um,
is it going to violate other rules? Yeah, I think just giving them a sounding board. (P5,
emphasis added)
It can be reasonably assumed then, as noted in Empirically Emerging Concept 1 above, that these
shared features made collective systems action possible, but that action was rooted in the
interactions—the relationships—between systems, but these are human, not systems
relationships.
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Second, these similarities underscore and highlight and the duality of the macro system.
Indeed, the bureaucratic macro systems seemed to demonstrate agency, or human values and
behaviors. Findings suggested the macro system demonstrated these spaciotemporal
dimensions—both structure and agency—rather than the asymmetrical status that scholars such
as Giddens (1984) have suggested. To wit, “[Giddens] stresses that institutions are connected to
specific forms of power and domination. But Giddens does not develop the full critical potential
of these innovations because he is actually more interested in the existential situation of
individuals, rather than in the nature and effectivity of structures of domination” (Jessop, 2001,
p. 1222).
Micro-Macro Integration
This apparent phenomenon can be explained by Ritzer’s major levels of social analysis
that recognizes the linkage or interrelationship among macro and micro systems. Instead of
recognizing only a horizontal or vertical relationship between systems, Ritzer creates a
micro-macro continuum that ranges from individual thought and action to larger systems. To this
he adds an objective-subjective continuum that ranges from material phenomenon such as
individual action and bureaucratic structures to nonmaterial phenomenon such as norms and
values (Ritzer & Stepensky, 2017, pp. 338–339). I have modified and customized this model in
context, and offer it in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.4
Macro-Micro Integration

Note: From Ritzer, G., & Stepnisky, J., Modern Sociological Theory. 8th Edition, 2018, p. 338,
Copyright 2018 by SAGE Publications. Adapted with permission.

This confirms that if these systems were actually more integrated than not, and as I noted in
Chapter II, that the objective facts of the macro system and the subjective values of the micro
systems cannot be separated; they are inextricably entwined and interact with each other. CLT
suggests that a leader pushes these systems to the edge of chaos by creating adaptive space to do
so, and as I’ve noted, it is unclear whether leadership emerges from that adaptive space or
leaders complexly lead the systems to it. That generally happens, according to the collection of
CLT diagrams, in a straight line with what appear to be two feedback loops, but within that, there
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is no importance attached to people, differences between people, or the acts of human relating
(Stacey et al., 2000). My findings suggest that these human acts of relating and the dialogue
associated with that relation are part of the dynamics of complex regulatory systems.
Agency
I pause here to recognize that human agency in a bureaucratic macro system emerged as a
theme in this research only after I began seeking a deeper understanding of the unique interplay
between complex regulatory systems properties and characteristics. For this reason, my literature
review did not include an exploration or discussion of structure or human agency in complex
regulatory systems, nor was it included in the presentation of findings. I have reserved it for this
chapter and place it here in this chronology and analysis because this is truly the point at which
the revelation occurred, and I was better able to grasp the empirically emerging importance of it:
none of the leadership literature, and very little of the public administration literature reviewed
during this research reference human agency in the way that the theme began to take shape in
this study.
It was through this “spadework” (a term used by a research participant) of analysis that
my findings seemed to suggest that understanding how human agency is situated in macro
systems was part of understanding this system’s properties and characteristics, but more to the
point, understanding that human interactions are complex and as much a part of the complexity
of systems as the complex systems themselves. As noted in Chapter III, these are the “messy” bits
of the human experience that this research sought to understand. However, trying to explain
these interactions through a complexity or CLT lens does not explain this concept.
Consider that CLT presents an idealized view of humans interacting that “abstracts from
the power relationships and conflict” (Stacey et al., 2000, p. 165). Diversity of opinion or
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thought, purpose and value are aligned. Complexity is used to justify human behavior but there is
nothing in the process of interaction in CLT that speaks to equality or distribution of power, and
in doing so, there is no substantive importance attached to diversity or any of the aspects of
human relating (Stacey et al., 2000). Here, human relating is important.
Additionally, buried within this table is the implied reality that as part of this system
integration, a portion of the legacy system was negotiating its merger with a future regulated
market. This meant that it was essentially giving its power away “The lack of control, feeling,
feeling like they don’t have control over who’s growing” (P3), but “we’ll show you what we do”
(P5) suggests this. I was unable to find examples in the literature of such a power shift happening
on this scale, in this space or in this way. Here, this shift in market oversight, or perhaps better
characterized as governance over it, from one system to another, escalated tension (“it was
walking through a minefield, I guess” (P5)).
Interestingly, and at the same time however, the meso/micro systems held power in
knowledge that the macro system needed to successfully create regulation framing the activities
associated with cannabis production and processing. In this way, the legacy market was able to
maintain its structure, meaning that by holding that power and knowledge, it was able to produce
and reproduce the rules and resources to support action, such as best practices and perhaps social
order within the legacy market.
This has tremendous implications regarding how regulations might be crafted in a way
that lead to socially equitable conditions, and I discuss those more fully in Chapter 6. It also has
implications in the ways complex thinking might be applied in practice and confirms my
findings, best summarized by Pollitt (2009), as I’ve offered previously, that “complexity theory
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function[s] more as a descriptive conceptualization of the backdrop to action” (p. 229, emphasis
added).
Empirically Emerging Concept 2
Complex regulatory systems display micro, meso and macro properties and
characteristics that cannot be separated. These properties, including human agency, are
integrated, and intertwined. These intertwined systems communicate through
relationships and dialogue grounded in interactive trust that creates a pathway for
knowledge exchange while retaining macro, meso and micro systems structure.
The theoretical construct of complexity does not explain this phenomenon or the presence
of agency within this dynamic, but rather, explains the system dynamic. Complexity
arises from participatory action, human relationship, and dialogue because it is the
nature of this engagement that describes the dynamic.
To further explore what role “leadership,” “leading” or “leaders” had in this process I turn to a
discussion of post-legalization leadership observations.
Post Legalization Leadership Observations
I began this chapter comparing findings to CLT, comparing participant experience to the
elements of CLT. I concluded that such a leadership theory did not explain the experiences of
this study’s participants. However, it is also unclear whether concepts and theories of
“leadership,” “leading,” or “leaders” explain participant experience.
Like complexity, there are many perspectives, theories, and understanding of what
“leadership” is and how it is demonstrated, practiced, and experienced. Northouse (2015)
suggests that “leadership is a process whereby one person influences one or more people in order
to achieve a specific purpose or goal” (p. 6). Others find it less simple to define. For example, in
questioning whether “leadership” exists at all, Grint (2010), offers a typology that expresses “a
significant portion” of what definitions for leadership include:
Leadership as position: is it where “leaders” operate that makes them leaders?
Leadership as person: is it who “leaders” are that make them leaders?
Leadership as result: is it what “leaders” achieve that makes them leaders?

186
Leadership as process: is it how “leaders” get them done that makes them leaders? (p. 4)
Uhl-Bien and Marion (2009) provide that “CLT is a contextual theory of leadership—it describes
“leadership” as necessarily embedded in context and “socially constructed in and from a context”
(p. 632). Under this definition, CLT could fall under any or all Grint’s definitions. Indeed, as
discussed throughout this work, CLT “aims to accurately reflect the complex nature of
leadership” (Nooteboom & Termeer, 2013, p. 2). However, neither complexity theory nor CLT
recognize or explain the actual practice of leading change in complex regulatory systems. This
returns us to one of my central assertions, now supported by findings that by “simplify[ing] and
reduc[ing] an abstract and complex phenomenon to a clear-cut practical entity” (Crevani et al.,
2010, p. 79) complexity is merely implied in “leadership” rather than applied.
Participants with titles signaling or signposting a leadership role indicated that they did
not “lead” anything; rather, they became the participants, rather than disassociated, objective
“leaders” of change. I am not suggesting that findings indicate consideration of “abandoning
vertical hierarchies altogether and simply adopting a more horizontal approach” (Grint, 2022, p.
9) as I’ve noted above. That approach does not align with the realities of complex regulatory
systems and the notion of systems integration.
This underscores the challenge of extending complexity theory into the social sciences,
but it is particularly problematic in leadership studies. Buried within that field of study is an
assumption that a leader can observe an entire system and all of its parts, or in other words, take
a whole-systems view (Wheatley, 1994), then select a leadership style that aligns with Grint’s
nomenclature or a hybrid of that nomenclature. Theoretically then, a leader leading complexly
inherently knows how to manipulate the system well enough to inject and stir some tension into
an adaptive space somewhere within that whole system that simmers until the time is right and
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innovation or novelty emerges. However, if these systems are as metaphorically complex as
asserted, and this is the way that complexity theory is suggested in leadership studies, then the
leaders who are “agents within those systems . . . are themselves . . . participants unable to step
outside, make objective observations, then design and chose dynamics” (Stacey et al., 2000, p.
206). The question becomes, then, is it leadership at all?
Findings suggest that participants did not believe it was, and as highlighted earlier, one
poignantly offered that “I am a survivor, not a leader” (P12). Reaffirming but expanding on
Empirically Emerging Concept 2, these findings suggest that complexity does not describe the
socially constructed concept of leadership as much as it does the collective action of a system,
and the interactions of agents within those systems.
Conclusion
Complexity is a big, but often over-extended concept. Leadership, leading and leaders
also seems to fit within that large conceptual pool. The findings of my study indicate that there is
no causal, linear link that can be made between governmental actions, such as legislation,
proposition or initiative, and regulatory outcomes that could be attributed to a leader, leadership
style, whether one complexly leads, leads complexity, or subscribes to a particular leadership
theory.
Instead, this study demonstrates that participants broke a long-standing tradition when
engaging with the legacy market to establish the first regulatory frameworks for a commercial
cannabis system. They did not adhere to traditional, macro-level understandings of truth and
continue with “business as usual” but built and fostered interactive trust in interactive spaces to
connect a broader range of knowledge through dialogue and relationships across systems levels.
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Thus, rather than bringing about change through managed emergence and staged adaptation,
change could be characterized as interactive.
The theoretical construct of complexity does not explain this phenomenon or the presence
of agency within this dynamic, but rather, explains the system dynamic. Complexity arises from
the participatory, human relationship, dialogue and engagement because it is the nature of this
engagement that describes the dynamic. Thus, rather than focusing only on systems and contexts,
participants engaged the properties and characteristics of complex systems—including human
agency—to bring about interactive change. This participatory approach, recognizing systems
integration, paved the way for regulatory innovation, interactive change and regulatory structures
where none had existed before.
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CHAPTER VI: DISCUSSION
In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute.
—Thurgood Marshall, Furman v. Georgia (1972)
The purpose of this study was to understand if cannabis might be regulated in a way that
leads to socially equitable conditions under the premise that to achieve that goal, one needs to
engage with complex systems across multiple dimensions with qualities and features that cannot
be measured in the same way. I took an unvarnished look at the messy, human side of change
related to a controversial area of drug policy reform from the perspectives of people who were
and for some, still are on the front lines of making that change.
Using the learning history action research approach, I interviewed twelve individuals
representing three different states, along with others who were or continue to be involved in
aspects of cannabis legalization and subsequent regulation. This approach provided a way to
gather data related to my overarching research questions, while providing participating agencies
with an actionable document that memorialized lived experiences in their own words and
described their shared vision for the future. Despite the structural differences between individual
state governments, legislative bodies and regulatory frameworks, the experience of being at the
forefront of monumental social change in the form of drug policy was similar for all participants.
In this concluding chapter, I focus on two key issues. First, what my research says about
leading in relation to complex contexts. Second, what my research says about leading in ways
that bring about socially equitable conditions. I then move to a discussion of limitations to the
present research, followed by suggested focus areas for future research. I close this chapter by
reflecting on my research and offering concluding remarks.
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Understanding how change might be lead in a way that results in socially equitable
conditions is the central inquiry anchoring this work. The inquiry presents two questions, though,
related to systems interactions. The first concerns leadership, and the second concerns social
equity. Here, I will discuss the first.
Critique of Complexity Leadership Theory and Leadership
What is “leadership” in the context of this research, how do those identified as “leaders”
lead, and what does complexity have to do with any of that?
I have offered that leadership theories relying on complexity appear to assume that all the
agents within a system share the same world view, and experience system and structural
dynamics in the same way, regardless of where they are situated within a system’s levels. By
basing its position on this assumption, CLT aligns more with the mechanistic, Newtonian
thinking it criticizes. As a result, the adaptive responses it holds will occur if its prescriptions are
followed do not seem to recognize cross-systems interactions that acknowledge agency, but the
impact such adaptive responses have on systems, even if agency is ignored. This has the
potential to result in unintended consequences with long term and far-reaching effects. In
addition to my research, I turn to a recent discussion of CLT as an approach to the COVID-19
pandemic, but also as a cautionary tale:
Adaptive responses emerged in COVID-19 when complexity pressures activated ideation
processes of entrepreneurial leaders and followers working together to search for
adaptive solutions and new ways of doing things, for example, distilleries converting
their facilities to producing hand sanitizer; Elon Musk using his network and financial
resources to acquire 1200+ ventilators from China; hospitals turning to crowdsourcing
and 3D printing to address equipment shortages; an informal trading economy emerging
in the face of consumer product shortages (e.g. toilet paper). (Uhl-Bien, 2021, p. 1401)
This opinion piece begins by reaffirming, consistent with most literature concerning CLT, that
the world is increasingly complex. The piece broadens the scope of that assertion by offering that
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since the 1990s, CLT scholars have held that “traditional leadership models . . . do not capture
the lived experience of navigating leadership” (Uhl-Bien, 2021, p. 1400). This is an interesting
assertion given that since that the 1990s, a number of scholars have questioned the theory based
on its lack of empirical support and among other things, its reliance on metaphor as validation
(Cairney, 2012; Cairney et al., 2019; Cairney & Geyer, 2017; Grint, 2020, 2022; Kok et al.,
2021; Pollitt, 2009; Rosenhead, 1998; Rosenhead et al., 2019; Tourish, 2019). Despite this, it is
suggested that these “adaptive responses” are the direct result of CLT in practice.
Unintended Consequences
From a practitioner’s perspective, and more specifically, a regulator’s perspective, such
adaptive responses present a variety of challenges. For example, the “expanded take out”
(Uhl-Bien, 2021, p. 1400) mentioned in the piece is framed as an innovative “adaptive solution”
to challenges of the pandemic. In practice, it was an extraordinarily controversial topic for
alcohol regulators, departments of revenue, public health, prevention, law enforcement
professionals, trade organizations, and lawmakers. This “adaptive solution” expanded the hours
of operation in which alcohol could be sold, allowed cocktails to go in various forms, curbside
delivery of cocktails to go, and in some instances bottle sales from restaurants that are not
subject to the same taxation rate as alcohol retailers are for the same sale. For public health,
prevention, and law enforcement, this “adaptive solution” increased and expanded alcohol outlet
density which increased the risk of youth access, and increased potential for open-container and
impaired driving.
Regulatory agencies were able to put temporary measures in place to establish some
public safety guardrails, ensure proper tax collection, or both, but most of the fallout from this
“adaptive solution” was borne by law enforcement, public health and social service agencies.
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Such solutions also required legislation, emergency rulemaking, and agencies offering to simply
not enforce laws and rules, setting uncertain precedence during an equally uncertain time. These
efforts were time and resource intensive, with the greatest toll falling on the human resources and
capital that are managed very differently in the public sector than they are in the private sector.
However, the impact went much further than that.
The specific adaptive response of increasing alcohol outlet density had far reaching social
equity and public health impacts. While the response may have supported commerce, it did so by
relying on some of the worst traits of capitalism, such as monopolization and exploitation, at the
expense of keeping communities and people safe and preventing harms related to alcohol
consumption. For example, as alcohol consumption increased in homes, youth exposure also
increased since most were attending school virtually. Third party delivery of alcohol to the front
doors of homes across the United States increased as well, sometimes without identification
verification, and sometimes simply left at front doors unattended.
There were similar impacts related to distilleries converting facilities to create hand
sanitizer. While the long-term effects of these adaptive responses are unknown while we wait for
research to be conducted, we do know that alcohol consumption and associated harms spiked
tremendously during the pandemic. We know that part of that spike was attributable to business
shutdowns and the reality that people were consuming alcohol in venues other than restaurants,
bars, and taverns. We are just now beginning to understand the full scope, impacts and long-term
effects of this adaptive response.
The Other Side of Leadership
I turn now to another, more troubling aspect of the assertion that adaptive responses are
demonstrative of the effectiveness of complexity-informed leadership. If COVID-19 did
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anything, it widened the gap between who had access to resources like healthcare, hand sanitizer,
toilet paper and ventilators, and who did not, shedding a bright, but necessary light on racial,
gender and other disparities. The adaptive responses of “remote work in business, telehealth in
medicine, online education in schools” (Uhl-Bien, 2021, p. 1400) were not experienced by
marginalized communities, and particularly people of color in the same way that they were by
people who already had access to these resources.
Consider that the ability to work from home is not available to everyone. The most recent
Bureau of Labor Statistics data on teleworking are from 2017–2018 and indicate that only 19.7
percent Black and 16.2 percent of Latinx people work jobs where they are able to telework,
compared to 29.9 percent of white and 37.0 percent of Asian workers. This gap and other
research documenting that Black and Latinx people now make up disproportionate numbers of
jobs deemed “essential” explains why people of color have been exposed to great virus risks
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021). What does that gap have to do with leadership and why does
it matter here?
The ability to adapt to the new ways of thinking and creative resourcing during the
pandemic to generate adaptive responses appears to have been available only to certain
populations. Although CLT scholars originally offered that it “does not support an ‘every person
on the same page’ assumption” (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007, p. 298), failing to consider every person
on every page is not an option in the public sector. And, although the piece is highly critical of
public sector leadership, it is that very group of individuals who, despite their perceived
“cronyism” successfully “collaborated for the greater good” (p. 1401) to create, as this work
memorializes, the first commercial cannabis systems in the world. That work was based on a
massive change in drug policy designed to reduce the harms of the war on drugs, and to restore
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the ability for all populations to “live in hope, to live in dignity” (Morton, 2013) and to live in
freedom to the extent possible.
If current leadership theories and approaches, whether deemed traditional or not, led us to
a pandemic, perhaps we should rethink our approach. In the United States, COVID-19 triggered
a national reckoning with our long history of colonialism that continues to serve as the basis for
continued structural and institutional racism. We were then, and I would offer, appropriately
continue to be, forced to take a hard, long-overdue look at who really benefits from privileged
“new” ways of thinking and take an even harder look at whose thinking it is. Moving our
thinking, our approaches to leading change, and in context, creating regulation and law must
occur through a social equity lens. That cannot be meaningfully accomplished if we apply
theories and practices designed to exclude and privilege. Rosenhead et al. (2019) offer that “The
conceptual imperialism implicit in much writing on complexity is both unfortunate and
unnecessary” (p. 20). This research and the forgoing critique align with that thinking.
If our ability to recognize the humanity of our fellow human beings is limited to and
based upon a privileged world view that happens when only “academic evidence” (Uhl-Bien,
2021, p. 1403) generated for researchers by researchers is considered, then it is not change or
innovation at all but preservation of the status quo under a different name. This is not a new
concept in the United States. It is centuries old, and has resulted, among other things, in
structural and institutional inequality.
“We” Versus Leadership
Participants in this study did not place emphasis on or describe a leadership style aligning
with a specific theory or style of leadership. Indeed, the general response and discussion around
leadership, the action of leading or being a leader was that no one practiced it, and in fact, I recall
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participants rather cringing when I mentioned the word. Instead, they identified with a larger
movement of which they were a part, but not the center, perhaps underscoring some of the
differences in approach between public service and private industry. That difference seems to
suggest that if leadership is a social construct, then the practice or act of it is tied to where it
happens, if it happens, how it happens and who is doing it. Here, participants constantly referred
to “we” rather than the act of any particular individual.
Leadership Versus Management
Public service is not only framed by laws and rules that public agencies administer, but
by a duty to apply those laws and rules in a transparent and inclusive way. At the state level, the
work of an agency and its direction is influenced by legislation, gubernatorial direction, or a
combination of the two. It is also influenced by public and social need or direction, a variety of
emergencies and international events. Despite what was offered in leadership literature reviewed
here, the reality is that public sector work is incredibly fast paced because the authorizing
environment is constantly changing, and as many in public service sometimes reluctantly note,
the one constant in our service is change. Even though recognized as being “mired in
bureaucracy,” this does not mean that public agencies cannot be agile or innovative, but it does
mean that certain rules apply to public agencies that do not apply to private industry. Things like
records, the ability to meet, rule and policy development, human resource management,
compensation and resource acquisition are all subject to public scrutiny in the form of public
disclosure laws and statutes governing the ways that business is conducted. There is a lot to
manage on most levels, and how one does that is not tied to being a servant, transformational, a
great man or a hero, but more to stewardship of resources to build and preserve public trust. In
public service, our customer is everyone.
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In contrast, private sector “leadership” may be responsible to shareholders, a board of
directors, or some other governing body that does not consist of publicly elected officials.
Decisions and the ability to act or not act are driven and informed in different ways, such as
commerce. Management of resources may be impacted by laws and rules, but ultimately the
decision to purchase a ream of paper does not become a public record. All of this suggests that
there are two very different levels of duty at play: one to the public and one to enterprise.
Turning back to the literature, there seems to be a blurry line between leadership and
management. Literature relying on complexity as an approach to leading and leadership seems to
float between suggesting that leaders manage things like dialogue, tension and people, but at the
same time leadership itself is purported to emerge from anywhere or everywhere in an
organization. This thinking is not exclusive to CLT, although it creates in a bit of a theoretical
vacuum in general that seems to be resolved by the assertion that leadership is contextual and can
be practiced or demonstrated by anyone.
Leadership Versus Change
If we say that we are “leading change” then, does that mean the same thing regardless of
where that change came from, where it’s going, or who is leading it? This research supports the
notion that leadership may very well be contextual, and it may very well be socially constructed.
However, it takes that thinking one step further by suggesting that change is not necessarily lead
as much as it is guided, and complexity is not necessarily an action as much as it is the
embodiment of relationship across, between and within systems.
In this context, change was initiated by a democratic process, and regulatory agencies
were tasked with carrying it out. That did not involve heroism, charisma or a transaction as much
as it did engagement, participation, dialogue, recognizing the humanity of others, and practicing
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inclusivity. It involved managing and balancing the expectations of voters, legislators and
government officials with a market that had never been regulated before and distrusted anyone
and anything related to government. It also required those identified as “leaders” to practice
public stewardship and management of public resources in a way that private industry does not
contemplate.
Thus, based on the observations of participants, the separation between “leadership” and
management becomes clearer, and reliance on a social construct that is largely theoretical,
socially constructed and ambiguous becomes less useful. Participants centered stewardship and
management on what matters: making sure that distribution of and access to public services was
available to all citizens. This is not an act of leadership, but rather responsible and equitable
management of public resources.
Toward Socially Equitable Conditions
The title of this study signals an exploration into the ways that socially equitable
conditions might be achieved in complex regulatory systems regulating cannabis. I was unable to
locate any literature or studies that spoke to how we might “lead” in a way or ways that result in
socially equitable conditions, and this is one of the reasons for my interest in the subject. In
contrast, there is a handful of literature speaking to how we might create policy that moves in
that direction, but in broad strokes. I have explored and discovered a collection of reasons why
that gap might exist related to leadership theories, and how the people involved with cannabis
regulation experience that space.
As I noted earlier, the weaponization of cannabis has not changed by any appreciable
measure since legalization. This can be largely attributed to white collective comfort in the
development of theory and policy grounded in institutional and structural racism designed to
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maintain and support a certain type of dominance. Indeed, rather than taking up ideals of
tolerance and respect for others and putting them to use in our schools, communities, and
throughout our lives, we exalt the structures that create barriers to the realization of Nelson
Mandela’s ideals, and in opposition to the words of Thurgood Marshall, fail to recognize the
humanity of our fellow human beings.
One of the ways that racism flourishes in the United States is through drug policy. The
idea that a single arrest can be dealt with and put behind a person once they pay a fine or serve
jail time is a fallacy (Hudak, 2020). Certainly, legalization efforts have sought to correct the
lingering effects of the war on drugs. While I have discussed this to a degree here, and offer
findings to support it, I can agree with Hudak (2020) in concluding that we simply cannot talk
about cannabis reform without a meaningful discussion and substantive inclusion of how best to
help communities most hurt by the war on drugs. We owe it to the groups and individuals
targeted by those failed policies to think creatively, comprehensively, and analytically about how
to reverse this trend (Hudak, 2020). It takes more than “coffee, courage, and cannabis”
(Hoffman, 2020, p. 43) but humility and the ability to accept responsibility to do that. Bravery,
however, should not be exclusive to activists and other reform groups. It needs to come from law
makers and regulators, and we can start that work by deconstructing the poor policies of the past
and reconstructing inclusive policies now and in the future. For purposes of this discussion,
however, I turn to a working definition of social equity.
Framing Social Equity
My training is in the tradition of public administration. The National Association of
Public Administration has identified four pillars of public administration: economy, efficacy,
effectiveness, and social equity. While three of these pillars are relatively static, the definition of
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social equity in the public administration context has evolved over time (Gadson, 2020).
Although I provided a working definition of social equity in Chapter 4 from the Melbourne
Institute of Social Justice, I rely on a definition in the context of public administration since that
is the perspective context from which I offer recommendations. This demonstrates two things:
the nuanced differences in concept interpretation, and the challenges regulators and policy
makers encounter when designing frameworks to realize and operationalize such concepts. To
that end, Johnson and Svara (2011) provide the following description that aligns with the focus
of this study:
Social equity is the active commitment to fairness, justice, and equality in the
formulation of public policy, distribution of public services, implementation of
public policy, and management of all institutions serving the public directly or
by contract Public Administrators, including all persons involved in public governance,
should seek to prevent or reduce inequality, unfairness, and injustice
based on significant social characteristics and to promote greater equality in access
to services, procedural fairness, quality of services, and social outcomes. (p. 282).
With this as a backdrop, I turn to discussion of what complexity might offer us in creating
regulations that create and support socially equitable conditions.
Complexity Thinking and Social Equity
A complexity informed approach to social equity “recognize[s] that the past shapes the
present and the present shapes the emerging future” (Boulton et al., 2015, p. 135). This is a
description of Prigogine’s arrow of time, and means that knowledge exchange can, as findings
suggest, not only memorialize past activity, but help to inform the future. I would, however, offer
that we proceed with caution.
For example, during the course of regulatory development and even during the I-502
campaign, phrases like “common interest,” “public good,” and words like “efficiency” were
commonly asserted. Looking at these words through a social equity lens, one might ask whose
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public good, whose common interest and efficiency for whose purpose? (Lane, 2016). This
speaks to being on the receiving end of what is termed downward causation, where higher level
properties place restraints on the behavior of their constituent parts (Mitchell, 2009).
Knowledge is not neutral and can be influenced by a number of factors. Some of these
are discussed in these pages and include but are not limited to where one might be nested in the
macro/meso/micro systems structure, taking us back to thinking about the relationship between
structure and agency. If capacity for reorientation is a condition of agency, how do structures
engage with agency to exchange knowledge? Does the relationship, or lack of relationship—in
other words, the grey, unknown space—between structure and agency pervade knowledge, and
create a tension around whose knowledge it is, and ultimately, who has the power to make that
determination? How might we shape interactive spaces, strengthen interactive trust and
meaningfully engage communities in a collaborative effort to bring about interactive change that
results in socially equitable conditions? This research provides some empirically emerging
concepts in answer to those questions, and here I link those concepts with complexity thinking.
The Arrow of Time
Consider that a legacy market participant with knowledge of effective and efficient
indoor cannabis growing might share that information with only a few other growers, largely to
protect the proprietary nature of their method. Within that particular group (and here participants
noted this group existed largely underground), keeping information to oneself was customary, or
an accepted practice. Sharing that knowledge more broadly could negatively impact business
survival. As findings suggest, we know this was a consistent characteristic of the legacy market
both pre- and post-legalization. Access to that knowledge base might help a new grower, whether
licensed or not, to shape new or reshape existing ideas about successful growing methods.
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However, those with such knowledge control its use within this particular group, exerting power
over it that reinforces the dynamics. So, while there is the possibility that one could reshape
ideas, it might only occur through a critical understanding of the groupings, or structures in
which the licensee acts as opposed to, for example, a regulatory agency acting unconsciously
through them (Lane, 2016).
This is the Socratic piece of complexity that authors like Lane (2106) refer to, and the
concept that I’ve introduced here: to understand the characteristics of a complex system, we must
actually interact with its agency, rather than through it. This is also the place where we can begin
to think about ways to bring knowledge forward, shift and broaden our focus, and remember that
the public good means all public good.
Washington’s Approach
In Washington state during the 2019 legislative session, House Bill (HB) 2870 passed
creating the statutory framework to redistribute cannabis retail licenses to future social equity
applicants. The bill also established a task force to make recommendations to the WSLCB
regarding the creation of a social equity program, the issuance and reissuance of existing and
new retail, producer and processor cannabis licenses. The Social Equity in Cannabis Task Force
met continuously since late 2020, and in late 2021, offered preliminary recommendations to both
the WSLCB and Washington State Governor Jay Inslee’s office. The work of the task force has
been challenging for several reasons, notwithstanding COVID-19 related delays, technical
delays, and the dynamics inherent in bringing a group of diverse people together to discuss an
issue as racially, emotionally, and culturally charged as cannabis. In other words, and to link the
flow of this discussion, the people whose agency had always been ignored by a structure
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designed to suppress it would at long last be afforded the ability and opportunity to benefit from
it.
A recurring theme throughout discussions was and remains the urgent desire of future
social equity applicants to meaningfully participate in the regulated market. Parallel to this
overarching theme, however, is the divide in perception and understanding around the origins of
I-502, which is largely held by white participants, and the experience of being on the receiving
end of cannabis prohibition, which is largely held by Black and Brown participants.
Consistent with this study’s findings and certainly, the rich participant narrative provided
in Chapter IV, I would offer that we need to think beyond the way we have framed this
conversation. In the same way that the learning history methodology looked to the past to guide
the future, I believe regulators should think about the “historical, cultural and social forces
justifying why social equity is a necessary and desirable goal within the cannabis reform
movement” (Packard, 2021, p. 154.) because it underpins our work.
I would offer that we cannot lose sight of the reality that the history of cannabis did not
start when it was brought into commercial markets. The war on drugs began almost a century
ago, and the resultant generational trauma has been realized in a variety of ways. The following
considerations offer some of historical, cultural, and social realities that might inform our
thinking around achieving social equity goals.
Cannabis Stigmatization
Cannabis stigmatization is as prevalent today as it was during the early years of
legalization. Reid (2020) offers a definition of stigma that I will rely on here: “Loosely defined,
stigma describes a part of the self that is socially devalued to where it becomes morally
offensive. This aspect can be a physical abnormality, faults on an individual’s character, or
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membership in a distasteful group” (p. 2). Stigma can be analyzed by systems levels in the way
that I analyzed the characteristics and properties of complex regulatory systems. To wit, there are
structural (macro) stigmas, social (meso) stigmas, and personal (micro) systems. Most relevant to
this research are structural stigmas because these are related to the macro system, and as noted in
Chapters II and V, it is within this system that drug policy is created, and from which statute and
regulation to create those policies emerge. Structural manifestations of stigma appear as
institutional policies that restrict rights and diminish life opportunities of people with stigmatized
identities (Reid, 2020). These stigmas are ideological and can be used to suppress otherness, like
anti-drug campaigns that are still prevalent in public health and prevention circles, and also
evident in local moratoriums prohibiting the placement of cannabis businesses in certain towns,
cities or counties in states where cannabis has been legalized.
Additionally, along with the public health and safety focus, the per se driving limits, and
the concentration on reducing harm, a selling point for legalization was that it would take
cannabis out of the hands of drug cartels and move into a legal market. Indeed, “The Washington
campaign argued that drugs should be legalized, not because they are safe but because they are
dangerous. It’s precisely because they are risky that we need to take them back from the
gangsters and cartels and hand them to regulated stores” (Hari, 2015, p. 282). Thus, voters “may
have been making the choice between their perception of shady cartels of color controlling the
illicit market and the more trusted white business owners and local governments profiting from
marijuana consumption” (Bender, 2016, p. 694 in Reid, 2020, p. 12). Even today, if one
performs a simple Google search of the term “drug trafficking,” one of the first things that will
appear in such a search is “Mexican Drug Wars.”
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Cannabis stigma continues to pervade discussion and perception. This stigma must be
neutralized and reduced to support positive engagement and interaction with the communities
most impacted by the war on drugs.
Cannabis Normalization
Closely related to stigma, cannabis normalization is socially and culturally nuanced but in
a slightly different way (Reid, 2021). As an example, one of the articles I reviewed for this
section had been published in a journal entitled “Deviant Behavior.” The piece approached the
issue of cannabis normalization from the criminology and sociological perspectives. The author
(Reid, 2021) points out that although more states in the United States have legalized some form
of cannabis use, “…the cannabis industry is often hailed as the next billion-dollar business
venture, and scores of celebrities have introduced their own brands of cannabis products” (p. 1).
As applied to cannabis, however, normalization is often taken to mean that society approaches
cannabis use as an unremarkable feature of everyday life. More specifically, it suggests that a
society’s moral boundaries surrounding the plant have been redrawn to accommodate nonabusive use (Reid, 2021, citing Duff et al., 2012; Sandberg, 2012).
There is also an argument originating from research on youth populations, that in a
post-prohibition world, we should all agree that cannabis and its use should be viewed as
normalized in the same way that alcohol has been. I would assert, however, that this argument is
based in what Reid (2020) refers to as “unchecked social privilege” (p. 2) from the industry
itself, which is largely white, male, and well-capitalized, and from public health and prevention
advocates, who are also predominately white.
Further, research often cited by public health and prevention advocates includes results
from a small portion of Black and Brown children compared to “White non-Hispanics.” For
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example, in Washington State, Black youth representing 4% of the total surveyed are compared
to White non-Hispanic youth representing 55% or more of the total surveyed in the 2021 Healthy
Youth Su7rvey. Assertions offered before reporting survey responses includes language that is
reminiscent of the war on drugs narrative which assumes of white privilege: “ATOD [alcohol,
tobacco, and other drug use] is associated with delinquency and criminal activity” (p. 12).
Survey results, then, are dominated by non-Hispanic whites, meaning that if cannabis use
fluctuates in that population, the experiences of Black youth are once again overshadowed and
minimized by “non-Hispanic white” domination.
Finally, gentrification has resulted in the placement of cannabis stores and production
facilities in communities that were once severely impacted by the war on drugs. These
businesses, however, are generally not owned by former community members, but by non-Black
individuals with access to capital and resources. In Washington state, this represents more than
90% of all licensees. Stores such as the Uncle Ike’s chain in the Seattle, Washington area serves
communities that were once predominately Black. The chain itself is owned by a non-Black
individual, and although the company cites the benefit it provides to the communities it serves,
such as the Joints for Jabs campaign in the summer of 2021 and support for various community
groups, its placement and presence in those communities remains controversial. This inequality
will continue to be amplified as whites continue to dominate the legal cannabis marketplace, a
process made easier by their relative reprieve from the war on drugs that has disproportionately
impacted Black and Brown communities (Reid, 2021).
Summary
Normalization extends beyond the realm of cannabis. Consider where, how and by whom
most laws and regulations are promulgated. The vision of society in the United States has been
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warped by hundreds of years of oppression, and much of that oppression is realized in the way
we craft our laws and rules.
Cannabis has been associated with outsiders in every society (Reid, 2020). As one
participant noted, and I offer above, “much of the treatment of cannabis has been race-based, and
regulators need to understand both that, and the right responses to create policy that will lead to
socially equitable conditions” (P2). Since legalization alone will not reduce structural stigma
related to cannabis, and normalization is a double-edged sword, removing the structural barriers
that aided in creating such stigma may be a strong approach to creating statute and regulation
that leads to socially equitable conditions.
Limitations
There are limitations that are both general in nature and unique to this study. As
discussed in Chapters I and III, my position as an insider action researcher offered both
advantages and disadvantages. These were accentuated by my position within the agency I
studied, my subject matter expertise, and by events occurring during this study. Chapter III also
highlighted some of the limitations of the learning history action research methodology. I discuss
each of these here.
Researcher Positionality
As noted above and as I write, Washington’s social equity in cannabis efforts are well
underway. Part of establishing that program includes creating a regulatory framework to issue
available cannabis retail outlet licenses to eligible social equity applicants. While I was in the
process of recruiting participants for this study, I began the rule development project to establish
the first social equity in cannabis program in Washington state. This meant that not only would I
be drafting the rules themselves but working closely with community and many others to create a
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framework for future applicants to become active participants in creating regulation that might
impact them in the future.
I had hoped to interview members of the BIPOC community as part of this research, as
well as several pre-legalization dispensary owners and a handful of medical patients. However,
as a result of this assignment, and the ethical considerations related to it, I reduced my pool of
participants by approximately 50%. I was concerned that my credibility and integrity as a
practitioner would be compromised as much as I was concerned about the conflict of interest that
I perceived would be present if I were to be working with potential research participants in
essentially two capacities, but from different perspectives and for different reasons. Based on my
experience and education, I knew that trust in government on any level is not a widely or
strongly held position of many, and here I would be part of a team seeking not only to build that
trust anew but earn it. These are two different, but related outreach skills, and more importantly,
a process that cannot be rushed.
As a result, I opted to reduce my recruitment pool to include regulators and a smaller
group of non-regulators with subject matter expertise that would not be directly involved in
social equity program rule development. Although I do not believe that this impacted the
outcome of this research, I view it as a limitation in terms of my ability to deeply explore the
breadth, depth, and contours of change related to social equity and justice.
Creation of One Learning History Artifact
Further, as noted throughout this work, this is the first study of its kind using a rather
uncommon but powerful action research methodology, and this research produced only one
learning history artifact. Given the flexible nature of the method, combining the experiences of
the three states involved in early cannabis legalization made sense as a starting point for this
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topic and from this perspective. It also made sense from a logistical and resource perspective
since I am a research team of one and learning history methodology is time and resource intense.
Although generalizability is not the primary goal of this research or the method, this approach
resulted in a learning history artifact that focused primarily on Washington state, and to a lesser
degree on Oregon and Colorado. This does not diminish the impact or substance of the shared
experiences memorialized in the artifact, but it does not offer learning history artifacts that may
be of focused use for Oregon and Colorado. Creating a research team might be helpful for future
Learning Historians when researching multiple states or entities is a research goal.
Data Limitations Based on Stigmatization
Finally, I raise both a limitation and concern related to the subject of this research, and I
take a bit of privilege to do so. We, as a society, spend an inordinate amount of time making sure
that we both proclaim our uniqueness while simultaneously invoking our separateness to
maintain that uniqueness. This occurs on multiple levels. As I write, I am listening to
correspondents reporting on the eleventh day of the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, where
establishing the difference between “us” and “them” has taken a horrific turn. In the context of
this research, that difference is related more to those who were impacted by the war on the drugs
and the associated stigma that I’ve briefly discussed here.
This fixation on silencing the “other” resulted in my inability to access and understand
the history of cannabis legalization through the eyes of many people before legalization
occurred. This is a different dimension than I noted above in that there are and have been
thousands and thousands of medical cannabis consumers who, based upon cannabis
stigmatization, have never shared their stories and perspectives. Instead, those stories are shared
through others or in general terms through people like me trying to stitch together pieces of a
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story based on second or third hand accounts, experiences, and whatever can be found in media.
Adding those voices may have offered more dimension to this the narrative and our
understanding. Unfortunately, those stories may be permanently lost.
Implications
Consider the Colors of Complexity
This research contributes to our understanding of complexity theory in several ways, but
primarily, it suggests careful consideration of the lens through which we view complexity.
Perhaps more importantly, who is on the other side of that lens.
As I have noted above, regulatory agencies are subject to laws and rules that govern and
frame their work. Without veering into a brief history of the United States in the style of Howard
Zinn, there seems to be general agreement that these laws and rules are promulgated in a system
created by colonists seeking to be break away from British autocracy. While that system was
based on a vision representative democracy, a bicameral congress, judicial and executive
branches of government, and separation of powers, it was reflective of it time and creators.
Bluntly, it was the narrow vision of white males designed to preserve the political power and
dominance of white males who were slave owners (Hannah-Jones et al., 2021). Although the
United States government has slowly started to become more representative of its population, its
institutions and structures, its laws, rules, and the process by which these are promulgated, have
largely remained unchanged. Drug policy is part of this static collection.
This means that current law and statute have an institutional memory that repeats itself,
creating a pathway for the survival of institutional and structural racism. Such repetition has
resulted in efforts like in the war on drugs, the weaponization of cannabis, and more recently,
voter suppression laws, among others. Implementing these policies falls to regulatory agencies,
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and this is where the cycle has an opportunity to repeat itself. I would offer that this research
suggest that it does not have to. What does any of that have to do with complexity theory?
Complexity theory, as this study suggests, was designed primarily to explain the
interactions, reactions, and behaviors of inert systems, both CPS and CAS (I refer to these in
Chapter V: complex physical systems and complex adaptive systems). As I have noted, these
refer to systems that are not human, such as chemical systems, the stock market, and tropical rain
forests, to provide some examples. Through its extension to other disciplines however, many
have offered that complexity theory resonates, as Prigogine noted, in other ways. We can agree
that government is complex, and that regulatory systems are complex. What we do not recognize
is that this stream of agreement not only dehumanizes these systems, but extends the concept of
complexity, which is a systems theory, to humans, who are not systems in the sense that
Prigogine and J. Holland intended. Some might argue that this is necessary because in context,
governmental entities should remain impartial, unbiased, and nonpartisan. Indeed, this is the very
paradox of the way these systems operate in practice, underscoring the tension between macro
and micro systems, or structure and agency as I’ve explored here. However, when we recognize
agency within these systems, and this research suggests that agency indeed is present and
demonstrated in complex regulatory systems, the very nature of complexity changes
dramatically.
This research suggests that instead of complexity only describing the arrow of time or the
properties of inert systems only through the multi-dimensional systems lens, it also recognizes,
describes, and foregrounds the multi-dimensional aspects of human agency within those systems.
Here, dialogue, relationship, and the complex human interactions between regulators and the
regulated become the focus, not the systems themselves. In this way, complexity might be
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considered a partner in interactive change rather than an ambiguous abstraction implying systems
instability that must be corrected and controlled by someone designated as a “leader.’ Indeed, it
is these multi-dimensional, human interactions that give systems their texture, depth, and shape.
These human systems, however, are not monotone.
As we rethink the ways complexity can be leveraged in partnership, I would offer that we
consider from what perspective that leverage comes. Moving the thinking of this research
forward in a way that may lead to socially equitable conditions requires us to remove the current
monotone lens through which we might view complexity. In doing so, we may be able to better
appreciate and honor the richly colored rainbow that is embodied in the human experience and
interaction that makes these systems what they are. Taking this approach moves us toward
recognizing the humanity of our fellow human beings by moving beyond a staged and monotone
daguerreotype taken from a distance, to a wide lens portrait that captures all of the rich colors,
dimensions and textures that represents us all.
Agency in Complex Regulatory Systems
This research introduces the concept of agency in complex regulatory systems.
Engagement, relationship building, and dialogue are not generally recognized as features of
regulatory or bureaucratic systems. Concepts of interactive trust, interactive stakeholder
engagement, cross systems pollination and interactive change also are not associated with
regulatory or governmental systems. Here, I have suggested that we open our thinking and
expand our discussion around agency and structure, considering what the recognition of agency
in complex regulatory systems might mean for future policy and regulatory development. The
interconnectedness and intersection of macro and micro systems I discussed in Chapter 5 may be
a link helping us build pathways toward realizing social equity in regulatory systems.
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Such a discussion might expand on this research by further exploring how an abstraction
like complexity interacts with human behavior. The present research suggests that complexity
may not fully capture or explain human dynamics in complex regulatory systems. While I am not
suggesting that complexity theory does not resonate with other disciplines, this study suggests
that there seems to be more than a fleeting indication that complexity theory might be better
applied in venues and in ways described by Prigogine, J. Holland, Pollitt, Stacey, and others. A
systems level analysis, as offered in this work, can be expanded upon, may assist in future
research and analysis, and help us to better understand complexity in other contexts.
Interactive Trust
This research introduces the concept of interactive trust into leadership, change and
public administration discourse. In the present research, such trust was built through
collaborative engagement in interactive spaces resulting in systems merging and coordinating in
ways that maintained and acknowledged existing structure. The concept of interactive trust
seemed to underlie and bolster the ability for future engagement, as well as the quality, quantity,
and success of such engagement.
I would offer, however, that there is an additional component that might be explored in
future research, and this pertains specifically to social equity. If we are to be truly committed to
equality—a tenet on which the United States was arguably committed since its founding—then
building interactive trust in our public processes might help us move toward creating more
socially equitable laws and regulations. When all citizens are offered full participation and feel
included and valued—experiencing a sense of belonging—in public processes, then the
confidence to fully participate and know that one will be heard in those processes increases.
(Coffman & Gordian, 2021). Such a sense of belonging, built on trust, can help us better
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understand the people we serve, and in context, allow us to begin to meaningfully move toward
right the wrongs that resulted from the war on drugs.
Yet, we are naïve if we think that this will occur just because we host a meeting and
invite BIPOC communities or send out a document by email and ask for comment or send out a
survey; we must earn it (Hudak, 2020, emphasis added). “Belonging, support, and trust are
interconnected and mutually reinforcing—improving or undermining one affects the others,” and
citizens will not wish to participate if they feel that the results are “rigged” (Coffman & Gordian,
2021). This underscores the importance of interactive engagement, a safe, interactive space in
which to participate, and government officials with the empathy and compassion to recognize the
humanity of others.
This is hard work. It is humbling work. It is necessary work. This research begins to
describe the ways that interactive trust can be developed and supported in complex regulatory
systems in ways that may lead to socially equitable conditions.
Recommendations
Reconsider the Contours of Leadership and Change
As a result of this work, “I join the raft of other leadership theorists who consider
leadership to be a socially constructed phenomenon” (Ladkin, 2010, p. 21). Indeed, Sinclair
notes that “leadership should be aimed at helping to free people from oppressive structures,
practices and habits encountered in societies and institutions, as well as within the shady recesses
of ourselves. Good leaders liberate” (Sinclair, 2007, p. xv). Sinclair goes on to suggest that in
order to do that, we need to liberate “leadership” thinking from its current narrow confines. I
would agree with that suggestion.
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On that premise, I offer that “leading” change in complex regulatory systems resembles a
combination of guidance, participation, collaboration, and engagement more than it does any
current form of leadership or a theory of leadership. I would also offer that we re-examine the
social construct of “leadership” by first taking a hard look at whether we are truly experiencing a
new “age of uncertainty” (Grint, 2022, p. 1), or as Uhl-Bien et al. (2007) describe it, a
knowledge age unlike any other. Perhaps this uncertainty has existed all along, but we were
unaware of it, or in the alternative perhaps it has changed as populations have grown. I would
suggest that we need to take a look at whose uncertainty it is.
How change is “lead” in the context of this research does not appear to be directly related
to the social construct of “leadership.” This study demonstrates that change is largely based on
collective systems behavior rather than a single act by a single person. Sometimes that behavior
is democratic in nature, and other times more forceful.
“Leadership” that might result in change is something entirely different, however. This is
evidenced by Nixon’s singular decision that drugs were “public enemy number one” and then
declaring a war on drugs. Change, on the other hand, occurred when Washington state voters
challenged that act of “leadership” and collectively decided that such a war was not in the public
interest. One might conclude then, that “leadership” is fundamentally anti-democratic based on
its stress on individual responsibility and authority, and its focus on the skills and attributes that a
person needs in general to be a “leader” to fit in a special class of heroes, great men, complexity
thinkers, transformers and even servants. Indeed, and as Rosenhead et al. (2019) point out, these
approaches support the “dangerous delusion” (p. 14) that people whose job is to “decide where
an organization is going, and to make decisions designed to get it there” (p. 14) might actually be
relying on the very checklists that frame these types of leadership styles.
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I suggest that we begin to approach and think about leadership and change differently by
exploring and considering the possibility that leadership may at times more closely resemble
management and coordination than it does the leadership constructs I’ve previously mentioned.
In this study, participants relied on their designated authority to do something, to engage in
activities or behaviors and encourage others to engage in activities and behaviors that ultimately
lead to change. Yet, what they described did not align within the rubric of “leadership” as it has
been described in literature to this point. Perhaps this underscores the potential of leadership as a
participatory, rather than observational construct.
Finally, as I noted in Chapter 5, not all “change” is created equally. It seems that the
subject of change is generally approached as if it is a one-dimensional event. I introduced the
concept of “interactive change” in the context of this study because it described a unified action
where change happened with rather than to participants. Like complex systems and human
interactions, I would offer that change is multi-dimensional, and we may benefit from
considering approaches that extend beyond simply “leading” change, to working with the people
impacted by and the processes involved in change.
Consider the Potential of Leaders as Participants in Change
I would suggest that we recognize leaders as participants in change, not as objective
observers, who engage in co-learning, co-creating processes as new ideas, or in context,
regulatory structures are created. This shifts focus from an artificial, social construct of
“leadership” or “leaders” and refocuses on relationships and interactions that lead to change. We
can then concentrate on strengthening those connections to build interactive trust, rather than
creating more theories that may or may not consider both structure and agency, or the power
dynamics associated with the tussle between them. We can also consider how such theories or
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approaches may be anchored or situated in structural or institutional privilege that may not lead
to equity or fairness, but instead maintains the status quo.
Reconsider the Role of Complexity
In this study, participants moved with the complexity of the systems of which they were a
part, leveraging that dynamic movement toward a trajectory of change, even though it was
unclear what the final result might be. In this way, complexity became part of the process of
change rather than the action of a single or multiple persons identified as leaders. I would offer
that this demonstrates how complexity is experienced in practice and serves as a foundation and
backdrop for further research and practical application.
However, I cannot over emphasize that even though complex systems are considered to
be multi-dimensional, this perspective is narrowed through the lens of viewing systems as inert.
Systems are also human, and this increases and changes the multi-dimensional nature of the
system and the nature of complexity. If we ignore the human agency of such systems, we miss
important nuances and signals that help us understand and interact with, between and across
these systems.
Recognize and Center Agency
As noted throughout this work, there is a perception that governmental action or failure to
act is based on a command-and-control model dating back more than a century. It was a model
developed during a time when thinking and world view aligned more closely with Newtonian
ways of knowing and being that sought to create and maintain certain societal order. Yet, in
doing so, many were dehumanized and marginalized, and this work has touched on how that
happened in relation to drug policy. This study also focused on the ways that regulatory agencies
approached operationalizing the first efforts to deconstruct those harmful policies.
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Considering agency to be a part of macro systems in context was the most unexpected
concept emerging from this study. I would offer that it is also the most important, as well, and
suggest that rather than viewing Mandela’s “ideals” of tolerance and respect for others as
aspirational, we continue to find ways to build interactive trust in recognizing the humanity of
our fellow human beings. This study suggests that even those who find themselves working
within a bureaucratic system that is based on dehumanization have the capacity to recognize
agency across all systems. In recognizing this agency, or in Marshall’s words, our fellow human
beings, we may be able to move toward systems, processes and engaging with each other in ways
the lead to socially equitable conditions. Although this case study was just one example, or a
snapshot in time of how that may be possible in complex regulatory systems, I suggest we
consider how such recognition may find its way into our academic, practical and personal
dialogue.
We cannot disassociate our humanity from our work, nor should we. We also cannot
ignore the humanity of those we serve. In doing so, we pay ourselves—and each other—the
highest tribute, and we can begin to move toward a more socially equitable society. To do that, I
suggest that we, in the words of a participant, “shut up and listen.”
Closing Reflection
My interest in complexity theory piqued when I was beginning the research required to
complete my capstone project for my master’s degree in public administration. I had hoped to
conduct a case study on indigent defense reform in Washington State, but the individuals
involved in policy implementation at the local level were not keen on participation. Rather than
focusing on the policy itself, I shifted into understanding the impetus and history of the policy,
how it was experienced in practice, and whether it had resulted in its intended effects.
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In retrospect, it was a much, much smaller version of the present work in terms of its
participatory action research approach. It was also the beginning of my interest in thinking about
complex systems and complexity theory in ways that I had not previously considered, and
certainly, beyond what literature seemed to offer. The more I studied and researched complexity
and its application, the more I noted what seemed to be an expanding gap between theory and
practice.
I hope this work begins to narrow that gap, and offers ways to think about leadership,
change, and complexity differently than we may have before. I also hope that I have begun to
move our thinking towards how we might lead change in socially equitable ways that may
ultimately result in socially equitable conditions.
I am hopeful because I practiced some of what I’ve recommended here. As I have noted,
I have been involved in writing the first set of rules to frame Washington’s first social equity in
cannabis program. Part of that work has involved building relationship with communities that
were left out of the first cannabis licensing opportunities available in Washington state based on
a variety of factors, many of which I’ve mentioned here. To begin a dialogue and work toward
healing and building trust, WSLCB hosted three virtual listening sessions starting in September
2020.
These sessions were difficult. There was much anger expressed toward the agency,
including accusations of structural, institutional, and individual racism. These sessions occurred
in the context of the time: during a pandemic, shortly after Seattle had been the scene of racial
rioting and social reckoning; during a time of mourning and outrage for George Floyd, Breonna
Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and so many others. Community sentiments were passionate, opinions
were strongly asserted, deeply felt, and profound. Although I did not participate in the sessions, I
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listened and watched closely. The grief, agony, indeed, the trauma of being Black and Brown in
the United States at that moment, and really every day weighed heavily and more urgently than
before. My sorrow in knowing that none of what I heard was new was the most troubling aspect
of the sessions.
Fast forward a year and a half. Several Social Equity Task Force meetings had been held
and were ongoing, recommendations had been offered to Governor Inslee’s office and our
agency, and it appeared that the aspirations and mandates of HB 2870 were on their way to being
realized. In early March 2021, my colleagues and I had completed the first set of draft conceptual
rules incorporating those recommendations and making some additional revisions in existing rule
to establish the first Social Equity in Cannabis Program in Washington. We were ready to invite
all of our stakeholders to offer feedback on the conceptual draft rules during an engagement
opportunity that I developed called “Listen & Learn.” It is an engagement model that creates
what I have identified here as “interactive space” for participants to review draft conceptual
regulations, and in a structured way, offer responses. I created this model based on the
appreciative inquiry approach and have relied on it for more than three years. It has reframed the
way the agency engages in rule development, building on past practice.
Part of the beauty of the model is that those who may be most impacted by regulations
become part of their development, expanding on what the agency did to establish the first set of
regulations. When regulations become effective, those who must comply with them have been
instrumental in their creation, and most concerns about the operationalization of the regulation
have already been discussed. In other words, change happens with participants rather than
through or to them, and the agency truly listens and learns from its constituents.
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There was concern that this particular Listen & Learn session could be similar to the
original listening sessions held in September 2020. While my colleagues and I recognized that
possibility, our concern focused on how failing to offer an engagement opportunity or offering
an opportunity that was different in some way than other opportunities would further marginalize
and “other” participants new to the process of rule development or new engagement with the
agency. For that reason, we hosted a “how to” session a few weeks before the Listen & Learn
forum to provide education on the rule development process, answer questions, and offer
resources that might help to demystify processes. The “how to” session went well, but few
attended.
Even so, the Listen & Learn session was held as scheduled. Over 120 individuals were in
attendance. I was the primary facilitator and conducted this forum in the same way that I have
previously: respecting the dignity of all participants, honoring, and valuing all contributions,
recognizing the importance of my role as a neutral representative of the agency in the process,
and modeling the change, being the change that I wish to see in the world. Some participants
asked pointed questions about the conceptual rules, some offered specific alternative language,
and others shared their thinking through storytelling and narrative. And we listened. Several
themes emerged in this discussion, but the overwhelming undertone was thinking, perceptions
and understandings around whether cannabis retail business licenses should be awarded based on
race. It was possible that this interactive space could have become hostile. Yet, while words and
sentiments did become passionate at times, the conversation remained respectful. The absence of
hostility and presence of focus on the subject matter was clear, and when I invited participants to
offer closing remarks, a gentleman offered, “Thank you for listening to us today.”
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While this may seem to be a small step toward positive engagement between a regulatory
agency and those it regulates or may regulate in the future, it demonstrates how Mandela and
Marshall’s words can be realized in practice, and how notions of building interactive trust
through dialogue can lead to the kinds of relationships that may lead to socially equitable
conditions.
Conclusion
This concluding discussion focused on what I’ve learned about how change might be lead
in complex regulatory systems in ways that lead to socially equitable conditions. There is not a
conclusive answer to this question, but instead, I offered general discussion, and expanded on
two emerging empirical concepts that contribute to thinking around leadership, change,
complexity, and approaches to achieving social equity.
There does not seem to be any linkage between complexity leadership theory (CLT) and
the act of leadership, nor does there does not seem to be any linkage between leadership and
complexity. Through a social equity lens, CLT’s “adaptive responses” may align with
complexity theory metaphorically, but in practice, ignores human agency to the extent that it may
widen knowledge and resource gaps because it has the potential to privilege knowledge. This
approach does not promote social equity, and the participants of this study did not rely on it,
even unknowingly, in practice.
Further, leadership, the act of leading, and the title of “leader” are social constructs that
seem to be connected to context, location and the person or people involved. In the context of
this research, participants did not identify as “leaders” but instead identified as part of a group of
people, or one of many in a system of interacting parts, referred to as “we.” While participants
possessed the authority to do something to offer support, management, and coordination in these
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systems, it was more akin to management than it was to being a hero, charismatic,
transformational or a servant. While this underscores potential differences between leadership
and management in public and private industry, it also highlights the less than solid relationship
leadership has with the abstract concept of complexity.
Instead, complexity arises from the nature of dynamic, human engagement between
complex systems, such as participatory action, relationship, and dialogue. This dynamic is the
result of interactive trust and begins to shift focus from how we might lead change as an action,
to a more human-focused approach that acknowledges agency. This research demonstrated that if
we are to understand the properties and characteristics of a complex system, we must actually
interact with its agency, rather than through it. In this way, complexity can be viewed as a
dynamic partner in change, rather than something that is leader-controlled to result in a certain
outcome. While the present research suggests that complexity theory was not necessarily
designed to capture or explain human dynamics in complex regulatory systems, it may serve to
our thinking around the process of change.
Viewing complexity through this lens, we can move toward considering the potential of a
participatory leadership approach, where those recognized or titled as leaders become
participants, rather than objective observers of change. This allows us to consider how we might
move with and guide system complexity as a process rather than an action, and foreground
agency in a way that recognizes the humanity of the people within complex systems, including
ourselves.
I conclude by offering that in my context, there is so much work to be done. As a
participant noted, legalization of cannabis was the first, but not the last blow against the war on
drugs. I offer a sentiment, based on the wisdom of Mandela: I can take a moment to rest, but the
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road to building trust in a way that leads to socially equitable conditions is long and comes with
great responsibilities. This small contribution is only one of many, many steps to come.
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Appendix A: Complex Systems Properties and Characteristics

Properties Connected to Objective
Processes and Outcomes

Characteristics Connected to Subjective
Values and Human Behaviors

It also made it very very difficult for the
regulator coming in to have to deal with the
conflicts that were established by that initiative,
of the only regulated marketplace out there and
not very regulated. (P11)

The, the lack of control, feeling, feeling like they
[legacy market] don't have control um in terms of
who's growing it. (P3)

Historian note: describes dealing with conflict
or conflict resolution related to an objective
process of creating regulation.
It's a pretty tremendous um night and day
difference between what was and what is and
who has power and who doesn’t. And honestly,
who has power are the same people that have
always had power. (P3)

Historian note: describes perceived loss of control,
or weakening of current market as a result of
legalization.
And they were afraid to ask questions because I
think they thought we would disqualify them in
some manner if they didn't know what they were
doing, which I think at one point I got across a
couple of them. (P5)

Historian note: describes perception of power
as a property legislative bodies, regulators,
similar officials, or governmental system
generally.
Culturally, you have an agency that for so many
years has a certain approach to cannabis and
keep in mind throughout this entire period it
remains a Schedule I controlled substance illegal
under federal law. Yet we have a different
perspective due to our state constitutional and
legislative mandate. That’s hard to reconcile.
And that’s a hard change culturally. (P2)
Historian note: describes approach as
“certain” suggesting an objective approach to
regulation and enforcement.
Then, you have regulators writing rules who I
don’t know who they were before, but they
didn’t have the experience that, at least, I had in
seeing them implemented. I think people who
are being charged of putting rules into place are
out of touch. If they have not actually lived the
regulated world and I think even an enforcement
person could probably write better rules because
they’ve been on the ground and they understand
it. (P5, similar comment from P9, P10)
Historian note: describes lack of subject matter
expertise or being out of touch with industry;
creating regulation with no knowledge.

Historian note: describes lack of trust and lack of
government process and expertise.
It was pretty strange asking people who were
working, um, in the illegal marketplace to come in
and talk to us about the illegal marketplace
It was a well-organized black market that existed.
Um, but just standing and talking to people and
eventually is, well, come and look and we’ll show
you what we do. (P5)
Historian note: describes subject matter expertise
in the unregulated market that had not been
formalized; largely shared through word of mouth,
community, informal channels.
That interconnectedness that this industry lacks.
[B]ecause in when it was, you know, underground,
you didn’t wanna raise your head up too high and
call attention to yourself. So, why are you gonna
create vast networks of information? (P3)

Historian note: describes lack of
interconnectedness, networks, relationships within
unregulated market.
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Power seemed to be held by the suits. (P7,
similar comment from P9)

Historian note: describes perception of
governmental power and authority as inherent
to system.
I was labeled because of my background. I was
identified of having kind of a myopic
perspective that was enforcement oriented.
(P10)

Historian note: describes marginalization and
stigmatization based role within the system.
We do quite a bit of public opinion research
because we wanted to make sure obviously that
anything that we were going to put on the ballot
was going to pass. (P1)
Historian note: describes an objective process
to achieve a specific outcome.

The loudest group was the medical people that were
claiming we're damaging the rights of medical
patients. Um, I come to find out this group of
people really weren't involved in the medical
marijuana thing at all. They were anti-government
taking control of the product. (P5)
Historian note: describes anti-regulation or
opposition to governmental authority.
You had groups or people were really excited
because they had won the lottery, so to speak. You
know, they are on the list to get, um, a grow license
or to open a store to be a processor. You had people
in the medical community that felt they were being
excluded. So they were angry. Um, really angry at
times. In fact, there was one meeting at Saint
Martin’s College and somebody threw a shoe at the
board. So, I mean, those people are angry. (P5)
Historian note: describes feeling of
marginalization based on role within community.
Um, the quietest group, I think, were the people
that didn't have a clue about what the
government process was. (P5, similar comment
from P11, P12)

Historian note: describes unfamiliarity with
government process as a barrier to meaningful
participation.
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Appendix B: Complex Systems Properties and Characteristics with Systems Levels

MACRO SYSTEM PROPERTIES
(Objective Processes and Outcomes)

It also made it very very difficult for the
regulator coming in to have to deal with
the conflicts that were established by
that initiative, of the only regulated
marketplace out there and not very
regulated. (P11)
Historian note: describes a process that
leads to an outcome as a macro system
property.
It's a pretty tremendous um night and day
difference between what was and what is
and who has power and who doesn’t.
And honestly, who has power are the
same people that have always had
power. (P3)

MESO/MICRO SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS
(Subjective Values and Human
Behaviors)
The, the lack of control, feeling, feeling
like they [legacy market] don't have
control um in terms of who's growing it.
(P3)

Historian note: describes concern over
impact of higher level decision making
or as a characteristic of the micro
system.
And they were afraid to ask questions
because I think they thought we would
disqualify them in some manner if they
didn't know what they were doing,
which I think at one point I got across a
couple of them. (P5)

Historian note: describes perception of
power as a property of the macro system.
This speaks to the higher level decision
making that leads to outcomes impacting
the meso/micro systems.
Culturally, you have an agency that for
so many years has a certain approach to
cannabis and keep in mind throughout
this entire period it remains a Schedule I
controlled substance illegal under federal
law. Yet we have a different perspective
due to our state constitutional and
legislative mandate. That’s hard to
reconcile. And that’s a hard change
culturally. (P2)

Historian note: describes concern over
the impact of higher level decision
making as a characteristic of the micro
system.
It was pretty strange asking people who
were working, um, in the illegal
marketplace to come in and talk to us
about the illegal marketplace.
It was a well-organized black market
that existed. Um, but just standing and
talking to people and eventually is, well,
come and look and we’ll show you
what we do. (P5)

Historian note: describes approach as
“certain” suggesting an objective
approach as a property of the macro
system.

Historian note: describes subject matter
expertise that generally existed in an
informal, social context as a
characteristic of the micro system.
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Then, you have regulators writing rules
who I don’t know who they were before,
but they didn’t have the experience that,
at least, I had in seeing them
implemented. I think people who are
being charged of putting rules into place
are out of touch. If they have not actually
lived the regulated world and I think
even an enforcement person could
probably write better rules because
they’ve been on the ground and they
understand it. (P5, similar comment from
P9, P10)

That interconnectedness that this
industry lacks. [B]ecause in when it
was, you know, underground, you didn’t
wanna raise your head up too high and
call attention to yourself. So, why are
you gonna create vast networks of
information? (P3)

Historian note: describes lack of
Historian note: describes lack of subject interconnectedness, or disorganization
matter expertise or being out of touch as as a characteristic of the micro system.
a property of the macro system. This
speaks to the authoritarian perception of
the macro system.
Power seemed to be held by the suits.
The loudest group was the medical
(P7, similar comment from P9)
people that were claiming we're
damaging the rights of medical patients.
Um, I come to find out this group of
people really weren't involved in the
medical marijuana thing at all. They
were anti-government taking control
Historian note: describes power and
of the product. (P5)
authority as a property of the macro
system. This speaks to the higher-level
Historian note: describes concern over
decision making that leads to outcomes
higher level decision making as a
impacting the meso/micro systems.
characteristic of the micro system.
I was labeled because of my
You had groups or people were really
background. I was identified of having a excited because they had won the
myopic perspective that was enforcement lottery, so to speak. You know, they are
oriented. (P10)
on the list to get, um, a grow license or
to open a store to be a processor. You
had people in the medical community
that felt they were being excluded. So
they were angry. Um, really angry at
times. In fact, there was one meeting at
Saint Martin’s College and somebody
threw a shoe at the board. So, I mean,
Historian note: describes
those people are angry. (P5)
marginalization and stigmatization as
property of the macro system. This may
Historian note: describes
marginalization as characteristics of the
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be related to the perception of power
wielded by this system.

micro system. This may speak to the
individual relationship occurring at this
level.
We do quite a bit of public opinion
Um, the quietest group, I think, were the
research because we wanted to make sure people that didn't have a clue about
obviously that anything that we were
what the government process was.
going to put on the ballot was going to
(P5, similar comment from P11, P12)
pass. (P1)
Historian note: describes an objective
process to achieve a specific outcome as
a property of the macro system.

Historian note: describes unfamiliarity
with government process as a
characteristic of the micro system.
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Appendix C: Recruitment Email
Hi there,
This is Kathy Hoffman, and I am a doctoral candidate at Antioch University’s Graduate School
of Leadership and Change and I am also an employee of the Washington State Liquor and
Cannabis Board. I would like to invite you to participate in my research study that is in no way
connected to my role at WSLCB, funded by WSLCB, or supported by WSLCB. My dissertation
research study is being conducted to fulfill the requirements of my doctorate work that seeks to
understand how you experienced the complexities of cannabis regulation and explore if it may be
regulated in a way that leads to socially equitable conditions. I am reaching out to you because
you meet the criteria for the participants I’m seeking – you work for the (WSLCB/OLCC/MED)
and have since legalization in your state.
As a participant, you will be asked to engage in private interviews with me, and at least one
group session that brings all participants together to review an analysis of our collective
feedback. I want to make sure that you know that when I conduct this research, I am acting in my
capacity as a doctoral student, and not as an employee of WSLCB. I might need to remind you of
that as we work together, and I encourage you to remind me of that, as well. I will not use any
WSLCB resources for this research, including equipment, facilities, or anything else.
The risks of this dissertation research to you are no greater than those you might encounter every
day. I anticipate that participants will benefit from interviews by being offered an opportunity to
reflect on their accomplishments, share perspectives, and discuss contributions to the creation,
and possible future of cannabis regulation. This dissertation research could serve as one of the
first studies of the complexities of cannabis regulation and could be used to inform a broader
audience as the nation moves toward national cannabis legalization.
I will only collect information from you, personal or otherwise, that is necessary to conduct this
research. That data will be coded so your identity will not be referenced in final research
document unless you authorize it. The same is true of quotes – I won’t attribute a quote to you
unless you authorize it. And, to make sure our communications are as protected as possible, I
will only send you encrypted documents from my university email address, to an email address
that you indicate. I will not use our business addresses.
Participation is voluntary. You can withdraw at any time.
If you would like to participate in this research study, I will send you a confirmation email and a
consent form to sign and send back to me. I will provide you with a signed copy of your records.
If you have questions later, please contact me at
at
.

or you may contact Lisa Kreeger, PhD,

If you have any adverse effects or concerns about this dissertation research, please contact
me or Dr. Kreeger at the email addresses above. This dissertation research is approved by
the Antioch University Graduate School of Leadership and Change IRB.
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Appendix D: Confirmation of Participation
Hello (name),
Thanks for speaking with me about my research. This email serves to confirm that conversation
and your willingness to participate in this study.
To recap, I am a doctoral candidate at Antioch University’s Graduate School of Leadership and
Change.
I have invited you to participate in my research study to understand how you experienced the
complexities of cannabis regulation and explore if it may be regulated in a way that leads to
socially equitable conditions. I am reaching out to you because you meet the criteria for the
participants I’m seeking – you work for the (WSLCB/OLCC/MED) and have since legalization
in your state.
As a participant, you will be asked to engage in private interviews with me, and at least one
group session that brings all participants together to review an analysis of our collective
feedback.
The risks of this research to you are no greater than those you might encounter every day. I
anticipate that participants will benefit from interviews by being offered an opportunity to reflect
on their accomplishments, share perspectives, and discuss contributions to the creation, and
possible future of cannabis regulation. This research could serve as one of the first studies of the
complexities of cannabis regulation and could be used to inform a broader audience as the nation
moves toward national cannabis legalization.
I will only collect information from you, personal or otherwise, that is necessary to conduct this
research. That data will be coded so your identity will not be referenced in final research
document unless you authorize it. The same is true of quotes – I won’t attribute a quote to you
unless you authorize it. And, to make sure our communications are as protected as possible, I
will only send you encrypted documents from my university email address.
Participation is voluntary. You can withdraw at any time.
A consent form is attached to this email for you to sign and send back to me. I will provide you
with a signed copy of your records.
If you have questions later, please contact me at
at
.

or you may contact Lisa Kreeger, PhD,

If you have any adverse effects or concerns about the research, please contact me or Dr.
Kreeger at the email addresses above. This research is approved by the Antioch University
Graduate School of Leadership and Change IRB.
Thank you for the contribution of your valuable time for this important research. I am looking
forward to working with you.
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Appendix E: Dissertation Research Study Consent Form
Dissertation Title: Toward Socially Equitable Conditions: Leading Regulatory Change in the
Era of Cannabis Law Reform Project
Investigator: Katherine Hoffman Dissertation
Chair: Dr. Donna Ladkin
1. I understand that this dissertation research study is of a research nature. It may offer no direct
benefit to me.
2. Participation in this dissertation research study is voluntary. I understand that I may refuse to
enter it or may withdraw at any time without exposing myself to or creating any harmful
consequences. I understand also that the investigator may remove me at any time from the study.
3. The purpose of this dissertation research study is to:
• Understand how complexity is engaged and experienced in complex regulatory systems;
understand what the practice of leadership looks like when engaging with such
complexity;
• Understand how the history and story of cannabis legalization told from the
perspectives of regulatory pioneers can help us to understand the ways in which that
complexity was navigated, including an exploration of social justice dimensions; and
• Memorialize the story of cannabis legalization in the United States from the
perspectives of early adopters by creating a living learning history artifact that serves not
only as a historical tool but supports movement toward a sustainable “yes/and”
organizational culture.
4. As a participant in the dissertation research study, I will be asked to take part in individual
interviews, and at least one group session to reflect on the learning history with other
interviewees. Participants in the dissertation research study will take up to ten hours of my time
and will take place in either a virtual space, such as Zoom or in person, consistent with state and
federal guidance and best practices. I understand that the Zoom meetings will not be video
recorded, but the audio will be recorded for purposes of transcription, and that the audio
recordings will be encrypted before the researcher sends them for transcription, and that once
that is complete, the audio recording will be destroyed.
5. The risks, discomforts and inconveniences of the interviews and group session might result in
some psychological distress as challenging or difficult experiences are remembered and shared,
including decisions made and how those decisions impacted current and future work; selfevaluation and reflection on the impacts of those decisions may also result in some psychological
distress.
6. The possible benefits of the dissertation research study for me are indirect. The interviews
conducted during this dissertation research study offer an opportunity to reflect on
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accomplishments, share perspectives, and discuss contributions to the creation, and possible
future of cannabis regulation. More directly, however, this dissertation research study has the
possibility to serve as one of the first studies of the complexities of cannabis regulation that can
be used to inform a broader audience as the nation moves toward national cannabis legalization.
7. Personal identifiers will be removed and the de-identified information will not be used for
future research.
8. Information about the study was discussed with me by Katherine Hoffman. If I have further
questions, I can call her at XXX-XXX-XXXX.
9. The purpose of this study is primarily to fulfill a requirement to complete a dissertation, which
is a research project, at Antioch University. The results of the study may used in future scholarly
publications and presentations.
10. I understand that Katherine Hoffman is both a doctoral student and an employee of the
Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board. I understand that when conducting this research,
she will be acting in her capacity as a doctoral student, and not an employee of the Washington
State Liquor and Cannabis Board. For that reason, I agree to contact Katherine Hoffman through
her email address at
, or her personal cell phone at XXX-XXX-XXXX. I agree to
provide an email address and contact information that is not connected to a state or other
governmental agency for purposes of this research.
11. I understand that interviews will not occur during regularly scheduled business hours or in
any WSLCB or OLCC facility to protect the agency and myself from the possibility of accidental
or unintentional public disclosure through either state’s public records acts. If you have any
questions about the study, you may contact Katherine Hoffman at XXX-XXX-XXXX or via
email at
. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may
contact Lisa Kreeger, PhD, email
or Laurien Alexandre, PhD, Provost and Special
Assistant to Chancellor, email
.

Date:___________________________ Signed:____________________________
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Appendix F: Permission Letter A
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Appendix G: Permission Letter B
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Appendix H: Learning History Artifact

From Prohibition to Production
A Learning History of the Participants in Early Cannabis Legalization
May 17, 2022
FINAL VERSION

Document History
A learning history is designed to be a living document. As Gearty (2007) notes, some are more
complete than others. Some histories started early in a process of change, while others occur
after the change has happened to inform future direction. More can be added to this history as
the story of cannabis legalization continues.
Version

Date

V1

December 18, 2021

V2
V3

February 13, 2022
May 17, 2022

Comments
Sent to participants based on descriptions
listed below; two-week review.
Feedback incorporated
Final Version

Learning History
This document is written in the style of a learning history, an action research approach to
learning that seeks to bring analysis and story together in a way that has value for those
originally involved in a case as well as those seeking to learn from it (Gearty, 2007). Learning
history is a type of action research that is “well adapted to complex issues” (Gearty, BradburyHuang & Reason, 2015, p. 46), such as cannabis legalization and the subsequent creation of
frameworks to regulate it. Action research engages participants and stakeholders as coresearchers often through cycles of action and reflection, so that all involved can contribute
both to the questions that will be addressed and to the actions that inform the research.
A learning history is a tool whose goal is to help an organization become aware of its own
learning and change efforts (Roth & Kleiner, 1998). It does this primarily by offering an
opportunity for reflection to people whose work life does not allow this. Its content comes from
the people who initiated, implemented and participated in the original change efforts as well as
nonparticipants who were affected by them. The learning history is a written document (or
series of writings) which makes extensive use of participants' own narratives, as well as
outsiders' assessments of the story (Bradbury, 1998, p. 51, emphasis added).
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Learning histories have been applied in several private organizations and the NGO sector, as
well as organizational settings within local governments in the UK. This research concerns state
government in the United States where cannabis has been legalized.
Learning History and Case Study Contrasted
A learning history differs from a case study in several ways. It tries to get at the individual
human stories of what happened and aims to present perspectives on a case rather than
synthesizing several accounts into one dominant research “truth” (Gearty, 2007). This allows
the learning historian to capture the ups and downs of individual experience from those close
to the case. Those accounts are not definitive or authoritative, so there will be gaps in detail,
and some experiences may be emphasized while others are not. We can continue to build on
this story by building on this original learning history in the future and adding additional
perspective. This reflects belief that human stories add accessibility to and demystify the
happenings in a way that can be more powerful for both the reader and those who have jointly
told the story.
Additionally, this is a multi-leveled account. The story is presented chronologically, and quotes
are included from those involved, together with the learning historian’s reflection and thematic
analysis. The purpose is to create a lively account of the story, but also derive a history that
works at different levels. The thematic analysis that appears next to the story provides
potential for more conventional theory building to play its part in the research. Sometimes
theoretic links are made (Gearty, 2007).
Using an action research approach, attention is focused to the value for the various research
participants. These range from those directly involved in the subject of the learning history, to
those with a similar set of challenges elsewhere who wish to learn from it to other interested
parties including academic audiences or those working in entirely different settings who might
also find insights in the history presented here. Thus, this isn’t extractive research, and the
learning history is not an ‘output’ but a point around which the research hopes to gather
interested parties (Gearty, 2007).
Learning History Creation
A learning history can be described as a “jointly told tale” (Van Maanen, 2011) between an
outsider (researcher) and insiders (protagonists). Here, the story started well before cannabis
was legalized in the states of Washington, Oregon and Colorado. Interviews were held with
people who were close to the various dimensions of legalization, such as what is termed here as
the “legacy market” (the cannabis market that existed before legalization, referred to by some
as the “illicit market” or derogatorily, the “black market”), those involved in both legislation and
regulation, and those who were impacted by legislation and regulation. These interviews were
recorded and transcribed by a professional transcription service. The transcripts were sent to
participants for review. Once review was complete, transcripts were annotated, sorted by
theme, and then sorted again. Through this process, the researcher reflected, drawing on the
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annotated transcripts, other research and supporting materials. Drawing from this material, a
story line begins to emerge that places emphasis on key chronological moments or phases
(Gearty, 2007). This is then textured by presenting those moments next to key themes and
reflections that have been identified along with key quotes from the interviews. This is at play
with the form of presentation knowing, but also borrows from ideas of presenting a learning
history (Bradbury & Mainemelis 2001; Roth & Bradbury 2008) as well as some aspects of
narrative inquiry (Connelly & Clandinin 1999). The history of the actual learning, then, is
presented in a way that allows learning on behalf of the reader on the reader’s terms. This way
regardless of where the reader is situated with the learning history – protagonist, scholar, or
practitioner – learning agendas can be satisfied to the extent possible.
Theoretical Connection
Where appropriate and relevant, connections to theory are offered in general terms. These
relate to the theoretical constructs the researcher sought to explore in the dissertation and
beyond. Readers are encouraged to bypass these carve outs in the learning history if they
detract from the narrative. These connections are developed in later chapters of the
dissertation.
How to read this learning history (Gearty, 2007)
The purpose of this learning history is to “invite” readers into it and to participate with what
has happened. In this research, consistent with Gearty’s 2007 approach, four types of readers
have been identified to guide this process.
The active reader is someone exploring the value and relevance of the learning history for their
own learning. These readers are invited to find meaning relevant to their own context and
experience. As an active reader goes through this this learning history, they are invited to
monitor responses, noting events, themes or reflections that resonate or seem familiar to a
setting. Please pay attention to things that evoke a visceral response or pique interest. If
possible, mark these on your copy and consider whether the learning history has influenced any
of your actions, responses, or thoughts, and in what ways.
A participating reader is one who has been directly or indirectly involved in the history that is
presented here and has been invited to comment.
A direct participating reader has been directly involved in some of the events described in the
learning history, and with their consent, may be named. This means the researcher has invited
you to present your perspectives to the story told here. Some readers may have responses the
learning history that range from happiness to great concern around how the story is presented.
However, all responses are encouraged. If you are able to add pieces that add an additional
story, fills a gap, or adds texture and perspective, please do so. The emphasis on the learning
history is building upon, rather than condensing or removing the parts of the story. Although
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the learning history as offered here won’t be revised, the final products will include input from
all participating readers, with the idea that this will create enhance the richness of the story.
An indirect participating readers may be familiar with the topic but are not familiar with the
human side of it or have not seen the topic presented in this way. These readers can provide
perspective on what the topic has meant for them, or what elements of the learning history
was interesting, and how it may have shifted their view of the topic. Invitation to indirect
participating readers is like an informal gathering to recall an event they participated in, as
opposed to a more formal fact-finding meeting designed to assess the importance and impact
of the event.
Finally, indirect, non-participating readers may be familiar with this topic by way of the
dissertation that this learning history will become part of, or as a reviewer on the dissertation
committee. These readers are unfamiliar with the topic in general but may be familiar with
some of the theoretical constructs and connections noted by the Learning Historian.

Definitions
Authorizing environment: Public sector organizations require authority to deliver on their
functions. This authority comes in different forms and from different sources that make up an
‘authorizing environment’. There are:
•

•

'Formal' or 'hard' authorities, like those granted through legislation, budget approvals
and a range of statutory, financial, or administrative delegations. These are necessary,
but insufficient on their own, to enable an organization to be successful.
'Informal' or 'soft' authorities, which are the mission-critical people and organizations
that support and authorize the scope of work and the way work is undertaken. This can
include the executive branch of government, central agencies, other departments,
portfolio agencies and a wide range of stakeholders.

Legacy market: The cannabis market that existed prior to legalization.
Macro system: Large scale entities, affecting entire communities, states or countries, such as
governmental systems or organizations.
Micro system: A self-contained subsystem located within a larger system. It generally
constitutes the smallest unit of analysis in systems theory.
Underground: A group or movement that functions outside established structures or
government.
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Key
Researcher

White thought bubbles contain researcher
reflections designed to highlight themes,
point to areas of interest, or suggest areas
for future discussion.

Light green thought squares
include media releases in
multiple forms, information
publicly available on the
internet, and public commentary
from multiple domains.

Pink thought rounded squares
are quotes from transcripts
selected by the researcher that
offer a different perspective,
experience or understanding of
a particular topic or issue.

Light blue thought bubbles
contain quotes or relevant
information from other
domains, including but not
limited to relevant
literature or journals.

The atomic symbol notes
points in the story that
highlight the characteristics of
complex regulatory systems
and theoretical connections.

Green thought squares are quotes
directly from transcripts, identified by
unique participant code.
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ORGANIZATION
This learning history is organized chronologically by historical markers that signal specific eras
or epochs in the story of cannabis legalization in the United States as described by the
protagonists of this story. These epochs are referred to as “Part I,” “Part II” and so on
throughout this document. Within each part are chapters that describe an event or series of
events that occurred during an epoch. For additional content richness, themes are identified
that emerged during interviews and are specific to each part and chapter. Themes serve to
highlight a common thought or perception shared by research participants, as well as what may
have been offered in media, literature, or other supporting materials unique to that part of the
story. For example, Part I is designed as follows:
•

Part I: Pre-legalization.
o Chapter 1: Legacy Landscape and Prohibition
▪ Theme 1: The legacy landscape is multidimensional and inherently
complex
▪ Theme 2: Power within the overall systems was not evenly distributed
o Chapter 1: I-502 Isn’t What you Think
▪ Theme 3: Macro/Micro Systems Meet and Aren’t Instant Friends

The final marker – closing words – represents a culmination of participant observations and
reflections about what the future. It also represents the point at which organizations can use
this learning history as a tool to inform and design those future constructs. This is a story that is
very much in progress, and for that reason, this learning history does not have a conclusion.
We’re still writing the story.
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PART I: Pre-Legalization

“We’ve been farming
indoors forever
because it was
underground, right?”
-P3

Chapter 1: Legacy Landscape and Prohibition
When: 1990 - 2010
Where: Washington State, Western United States
What: Plant, weapon, medicine, commerce, or danger?

A quasi-commercial market for the cultivation and distribution of cannabis for both medical and adult
use existed long before discussions of decriminalization and legalization gained traction. These markets
were characterized by participants as illicit, “legacy,” or “gray” based on their relationship with cannabis,
understandings and perceptions of its status as a substance, and position within the authorizing
environment. Here, these markets are referred to as legacy markets.
Cannabis was recognized by many in the legacy market as medicine.
Multiple sources described how cannabis was recognized as a
therapeutic product to manage symptoms of debilitating disease or illness, such
as multiple sclerosis, cancer, and wasting from AIDS.
However, there are equally as many stories and sources describing the effects and harms of cannabis
prohibition on those who relied on it for pain relief, and those who were impacted by it merely by virtue
of their membership – or appearance of membership - in a racial group. There are just as many sources
characterizing it as a dangerous gateway drug that exposes those who consume it to a variety of adverse
and dangerous effects, such as paranoia, memory loss and interruption of brain development.
“…because people
saw it as treatment
first and foremost.” –
P3

To raise awareness of the harms associated with prohibition, as well as other issues related to both
hemp and marijuana policy, an activist group called the Seattle Peace Heathens organized the first
Seattle Hemp Expo in 1991. This would later become Seattle Hempfest. Hempfest
signals a period in the story of legalization where energy, momentum, and
organization began to build around speaking out against cannabis prohibition.

Theme 1: The legacy landscape was
multidimensional and inherently complex

Targeting street-level youth and homeless
people, the Peace Heathens had many projects
aimed a benefiting the community. The
longest-lasting project is the Seattle Crisis
Guide, which can be found at seattlecrisis.org.
Source: Protestival, Vivian McPeak, July 2011.

Legacy cannabis markets offered an opportunity
for unlicensed producers/processors and retailers
to interact directly with consumers to discuss the ways that different cannabis strains could meet the
needs of patients with what were referred to as “qualifying conditions,” but not all consumers sought
the product for medicinal use. As a result, and since cannabis is (and currently remains) recognized as a
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Schedule I controlled substance, participation in the legacy market involved substantial risk, including
but not limited to incarceration, loss of assets, and for patients with qualifying conditions, loss of access
to a product they valued.
The environment that framed the legacy market can be characterized as a multidimensional landscape.
Within that landscape, a collection of intricate connections framed a complex authorizing environment
that made space for committed activists to develop early legalization concepts. From this environment
emerged the varying perspectives and degrees of separation that would later influence and inform
cannabis law reform and policy:

Law
Enforcement

Governmental/
Regulatory
Agencies

Medical
Marijuana
Consumers

Adult Use

Unregulated
Producers
Unregulated
Distribution
and Sale

Legacy
Cannabis
Market

Cannabis advocates

Unregulated
"Retail"
Dispensaries

Unregulated
Processors
Public
Health/
Prevention

Judicial/Legal
System
“…because in when it was, you know, underground,
you didn’t wanna raise your head up too high and call
attention to yourself. So, why are you gonna create
vast networks of information?– P3

The systems clustered around the legacy cannabis market largely existed underground. This meant that
system participants tried to stay below the sight line of authorities and others, even though movement
toward thinking out loud about challenging prohibition had gained traction. Tightly guarded, insulated
networks served as a way for the legacy market to effectively function and protect itself during
prohibition. The market was vertically integrated, meaning that dispensary owners generally grew,
processed, and sold their own unregulated products. Market information was shared sparingly within
what can be characterized as micro systems to preserve market space, even though the boundaries of
the space were fluid. Perceptions of how and why these markets were protected vary greatly.
“…some of the stuff that I saw that was really, I'll never forget it,
was packaged, processed, like cakes or brownies wrapped in
cellophane with uh, a handwritten note on the package of what it
was. It wasn't properly packaged or labeled. I have no idea. I mean,
it was basically someone making this in their home and then bringing
it to the dispensary or possibly making it in the dispensary but
whether it was tested, whether it was tested for potency, uh, I-I have
no idea, but it was certainly labeled. It would-, it'd be like something
I would make in my home….[[t]hey could sell anything, create
anything…” – P11

There were no standards for legacy market products.
Flower, concentrates, and edible products were tested
for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration in what
are now considered to be rudimentary ways, pesticides,
or heavy metals. Extraction methods used in creating
concentrates (which may indicate the presence of potentially harmful solvents, acids, or both) were not
required to be disclosed. This lack of oversight in basic product safety underscored some of the concerns
“I'll never forget, you know, a father and a mother who met with me and the father breaking down as he relayed his observation of his teenage
son being forced down onto the ground at pre-dawn hours by law enforcement in Black SWAT gear. Pointing semiautomatic rifles at his son's
head and being afraid that he was about to see his son get shot dead. And this was all for the fact that his wife was growing medical cannabis for
a community member, who was suffering from a disease that made it impossible for him to keep food down, unless he was using cannabis. She
was trying her best to comply with the informal medical marijuana guidelines that had been established at the time.” - P1
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that would frame elements of future legalization proposals. One of the most prominent concerns tied to
the nature of a closed, underground, and unregulated system was the widespread victimization of
medical cannabis consumers, including but not limited to home grow raids, arrests for possession, unfair
business practices, and assaults and rapes at points of sale beyond dispensaries. People who viewed
cannabis as medicine were viewed as criminals but were also often the victims of crime themselves.
“I remember these 2 women who quite a few months apart, called me
and, separately and, I don't think they knew each other but they saw
some information where they could get medical marijuana or heard
about it. So they met up with this person…and they became victims of
rape by this person. It made me realize that there was some predator
out there who were using the illegality of marijuana to get access to
women to rape them .” – P6

Important to note here that cannabis was not
only weaponized to disproportionately target
and incarcerate members from communities
of color, but that weaponization extended to
the medical cannabis community in a
different way, both within the community
and in the way law enforcement interacted
with the community.

This backdrop illustrates early relationships within the
authorizing environment that were based on the war on
drugs: law enforcement, the judicial/legal system, and
the legacy market. It’s also important to note that
entities and individuals that would eventually regulate
cannabis in the future did not have a relationship or had
a very limited relationship with cannabis, these entities,
this authorizing environment, or all three.

Early Medical Cannabis Frameworks
Several states, including Washington, Colorado, and Oregon passed legislation to decriminalize
prescription or possession of small amounts of cannabis by certain physicians and qualified medical
cannabis patients. These early measures were designed to begin to address some of the risks involved in
relying on and obtaining cannabis for medical use, although referring to cannabis as “medicine”
continues to be debated. Legislation was targeted, at least in part, to address scenarios where a medical
cannabis patient might not go to law enforcement or their physician when they had been a
victim of a crime related to obtaining cannabis for fear of criminal prosecution. These laws provided
authority for health-focused agencies to create regulations for the administration of early medical
cannabis programs and created an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution for qualifying patients
and their primary caregivers. In Washington, that meant allowing possession of no more than a “60-day
supply.” Health-focused agencies were tasked with determining what would constitute a 60-day supply,
and the first interactions between the legacy market and a governmental agency that wasn’t law
enforcement, or the judicial system began.

Theme 2: Power distribution
The challenge from a regulatory perspective was that a “60-day supply” meant something different for
each medical cannabis patient. Public rule development hearings at the time were often strained and
illuminated the positions around the cannabis as medicine
“…it landed a place where patients could reasonably
disagree with whether or not that definition was
discussion. Despite trying to put rules together around
consistent with their personal experiences.
what supply meant, and a set of laws that tried to carve out
I think there was some concern among the people in
a medical system (which never quite got off the ground in
the audience who were going to be testifying, because
Washington, as least), simple possession of cannabis, even
the County Sheriff was there in the room and he had
with a valid medical card or doctor’s note, still could result in gone on a record saying in a newspaper article that he
believed there was no such thing as medical use of
marijuana.” – P6
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prosecution, incarceration, and a variety of associated harms.

It’s at this point of the story that it becomes apparent to
participants that the war on drugs has failed. The connection
between the medical market and increased arrest rates are noted
in some reports, but the ACLU pays closer attention to what
communities are being impacted by cannabis possession arrests.
Also interesting to note that traditional, bureaucratic forms of
“leadership” are still very much a part of the narrative because the
approach to cannabis remains firmly rooted in the war on drugs:
incarceration,
severe
penalties,
stigmatization,
and
marginalization even after legislation to create medical programs.

“I was on the street and
arrested people for simple
possession of marijuana and
found marijuana and pipes
on searches.” –P2

“Uhm, the joke when I
was a police officer -the joke was, you
know, if you're getting
low grade THC, you're
buying it from a stupid
grip third-grader that's
growing it in the
backyard. – P10
.” – J

Still, lives could be destroyed by an arrest for possession. Housing, student loans, employment, and a
variety of privileges were no longer available to a person with a possession or production of cannabis
charge.
The only affirmative defense a medical consumer might assert was a possession of a medical cannabis
card or a physician’s authorization. Even so, medical consumers and other disproportionately impacted
communities experienced the indignity of home raids, being handcuffed (particularly traumatizing for
patients with physical or emotional disabilities), spending the night or several days in jail, being charged
with a crime, the prospect of family abandonment, job loss, and a variety of other harms. This created a
fragile environment where someone with a terminal or seriously debilitating medical condition –
regardless of where they lived, the color of their skin, or how they lived– could go to jail. This, along
with possession while Black1 formed the backdrop of the first organized movement toward legalization.
Chapter 2: It Isn’t What You Think
When: 2010 – 2012
Where: Washington State, Colorado
What: Cannabis is legalized in two states…and changes the world.
“I'm doing this for the people who are getting hurt the most by our current policies. So, everybody who gets
arrested, everybody who gets stripped searched when they are put into a jail cell, experiences, a trauma that
is absolutely horrific. The shame of being publicly charged as a criminal of having to show up for court
appearances, that the- had the way that that puts your life on a completely different trajectory once that's
happened to you is horrible for every single human being. There's nothing good about the criminal justice
system for anybody that gets pushed into it. But for people with terminal and medically debilitating
conditions, that's just not- that's just not an acceptable outcome at all. So, at a minimum, we needed to deal
with that.” – P1
Note that I-502 was the initiative of a group operating within
an already complex system. The initiative interacted with the
broader system, as opposed to a specific individual directing
or influencing the system. It - not any specific person changed the trajectory of the entire narrative around
prohibition.

1 Cannabis use is roughly equal among Blacks and whites, yet Blacks are
3.73 times as likely to be arrested for marijuana possession.
https://www.aclu.org/report/report-war-marijuana-black-and-white?redirect=criminal-law-reform/war-marijuana-black-and-white.
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Theme 3: Wait, what does legalization do?
In Washington State, the Initiative 502, or I-502 campaign was by all accounts, well-organized and
supported by a wide variety of proponents including certain law enforcement agencies, public officials, a
handful of cannabis advocacy groups, and others. These supporters were located throughout the state
and clustered in highly populated cities, such as the Seattle/Tacoma area, Spokane, and Vancouver.
However, it was not supported by public health and prevention groups, conservative pockets of the
state, and associations like the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs. And, it was heavily
opposed by some members of the legacy market, based largely on concern that making driving under
the influence of cannabis a penalty would result in long-term outcomes that were worse than simple
possession. They argued that the measure’s per se THC threshold (5 nanograms of THC) for automatic
DUI conviction was so low that it would target patients whose therapeutic THC levels were consistently
beyond 5 nanograms. Additionally, I-502 did not authorize home grows based on concern that such an
allowance would increase youth exposure and subsequently, access. But for many, legalization under I502 would mean displacement of the existing quasi-commercial, vertically integrated legacy market. I502 proposed to regulate cannabis like alcohol, which was not a vertically integrated system. In
contrast, Colorado’s existing medical system was ready vertically integrated, with licensing and taxation
structures in place.
“…[the] medical cannabis community was split on this. And that some of the most vocal voices at
the time, were the strongest opponents to passing Initiative 502. And, um, my interpretation what
was happening was that those most vocal voices were those who, um, saw a very profitable
business structure that they had created for themselves, being threatened by what would happen
when this industry was brought under state regulation.” – P1, P11
The composition of this authorizing environment underscores the greater challenge of adult-use
legalization: there was no jurisdiction in the world at the time that had legalized and regulated the
production of cannabis for any purpose.
Like most initiatives to legalize cannabis, from the early adopters to states that followed, I-502 was
written in a way that would result in positive voter response. While the message focused on failure of
the war on drugs, it was also about a “smarter” government approach to pursuing public health and
social justice. These messages appealed to non-consumers and even “soccer moms.”2 The same is true
of Colorado’s Amendment 64, and later Oregon’s Measure 91. Additionally, the authors of I-502
understood that once voters made their decision, legislators could make adjustments to current law,
add language from the initiative where the measure mandated it, and provide other revisions
throughout existing statute as needed to address future legacy medical market alignment because even
though a segment of the legacy market vehemently opposed legalization, the initiative left that market
itself untouched.
“And realizing that we were- we were on the cusp of doing something that was going that could potentially change, not only policy in
Washington state, but across the country and around the world because really it- it wasn’t legal anywhere. So that was a moment
that stood out for me.” P1, P2, P5, P11, P9

2

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CEPMMJWallach.pdf
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When reflecting on the focus of I-502, the following three elements were emphasized by learning history
participants:
•

Harm reduction:

“If the law applied to everybody, we knew patients would be protected
regardless of whether or not they could find a doctor who’s willing to say,
yes, I will, I will, you know, authorize or recommend medical use of cannabis
for you.” P1

“…purposely left the medical piece out of the initiative because…knew that the
system that was in place today, the medical law for cannabis, was very different
with that when she was proposing through the initiative. And the most important
piece of that, I think, was that it was not vertically integrated, right?” – P11

•

Protect patient access:

•

Create a tightly regulated system like that of alcohol:

“….we tried to borrow a lot at the language from the liquor
control act. So that it would be a little bit easier for LCB to
undertake the rulemaking.” P1
“…a large amount of it was just copied from the liquor
statutes.” – P4

Additionally, these early measures, like I-502, Amendment 64, or Measure 91, did not focus on social
equity, but instead focused on social justice by first decriminalizing simple possession, but also
establishing a framework for regulation to assure that tax revenue generated from the production and
sale of the product was devoted to education, healthcare, research and substance use prevention,
infrastructure improvements or other community support funding.
A Systems Inflection Point
Enabling legislation signals the point at which the entire authorizing environment needed to come
together to implement the changes that the newly enacted legislation mandated. This highlights the
differences in state statutory and regulatory construction, and how implementation was different
for each state. It’s important to note that most enabling legislation delegated shared authority to
multiple agencies with specific expertise to take on work related to their specific area of expertise (such
as science, public health, etc.) except for Washington state. WSLCB was tasked with all implementation
and a mandate to construct an entire regulatory structure from scratch. In contrast, Colorado’s existing
medical cannabis system and tax structure served as a frame for an adult use regulatory system. Two
years later, Oregon established a similar tightly regulated system.

Information, Misinformation, and the Vote
“…they [No on I-502 activists] were creating fear and anxiety among patients who use cannabis. Um, patients who had
very serious health conditions. Um, patients who were very afraid that they would lose access to cannabis and were being
told that they would lose access to cannabis.” – P1

“We'd be able to provide more health care for homeless, provide

more housing opportunities. All these different things that-that
told people what they wanted to hear. In essence, when they
voted, they were voting for something that they thought was
going to help them or meet their intrinsic need or values… Uhm,
in the past, but like we all know, if you try to make everybody
happy, nobody is happy. That was sort of where we ended up.
Then, legislators got involved and started trying to make changes.
Some of them were well received, some we're not well received.
Some of them were not, uhm, consistent with the original
language associated with the initiative”. – P10

“Oh my God, what are those

people doing over there?” – P11
“And I realized they didn't realize that they

were voting for uh, setting up commercial
businesses like that.” –P4
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“…that decision to oppose the campaign
through instilling fear in people who are
vulnerable and were already being harmed by
the practices.” – P1

Enabling legislation was in and of itself complex, and the
full text of I-502 appeared in the 2012 Washington State
Voter’s pamphlet. Participants generally reflected that voters may not have completely understood the
impact of the bill. There was also reflection that opposition to the bill, while largely viewed, and indeed
reported, as unorganized, contributed to polarization that became more profound as election day
approached. That polarization foreshadowed how the authorizing environment – the complex network
of macro and micro systems that would be impacted by legalization – would begin to reconfigure itself
as it began to move toward implementation.
“[People said] ‘I voted for it, but I didn’t know it was going to do that.’ And so people were
just… I didn't know it was going to do that. And a real lack of understanding of what the whole
structure would look like. They didn't expect pot stores down the street.” – P7

Theme 4: Macro/Micro Systems Characteristics Influence and Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

Systems behavior after legalization is
consistent with complexity theory in that
existing systems emerged as something else
as a result of internal and external forces.
Note that here that bureaucratic theory
explains how power is distributed in the
overarching system. However, a specific
individual is not directing activity – it is the
characteristics and properties of the systems
themselves – not individuals within the
systems - that influence movement.

The original structure that comprised the legacy system
consisted of a smaller collection of macro and micro systems
that reorganized after legalization.3 The new, larger system now
included competing and fractured systems, systems that could
potentially or did become obsolete, and systems that merged
and collapsed into either a larger or smaller systems. We look at
Washington’s system here.
“I-I have to say it's probably some of the most painful stuff that I've
witnessed and continues to be when I think about, for lack of a
better term, the bodies on the side of the road. Like, it's just, it
wasn't, I don't know many people who got through at all, and I don't
know many, I don't know anyone who got through unscathed. Um
so it's, it definitely took its toll um and I saw kind of it all happen. “P3

“The problem was though, is that I think what happens is even in that short period

of time, you end up creating a culture and an economy with expectations and
community standards around an industry that’s unregulated. And then an
organization like XXX is stood up after the fact in response and then has to
effectively confront all of those community standards that have been established
in this new industry and change all those expectations and behaviors. That’s a
very challenging thing.” –P2

3

This is reflective of Washington’s system. Colorado and Oregon systems were designed differently.
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Emergence of new systems shifts or
reduces informal power or authority that
rested with the legacy market to
governmental entities based on authority
conferred by legislation. This was not the
result of the actions of a single leader or
distributed leadership guiding the actions
of any part of the system.

“And in essence, it meant the end of the unregulated medical
marketplace out there to a regulated marketplace for medical and for
adult-use, but I think the loudest voices against legalization was in a, you
know, and it totally made sense because it did exactly what they said it
would do. It displaced the need for this other unregulated medical
marketplace with a legal medical and adult-use marketplace, and I
think they were the loudest voices against it which is kind of ironic, but
again, it was because they were making the money by being a
commercial marketplace which is what it was never intended to be.” –
P11

Each of these systems is represented above
in visual form, as are their general connections to each other, from the perspective of the
Washington system. One participant recognized the “voice of reason” as an ever-present, but
largely disconnected part of the process of change, while the “voice of innovation” was likely
closer to the systems movement, although there was tension between these voices. The size
and impact of each system represented above reflects that system’s perceived or realized
power within the overall systems structure. While there is a great deal of systems overlap,
there was also a great deal of systems separation in the legacy market, and this both impacted
and influenced relational dynamics between systems in ways that legislation could not
anticipate or predict. Unpacking systems relationships, their dynamics, and taking it a step
further by exploring their unique characteristics helps us to understand those dynamics and
moves us toward beginning to explore how change was navigated following legalization. To do
that, the systems from the visual above are grouped by where each existed in the authorizing
environment by macro or micro buckets:
Micro Systems
Macro Systems
Department of Revenue
Local Jurisdictions
Legislature
Department of Health
Department of Agriculture
Legal/Judicial System
Regulated Cannabis Market
WSLCB/OLCC/MED
Federal Government
The Voice of Caution

Public Health
Prevention
The Public
Law Enforcement
Banking Systems
Cannabis Advocates
Anti-legalization Movement
Medical Marijuana Patients
Communities of Color
Unregulated Distribution and Sale
Legacy Market
The Voice of Innovation
Cannabis
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“And so, they don't trust, you know, the
systems that are set up that are, you know,
whether they be medical systems or
governmental systems or whatever it is.
There's a, there's an inherent mistrust that
kind of permeates everything because of
the way they have personally been
affected.” – P3

What are the observed
characteristics of these
systems? Participants shared
their perceptions of macro and
micro system characteristics.
Learning Historian interpretation,
based on narrative description
rather than researcher interpretation is
offered to tease out system characteristics
and add dimension to the extent possible:

Note that the legacy system was informally organized in a way
that likely distributed leadership and power in a horizontal
way. However, when legalization – specifically, the formal
authority to regulate the market – was shifted to the
government, systems dynamics changed in predictable and
unpredictable ways. This aligns with and underscores the
notion that the epistemology of complexity matters because
traditional understandings of truth informed the macro
challenges of statutory and regulatory construction, or the
mechanics of that construction which is more focused on
objective processes and outcomes. But that rigid
epistemology did not necessarily contemplate and may have
excluded subjective micro processes and outcomes that were
informed by values and human behaviors. These directly
impacted objective processes. In the context of cannabis
legalization, the objective facts of the macro system and the
subjective values of the micro systems could not be
separated; they were inextricably entwined and interacted
with each other.

MACRO SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
(Objective Processes and Outcomes)

MICRO SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
(Values and Human Behaviors)

It also made it very very difficult for the regulator coming in to have to
deal with the conflicts that were established by that initiative, of the
only regulated marketplace out there and not very regulated. P11

The, the lack of control, feeling, feeling like they [legacy market] don't
have control um in terms of who's growing it. P3

Historian note: describes dealing with conflict or conflict resolution as a
macro system characteristic.
’It's a pretty tremendous um night and day difference between what was
and what is and who has power and who doesn’t. And honestly, who has
power are the same people that have always had power. P3

Historian note: describes perceived loss of control, or weakening or as a
characteristic of the micro system.

Historian note: describes perception of power as a characteristic of the
macro system. Note this is also experienced within the micro system.

Historian note: describes lack of trust and lack of government process
expertise as a characteristic of the macro system.
It was pretty strange asking people who were working, um, in the illegal
marketplace to come in and talk to us about the illegal marketplace.
It was a well-organized black market that existed. Um, but just standing
and talking to people and eventually is, well, come and look and we’ll
show you what we do. P5

Culturally, you have an agency that for so many years has a certain
approach to cannabis and keep in mind throughout this entire period it
remains a Schedule I controlled substance illegal under federal law. Yet
we have a different perspective due to our state constitutional and
legislative mandate. That’s hard to reconcile. And that’s a hard change
culturally. P2

The quietest group, I think, were the people that didn't have a clue about what the
government process was and how do we go about getting licensed. And they were
afraid to ask questions because I think they thought we would disqualify them in
some manner if they didn't know what they were doing, which I think at one point I
got across a couple of them. P5

Historian note: describes approach as “certain” suggesting an objective
approach as a characteristic of the macro system.
Then, you have regulators writing rules who I don’t know who they were
before, but they didn’t have the experience that, at least, I had in seeing
them implemented. I think people who are being charged of putting
rules into place are out of touch. If they have not actually lived the
regulated world and I think even an enforcement person could probably
write better rules because they’ve been on the ground and they
understand it. P5, P9, P10

Historian note: describes subject matter expertise as a characteristic of
the micro system.
“That interconnectedness that this industry lacks. [B}ecause in when it
was, you know, underground, you didn’t wanna raise your head up too
high and call attention to yourself. So, why are you gonna create vast
networks of information? P3

Historian note: describes lack of subject matter expertise or being out of
touch as a characteristic of the macro system.

Historian note: describes lack of interconnectedness as a characteristic
of the micro system.
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Power seemed to be held by the suits. P7, P9

The loudest group was the medical people that were claiming we're
damaging the rights of medical patients. Um, I come to find out this
group of people really weren't involved in the medical marijuana thing at
all. They were anti-government taking control of the product. P5

Historian note: describes power and authority as characteristics of the
macro system.
I was labeled because of my background. I was identified of having kins
of a myopic perspective that was enforcement oriented. P10

Historian note: describes anti-regulation or opposition to governmental
authority as a characteristic of the micro system.
You had groups or people were really excited because they had won the
lottery, so to speak. You know, they are on the list to get, um, a grow
license or to open a store to be a processor. You had people in the
medical community that felt they were being excluded. So they were
angry. Um, really angry at times. In fact, there was one meeting at Saint
Martin’s College and somebody threw a shoe at the board. So, I mean,
those people are angry. P5

Historian note: describes marginalization and stigmatization as
characteristic of the macro system.
We do quite a bit of public opinion research because we wanted to make
sure obviously that anything that we were going to put on the ballot was
going to pass. P1

Historian note: describes marginalization as characteristics of the micro
system.
Um, the quietest group, I think, were the people that didn't have a clue
about what the government process was. P5, P11, P12

Historian note: describes an objective process to achieve a specific
outcome as a characteristic of the macro system.

Historian note: describes unfamiliarity with government process as a
characteristic of the macro system.

These descriptions lay the foundation for the next part of the story: the preparatory work for legislative
implementation, the interaction between regulators and the regulated, and…change.
Note that each of the participants
describe macro and micro systems in
terms of qualities or distinguishing
system traits of the systems rather than
individuals within those systems.

Characteristics may vary based on the
systems involved. The characteristics
described here are exclusive to this
subject and
space
in
time.
Understanding these characteristics
helps to unpack to textures and
dimensions of complexity in this space.

PART II: “SPADE WORK” (Implementation)
Chapter 3: Regulatory (and Organizational)
Growth and Development
When: 2012 - 2014
Where: Colorado, Washington State, Oregon
What: Building regulations through engagement,
cooperative education, collaboration, and some
difficult conversations.

Theme 5: How Do We Do This…Now?
“…we were a little bit overwhelmed with having to
implement privatization of alcohol when the
Costco initiative 1182 passed in 2011. And so this
just added more to what we were doing without
very–with very little knowledge of how we would
put it in place.” – P11

At this point in the story, it’s important to note that Washington
State had voted to privatize alcohol sales by way of Initiative
1183 in 2011 – one year before cannabis was legalized in the
state. This measure not only had statewide impact, but
organizational impact, as well. The WSLCB
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went from over 1,000 employees engaged in licensing and regulation of alcohol manufacturers, in
addition to oversight of alcohol product, distribution and operation of state-run liquor stores, to
approximately 300 employees after all the state-owned stores had been auctioned off to private entities
consistent with legislation. Although overwhelmed, to make that shift, the agency took a methodical
approach and assembled 11 teams manage the legislatively mandated downsizing. They had six months
to deconstruct a decades-old system.
Around the same time, the I-502 campaign began in earnest as Initiative 1183 was being implemented.
This piece – the tremendous agency change that was occurring at that time – is often discussed and
recognized internally, but not discussed as broadly externally. Even so, the WSLCB proactively began to
educate staff and assigned the 11 teams devoted to downsizing to a new project that would create a
regulatory structure for the production, processing, and sale of adult-use cannabis. In other words, the
agency reverse engineered what they had just completed deconstructing. Part of that work included
learning about the new market, confronting long and sometimes strongly held beliefs around the use
and consumption of cannabis, and
“….but to be honest with you, as a regulator of alcohol at that time, we were
working with the state of Colorado to
busy doing our jobs. There was not a lot of time or effort to look at how this was
share information, learning, and best
going to work. We began to put teams together just as it became more clear
that it looked like the initiative would pass. But the extent of my knowledge was
practices.
almost zero – as far as how we would regulate the new industry. I mean we’re
all aware of cannabis, but as far as how it would be regulated, none.” P11

Theme 6: Culture Shock
There were varying degrees of individual and organizational surprise that legislation to legalize cannabis
passed, although some indicated a lack of astonishment based on how well the I-502 campaign was
executed and funded. Learning history participants shared that they had little knowledge of cannabis
until they were tasked with creating a structure to regulate it. For this reason, the general approach was
to find out more about cannabis through coordinated organizational education around both the product
and the legacy market. It was clear to these agencies that while it was exciting for some to be on the “tip
of the spear” of monumental social and cultural change in the form of cannabis law reform, no one had
done it before.
There was no way for them to know or predict how to
“[We needed to] find out what the history and myths were
create new regulatory systems: it was completely
about marijuana. Because that was a big thing…the
education piece, telling people you've heard this all your
unknown. While it was true that the first two states
life, but it's not true. And here's what you haven't heard
modeled enabling statutes and initial regulatory
that is true. So, um, I think we did a really good job on that
basic education piece.” P5
frameworks similar alcohol regulation, they
knew that the products were different, and regulating cannabis was unprecedented. They also were
aware that organizational demographics were reflective of state demographics, meaning that there
were staff in agencies who may not have supported the initiatives, even though they were employed by
the agencies that were going to make it happen. This added an additional layer of implementation and
organizational complexity. This dynamic
Number 1, I thought I would be fired promptly. This is going to be a
presented challenges for regulators, and some highly controversial implementation…but what I expected was some
pretty intractable implementation issues between the legislature and
reported fear of job loss, or other drastic
public safety and marijuana community and that, you know,
measures, such as employee separation when obviously, the agencies are simple, we would be right in the middle of
the crossfire and all that.” – P12
resolution and compromise could not be
reached on whether working for an agency
charged with regulating a Schedule I substance “…I think the best part of the navigation was to, at times, just shut up
and listen to what were they dealing with, what were they angry
was legal. However, agencies sought to find
about.” P5
common ground, learn through and with each
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other, the legacy market, and experts across multiple disciplines. Change was approached as a group, as
opposed to a singular effort.

Theme 7: Tension is a catalyst for change (but chaos isn’t)
The most common approach to developing initial regulations was to begin with outreach to
communities and engage as much as possible. Some participants described a “road show” where
officials traveled across a state to gather input from stakeholders and other interested parties. This
aligns with the general approach these regulators took to gain understanding of the existing landscape
to the extent possible before beginning to draft initial regulatory structures.
“Some of those meetings there was the same cast of characters that would show up every time and trying to, I think, cause a little

distraction, a little trouble, because they were so for the existing medical marijuana group that was working, and so much against
state government. So, yes, those two things combined with them that they would show up in at times and cause trouble.” – P5

However, it was during these initial outreach meetings
that some of both the richest and most vitriolic
engagement occurred. In Washington, it was during these
meetings that the tension between the macro and
micro systems became obvious, and the tension
within the reorganizing micro systems themselves was
amplified by marginalization within the system. That
marginalization took the form of meeting disruption,
shouting down, incivility, and sometimes, violence.
Colorado and Oregon described similar experiences, but to
a lesser extent.

“How

did we deal with this as a new
agency?...primarily getting out there in front of
the community and getting knowledgeable very
fast about not just what we thought the issues
were but how the public opinion was thinking
about it…Will we use real science and research?
and not made up stuff…we had a chance
to…create a good.. centrist... balanced, viewpoint
relationship, just based on the recommendations
that came out of there.” – P12

The most important feature of these sessions was that officials – the identified “leaders” of the agencies
– listened. Although “listening” was interpreted by the entire authorizing environment in different ways,
the message each agency intended to convey was the same: “We need your help. We want your help.
Talk to us.” No attempts were made to control or restrain conversation with any participant. Since the
pre-existing conflict between enabling legislation and the legacy market fell squarely in the lap of
regulators, rather than attempting to control these multiple and often colliding interest groups,
narratives, and communication approaches, regulators sought to work with these through engagement,
seeking common ground and building trust.
“…it was pretty strange asking people who were working
in the illegal marketplace to come in and talk to us about
the illegal marketplace. It was a well-organized black
market that existed…but just standing and talking to
people and eventually is, well, come and look and we’ll
show you what we do.” – P5

This scenario seems to suggest
that there is a difference
between tension as a system
dynamic and driver of change,
and intentionally pushing a
system to the edge of chaos.
Tension was leveraged here
for purposes of engagement
but none of this experience
suggests that “leaders” knew
exactly when or if they should
interrupt or restrain that
tension.

“Well, how [are] you going to have the
expertise? How you gonna get it done? I said
“We can get it done because you’re gonna
help us do it! That’s how we’re going to do it.”
– P12

“So, we built up our acumen really, really quickly, agency-wide
through this sort of all-hands-on-deck process…we delivered on
that…and everyone saw us engage the community and the
recommendation sort of fit-out of that and that process built-in
finalized, sort of the cap on the trust industry had in us.” – P12

This concept of “interactive trust”
lies at the heart of how
regulator/regulated
interacted:
top-down,
authoritative
trust
(“trust me”) did not work here;
rather, two-way, reciprocal trust is
championed.

“None of us
know what
we’re doing, so
please ask your
question.” – P5

“… we were very open about the process and that
was also part of, you know, that mix of gaining that
interactive trust as the regulator or dealing a
unknown world of marijuana regulation.” –P12
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“A lot of them were very free flowing…uncontrolled or unmanaged. I want to say there were some rules, put
up at one of the public Community meetings – we put up, but nobody followed them. Uhm, nor were they
enforced. Not that this ever happened, but if you stand up and you say “if you’re going to yell and be
disruptive, you’re going to be asked to leave the meeting.” Actually, that did happen, but nobody was ever
asked to leave the meeting. We had people storm out of the meetings because they didn’t believe they were
getting heard.” – P10

“Yeah, I think in those moments of
heated discussion like at Saint
Martin’s just took, I think... I think
Sharon Foster was chair then, and she
just at one point just said, “Everybody
calm down. You’ll get a chance to
speak. Let us hear what people are
saying.” So, I think just taking control
of the meeting that way. I thought
she did a great job.” –P5

These engagement sessions were not rushed, largely because
there were several stakeholders representing multiple interests
across the diverse micro system and all voices were important
to the conversation. Some reported that they experienced this as a lack of control over the sessions. It
was reported that these were extremely difficult, sometimes one-sided conversations fueled by the
anger connected to the passage of legalizing legislation that had been shifted to the agencies tasked
with implementation. It was perceived that this anger was displaced but did not impact regulator
commitment to seek common ground through meaningful stakeholder participation in regulatory
construction.
“And so I think there was a little bit of, I think, that that
impacted their ability to engage with us, didn't impact our
ability to engage with them. We purposely set out to meet
with them to know their concerns. But I I think it was partly
their anger with it passing that it took a little time for them to
be engaged. It also took a little time to figure out what the
impact was happening in the community. – P11

“That [anger] decreased over time as people saw what
was going on. There was one meeting in Bellevue I was
in, though. I’m not sure it was a skill. Somebody was
standing up upset about something and I basically just
said, “You know what, that’s a bunch of bullshit.” And
the room went silent. Somebody from the state swore at
us, you know.” –P5

Ultimately, these listening sessions resulted in
initial regulatory frameworks, offering
additional opportunity for engagement. Although those initial frameworks represented a monumental
step toward realizing enabling legislation for the agencies, for some it didn’t come fast enough, wasn’t
restrictive enough, or was too strict.
“A lot of people from the agency
and some people did not want,
um, this to happen. They didn't
want marijuana legalized, even
though they were on the team to
help do this. So they are trying to
be as restrictive as possible. And I
kept pushing back, you know.
We're supposed to make this an
open market for this product, you
know. And so I think at times they
were too restrictive.” – P5

“Recognizing all the competing priorities…. of
being caught in between the regulatory and the
prevention because it wasn't restrictive enough
for the prevention side of it.” – P7

These original regulatory structures were very much reflective of their
significance in the history of legalization, offering a rigid, conservative
approach consistent with concern that the federal government would
block implementation. Stakeholder engagement became more difficult
during this period based on several factors, including unfamiliarity the complexity of regulatory
construction, and specific to this work, a regulatory structure that would guide an equally complex
existing and future cannabis economy that had never been regulated before. There was also an
expressed belief that somehow cannabis should be regulated differently than other products
(such as controlled substances or alcohol) based on its “Arguably the proponent was pushing boundaries and it
reflective of marijuana exceptionalism – at least the
qualities that some stakeholders believed transcended was
expectation that cannabis, because it could not be licensed
all other products. This highlighted the tension that
under a federal regime, that it be exempted from the spirit
of those federal rules and we would create another
began to mount between soon to be regulators, and
standard to allow it. Marijuana exceptionalism. How do we
the soon to be regulated around what was legal, what respond to that exceptionalism? Because there’s a euphoria
wasn’t, and how that would be expressed in regulation. and aggressive innovation in the cannabis community, not
to mention the fact that they want to make money.” – P2
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Theme 8: The Challenge of Building Value into an Unprecedented Regulatory System
“You’re asking a bunch of
people to interpret this
whole new area of law that
nobody has ever done.” –P9

At this point, Colorado and Washington were beginning to finalize initial
regulations and waiting for guidance from the Obama Administration on
whether they would be able to move forward with regulation at all. Initial rule
drafts were not well received, and
“The initial structure of the regulations was
horrible. [Staff] background was such that when
were characterized as “horrible” or written with “the wrong
some of the rules were written, they were
language.” The challenge, however, went beyond merely
written with the right idea, the right goals, the
establishing a brand-new regulatory structure for a controlled right information, but some of the wrong
substance that was a Schedule I drug, but accomplishing that language, so it said one thing, but we couldn’t
enforce it because of the way it was written, if
in a way that compensated for the lack of federal oversight.
that makes sense.” P9, P10
It was not easy. For Washington and Colorado, the importance of the August 30, 2013, Cole
Memorandum cannot be understated. This story would be incomplete without it.
“It’s just what was needed at the time in order to basically placate the federal government from taking action against us. Our 2 US
attorneys on the east and on the west side of the state were watching closely what we were doing, and so I think the only lesson
learned, and I’ve said it many times over the years, is I wish I wasn’t one of the first 2 states….” – P11
“The most significant thing that happened was the Federal
Government saying, through the Cole memo, “We will not shut
you down. We will allow you to move forward with this
experiment” – P11
“ I think I pulled up at the Target parking lot to call my office… I
was looking at my work e-mail…when [is] this phone call the
governors gonna take place and cause I thought the AG would
be there, and I- I would try to be there and
everything….[anyway, it was very exciting.” P4

Even so, once the original regulatory frames were
finally promulgated, some stakeholders found
the rules to be both blind to the market and tone
deaf to the individuals who were required to
comply with them. This prompted continual
requests for rule revision, and the perception
that rules were being revised constantly,
creating intentional regulatory instability.

Significant Moment Spotlight:
To this point in the story, there had been no federal
response. In January of 2013, the Attorney General of
Washington (Bob Ferguson) met with US Attorney
General Eric Holder trying to get a read on how the
federal Government would respond. The meeting
resulted in very little guidance from Holder directly, but
there was a promise of guidance from the US
Department of Justice (DOJ).
The WSLCB and the Washington State Governor’s Office
waited for many months, even though implementation
of the legislation needed to begin, and the agency had
to gear up for the new regulatory responsibility. In
August 2013, the Cole memo made it possible to
complete that work. The memo stated that given its
limited resources, the DOJ would not enforce federal
cannabis prohibition in states that "legalized marijuana
in some form and ... implemented strong and effective
regulatory and enforcement systems to control the
cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of
marijuana," except where a lack of federal enforcement
would undermine federal priorities (such as preventing
violence in marijuana cultivation and distribution,
preventing cannabis impaired driving, and preventing
marijuana revenues from going to gangs and cartels).

Yet, participants emphasized that the most
significant feature of this part of the story was
engagement, trust building, and finding common
ground. Participants reflected that the notion of
systems control was not a contemplated
approach or part of the equation to build durable
regulatory frameworks that met the letter of the
law. While there were strict standards that
needed to be reflected in rule, those standards were largely developed shoulder to shoulder with the
people to whom they would apply, and who would become the loudest critics of the agencies.
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PART III: Social Justice and Social Equity Meet
Chapter 4: The Diamond Tipped Spear
When: 2016 - 2019
Where: States with legalized cannabis programs, medical, adult use, or both
What: Legalization begins to spread across the county, changing shape and focus
“So, I imagined cannabis prohibition in the war on drugs in general is a very, very, very thick plate of glass. And
502 is intended to be a diamond tip spear that hit it and started making cracks, started making fissures and
that it was going to be more and more work and more and more pressure that was gonna break those fissures,
make them longer, broader, et cetera, until the whole wall came down.” P1
“So we met with, um, Central and South American
I-502, Amendment 64, and Measure 91 could
representatives, country representatives in Denver, Colorado. We
be considered as catalysts for social change that put together this meeting, um, with people from all those other
countries that were absolutely furious….for years the United
the world hadn’t seen before. Indeed, during
States had forced them to participate on the war on drugs. And
joint meetings with Colorado, Washington, and
now here we are simply opening up. And I don’t... There had to be
international partners, concern and even outrage in at least a dozen or 15 countries in there. We had headphones
was expressed that two of the United States had on because there were different languages being spoken. There’s
English and Portuguese and Spanish. So, you know, we’re wearing
the audacity, indeed, the arrogance to turn world headphones as if it was the UN meeting then. But you can tell
drug policy on its head, and ignore long-standing when somebody was talking at us that they were not happy even
way before it got translated. So, that was a tough meeting.” – P5
drug conventions that had been initiated by the
United States by Harry Anslinger. These policies had served as the foundation of not only the war on
drugs but as aids in confronting and eradicating drug cartels throughout the world in the most violent
and aggressive ways possible. The response to that outrage was generally that state cartels needed to
be bigger than illicit cartels. Legalization created an initial pathway for that to happen, but not without
global concern.

Yet, that initial pathway only went so far. It was not designed as an end point. It was the thing that was
supposed to capitalize on the momentum that had started with cannabis legalization. There had to be
someone, and a way to throw the spear. Thinking back to Seattle Hempfest being around for decades as
perhaps formation of the spear and thinking back to the medical marijuana laws being passed as
sharpening the spear. So much energy was building and now continues to build in the direction of
legalization to be able to land the spear and continue cracking the thick glass wall of prohibition.
There is still work to be done before the glass shatters. It is important to recognize that these initial
legalization efforts were meant to be the first blow – not the last blow – against cannabis prohibition.
It’s also important to remember that initial legalization efforts were concentrated on harm reduction
first: disproportionate incarceration rates and medical cannabis consumer victimization. This is where
social equity in cannabis comes into the conversation.
”I think it’s a great thing that people feel so

The challenge in trying to draft I-502 or Amendment
comfortable now in pointing out the flaws with 502
64 from a social equity perspective was not just that
because that means it worked.” –P1
social equity was beyond where voters in each state
were in the conversation around legalization in 2011, but also because it was very difficult to create
social equity programs in the first to states to legalize when it was possible that the federal government
would step in and stop the states from moving forward at all. Turning back to the Cole Memorandum,
one of the eight factors that the federal government was concerned about was cannabis seeping across
state lines. It was a problem with the illicit market and there was concern that it could be a problem
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with a regulated market. To guard against, or at least try to deter that seepage, each state was required
to set up a closed, tightly regulated system.
However, a closed, tightly regulated system creates artificial market restrictions simply by virtue of
statutory construction. Those restrictions were then imposed on the new industry to control how much
cannabis was being produced, how many retail establishments could be opened, and how many
production and processing facilities could be opened – because consistent with statute, it is a closed
system. This statutory construction in Washington was similar to the way that the Washington State
legislature established the WSLCB in 1933 to create a state monopoly for alcohol. The challenge with the
cannabis marketplace was that the people who would benefit from it were the people who already had
access to capital and power, political and otherwise. And, the United States has been built on centuries
of concentrating wealth in the hands of a few white colonists.
“I think that the conversation
right now is extraordinarily
over simplified…but that's
okay. What- what matters to
me is that the conversation is
happening.” – P1

Oversimplification of a complex issue or
system – and the difference between
social justice and social equity is nothing if
it isn’t complex – has been identified in
literature as a possible indicator of
attempts to control. By definition, control
is the polar opposite of complexity. So, by
attempting to ignore the complexity of this
issue, are we setting the system up to
repeat its past?

For these reasons, to start deconstructing laws that prohibited
the use of cannabis and promulgate regulations around it in
the first two states, a socially equitable marketplace was not
attainable. The dynamic and structure for that to happen successfully
did not exist ten years ago. In Washington, it’s important to recognize
that anti-affirmative action laws would not allow the state or any

Social Justice is “a communal effort
dedicated
to
creating
and
sustaining a fair and equal society
in which each person and all groups
are valued and affirmed. It
encompasses efforts to end
systemic racism and all systems
that devalue the dignity and
humanity of any person.”
Source: John Lewis Institute for Social
Justice, (n.d.)
https://www.ccsu.edu/johnlewisinstitut
e/terminology.html

Social Equity is “The fair, just and
equitable management of all
institutions serving the public
directly or by contract; and the
fair distribution of public service,
and implementation of public
policy; and the commitment to
promote fairness, justness and
equity in the formation of public
policy.”
Source: McSherry, 2013
https://socialequity.unimelb.edu.au/s
tories/what-is-social-equity

The interplay between social justice
and social equity is extremely
complex. Has social justice been
oversimplified to promote social
equity?

regulatory agency to assert that licenses could only be awarded to licensees from specific racial
categories, or preference given on that basis, even if voters would have been interested in such a
framework in 2011.
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Theme 9: “The Tightrope”

“One, um, I believe personally that people should have a
right if they want to use marijuana or not. You know, with a
product that [is] safe, what chemicals are on it, you know,
all the other things that we put in those baselines. But I also
wanted it done in such a way that the federal government
wasn't going to walk in and say, "Okay, close it down.
You're-you're violating too many federal laws." So, always
walking that tightrope was, um, part of the equation.” – P5

For regulators, illegal activity was an existential threat to
the very existence of newly formed regulatory systems.
Behind everything was always the threat that despite the
Cole Memorandum and the painstaking work that led up
to the first regulatory frameworks, the federal government might step in and assert “This whole thing is
not working, shut it all down.” There was ongoing concern that regulators and by extension,
enforcement staff in the field could be charged by the federal government under some theory of
complicity.
However, society, culture and public opinion has changed in the last decade. Regulators, both
pioneering and new, have replaced the tightrope with an ever-widening bridge as more states legalize
cannabis and regulatory frameworks are created based on what we’ve learned.
At the same time, the fissures continue to spread in the thick glass wall of prohibition. Although now,
there are more hands on that diamond-tipped spear.

PART IV: Toward Socially Equitable Conditions

Political, policy and strategic expertise
focused on collaboration to address the
diversity of opinion. Another example of
interacting with systems characteristics.

Chapter 5: The Next Five Years
When: 2019 - Present
Where: Across the United States
The first three pieces of legislation to legalize cannabis in the United States have achieved their
overarching goals in three ways:
“It wasn’t possible for the state to say we’re actually going to give the licenses to people
from specific racial categories or some give them preference. We couldn’t preference
anything in that way.” P4

1. They passed.
2. As a result of successful state-level legalization, the federal government allowed those states to
implement the legislation.
3. Legislation and subsequent regulation served as models and lessons learned for other states
choosing to legalize cannabis.
“Unfortunately, like a lot of licensing processes and state
This momentum would be difficult, if not impossible to
reverse because cannabis is currently legalized or
decriminalized in one way of another in all but four states.

contracting processes, there's, there is no favoritism, you
know. It's here's what you have to do. If you do that, then
you can proceed. And, um, there might have been a better
way to educate people that are not used to working, um,
with the government or working in a business environment
to be a little more successful” – P5

Now, we can look in the rearview mirror and think about what we might focus on moving forward. What
about original statutory structures should be revised as industry begins to mature and the broader
society is shifting its thinking about cannabis? What does this learning history tell us about what where
we’ve been to inform where we’re going? How do we do this differently…. or better, or smarter? How
might we initiate and guide change efforts, and how might those efforts reshape the structure and
connectivity (or lack connectivity) of current macro and micro systems? The following themes emerged
when we thought about the future.
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Theme 10: Continue the conversation…
Legislation to legalize met voters where they were in the 2011 conversation around cannabis in
Washington and Colorado, and later in Oregon. We know that the authorizing environment has changed
since that time. We have a better understanding of inclusivity. We have demonstrated that our initial
conservative and strict regulatory systems didn’t result in federal intervention. We learned that cannabis
legalization did not result in increased youth access and states have seen a decrease in youth
consumption. Here’s what we’re thinking about moving into the future:
•

Continue to grow the stakeholder base because it continues to expand in a variety of ways.
Continue to create inclusive engagement models that invite
“Beat down the doors of the
stakeholders to join in participatory regulatory processes.
agency and make sure they
Provision of inclusive rule and policy development opportunities
know who you are.” – P3
has strengthened stakeholder relationships, but some continue
to experience a higher level of regulatory tension. Is this experience of divisiveness reflective of
the current political environment, a continuation of the early and uncertain days or regulation,
or something else? What opportunities for coalition building does this perception offer?

I would hope at least that
regulators would be like Allison
Holcomb. And I feel like
regulators, for the most part,
our regulators. They're
bureaucrats, and they're what
people expect regulators to be.
There's a lot of crazy political
stances in this movement…but
at least be dedicated to
professionalizing, reducing
harm. If you regulate us like
professionals, then maybe we
will be professional.” -P9

•

“I just think it's it's easy to look back and, and with
the cynicism that we have toward government
today. so polarizing is that we all know it is, and
the lack of trust that people have in their
government whether it's at the national level, at
the state level, at the local level. It's easy, it's
easier for some people to believe that there was a
motive and intention to leave people out.” – P11

Further demonstration that
complexity is not an action. It
is a property and
characteristic of a system or
a collection of systems.

Where is the balance between adhering
to the law and flexible rules? Are we at a
point where we can release more of the
“safety valve” that was at the heart of
Cole Memorandum? It accomplished its
goal, but how long will that level of
restraint be necessary?

Reinvigorate focus on harm reduction. Recognize that harm may be realized in multiple ways,
including access barriers to medically appropriate products, but also entry into the licensed and
regulated system. Take a realistic look at
demonstrated youth impact, and adjust
“I think making sure that we are coming up with policies is not about
if needed, thinking about advertising and
punishing young people for making bad choices, and not about
punishing adults from making bad choices, but about equipping them
commercial speech.
with the information, the experiences that support them making good
choices.” P1
Does public health and prevention continue to
contribute to the narrative around the war on drugs?
Is complete abstinence the answer or should the
focus be education? Consider how engagement
occurs here. Are there leadership implications?

•

“…kids aren't having any trouble whatsoever getting it. And so at least,
if we bring this into a regulatory environment, perhaps we're making it
more difficult or at least, you know, we’re- we're focusing on taking the
people that are obviously willing to sell to children out in the
marketplace.” P1

Remain focused on supporting and continuing to create a regulated system that offers value
to both licensees and the public. Consider how that value may be distributed across the supply
chain and beyond. This is a tie directly back to enabling legislation and national legalization.

This is almost a continuation of standing up the
original regulatory frameworks. It would seem
that more engagement with the regulated is
implicated here, and this ties into the
perception that cannabis businesses wish to be
recognized as the same as all other businesses,
but are they?

“…creating value in a regulated framework; even where that there is
a presence of a relatively high taxation load, with an excise tax and
special sales tax, that if you can add sufficient value to the product
through the regulatory system, then consumers, and suppliers, and
retailers, will move to that system because there’s value there,
there’s value in testing, there’s value in packaging, there’s value in
security, there’s value in open hours of your business, there’s value in
consistency of retailers, there’s all of this value that’s built into a
regulated framework that moves that illicit activity to the licit space.”
P2
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•

Take a hard – and perhaps uncomfortable – look at cannabis stigmatization. Prioritize
reduction of both structural stigma (macro level stigma, including state policies and
institutionalized procedures that oppress cannabis users and people impacted by the war on
drugs), and micro level stigma (such as “stoner” stereotyping). The deviant status of cannabis in
American society still appears to hold true (Reid, 2020). To say that cannabis has been
normalized or is being normalized may be symptomatic of unchecked social privilege and
distance from cannabis users. It may also be attributable to valuing qualitative data over
nuanced accounts (such as this one) gained through qualitative methods. This has implications
for social equity, social justice, and racial justice in cannabis statutory and regulatory reform and
requires a close eye to overgeneralization.

Cannabis-related stigma also is the result of
the public health and prevention approaches
of the “just say no” movement that was part
of the war on drugs. Implications for change
efforts suggest another opportunity for
increased conversation and engagement: the
medicalization of cannabis. In Washington,
this means focus on strengthening medical as
opposed to adult use markets.

“It's time to take the bias
away and the stigma that
people have placed on
cannabis for years, even
those that supported
legalization. We still, we still
deal with it today.” –P11

Theme 11: Explore how social equity can be demonstrated, beyond equity and ownership of
cannabis businesses.
A common theme throughout this learning history was recognition that the first legislation to legalize
cannabis was designed to begin the process of dismantling the legal framework of prohibition. That
framework consisted of both statutory and some regulatory structures. As acknowledged above, the
first strike was grounded in social justice, rather than social equity. This was intentional because
measures to legalize were designed to be as uncontroversial as possible so they would be broadly
understood and accepted. And the reality is that the political context in the summer and fall of 2012 is
much different than it is now (Hudak, 2020).
This highlights the complexity of not only the circumstances, but the way in which the narrative history
of legalization has been recharacterized over time. It also highlights the work that lies ahead in terms of
providing information and education about the ways that government works, but at the same time, the
work that regulators can do to help bridge the gaps – actual or perceived – between government and
the citizens participating in that government. In other words, while cannabis legalization has pushed the
limits of what it means to lead innovative regulatory change, it also pushes the limits of an identified
leader’s ability to transparently guide change as a democratic process. Assuring that everyone has a
place at the table, the ability to participate comprehensively, creatively, and analytically is a step toward
creating socially equitable conditions for all.
True social equity can be created when the collateral consequences of cannabis criminalization are
materially addressed. The communities that social equity programs are meant to serve must be included
in decision making to break the cycle of exclusion. We are actively seeking to achieve this. There is much
to do and we know it, and much of that change involves lawmakers rather than cannabis regulators.
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While in some ways this points back to perceptions and understandings of bureaucracy described in this
learning history, and the way that
“…the assumption is that most everything about social equity has been translated into equity
stories are sometimes revised over time, and ownership in marijuana businesses.” – P2
it also underscores the tension between the regulated and the regulator and asks us to look at how
those relationships evolve. We can start by looking at regulator roles in the following that were
meaningful to this learning history’s participants:
•

Community reinvestment programs: is it enough to award licenses from cannabis production,
processing, and retail? How can equity building and community reinvestment partner in
achieving social equity goals? Does the regulator have a role in that, or does the community
shape that partnership?
“People [need]to respect the communities, the identification of what they
want. But the reality of what I was pushing for is not very good…I believe if
you implement it, I don't think it's a model to success, for the community,
and have a hard time reconciling my values to be representative of all that,
while my policy says, "Tell me this is not what we should be doing for
transfer of wealth, making up for those kinds of issues, trying to bring [it]
forward. Let me spend it on education and the underachievement in our
school system. Let me spend it on drug and alcohol treatment if that's the
issue. Let me spend it on any other business development which is close
enough, that it's not quite as competitive or as completely capital-intensive
as this…” P12

•

“Yeah, maybe we need to make it easier for people that we've taken
away their livelihood, even though it was an illegal livelihood. And
we're giving it to other people, you know, corporations in some
cases. But how do we say, well, they're not the only ones who've
suffered. We've got all these people coming out of jail with no skills
or records that they can't um overcome. It's challenging…the more I
read on social justice, I just listened to a pretty controversial speaker.
A speech he did at Johns Hopkins University. I have to look but his
topic was "Drug policy is racist policy." – P7

Outlet density impact. Concern was expressed around negative outcomes weighed
against positive benefits of increasing cannabis outlet and production density in
communities most impacted by cannabis prohibition. “But it really also talks about things like the impact
“…why did we want to extend what has been-- What has caused
problems for those communities? And put it right back in the
communities. Put cannabis right back in those communities when it's
been a source of problems. And are we really serving those
communities by doing that? And- and isn't there a better way? If you
want to look at the revenue that's coming in, couldn't revenue be set
aside to provide business counseling for things other than cannabis
businesses? Why is it only for cannabis businesses? If I've been sitting
in jail for five years over minor possession, and I've missed out on an
education, and I don't wanna sell cannabis, what are you doing for
me? “- P12

on communities of maybe e-, you know, ag- thisthis business aggregating in those, in those
communities and the- and consumption impacts.
And that sort of thing which you usually don't hear
talked about in the social equity context. Both the
positive and the negative impacts of or
opportunities and potential harms – P2

Should the contours of racial justice be part of

the regulatory discourse here? ICMA describes
racial justice as, “the proactive reinforcement of
policies, practices, attitudes and actions the
produce equitable power, access, opportunities,
treatments, impacts and outcomes for all.” It’s
the presence of deliberate systems and
supports to achieve and sustain racial equity. Is
this the role of the regulator?

•

Explore the impact of perceived “farce” of social equity. Lack of access to capital and
funding for on-going business costs increases concern about effectively resourcing
equity efforts. Will those efforts achieve desired results?
“[Business thrives with] Sustainable income, pretty easy to operate, protected
environment. But this environment? I think it’s very rough for government to offer a
license and create something that’s successful for them. You’ve got to come with the
savvy, the skills, the ability, the capital, the wherewithal, and simply creating a
license to get in, which is… has been generally, as you know, if a [state] system is, not
to my mind the big makeup for, um, the, the, the problems of society. “ P12
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Theme 12: “I’m a survivor, not a leader” – Implications for Practice
Throughout the development of this learning history, participants referred to their role in change efforts
from the perspective of “we” rather than “I.” While this is explored in dissertation findings, it’s
important to note here because it was clear that no participant felt compelled to think about this
monumental work as attributable to one person. It was a group effort by all accounts. The standout
comment capturing general sentiment is offered here as Theme 12. This is consistent with dissertation
findings that “leadership” is a social construct rather than something someone does.
Looking at this theme more closely, what is the difference between a leader and a survivor? The
Cambridge online dictionary offers broad definitions of both:
“It was an exciting time. I really
enjoyed it. Um, beyond that, I don't
know what I would tell myself. Um,
maybe you didn't have to talk to
everybody.” – P5

leader: a person who manages or controls other people
especially because of his or her ability or position.
(Source:https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/lead
er)

survivor: a person or organization that continues to
exist, especially after suffering difficulties.
(Source:https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/surv
ivor)

Washington and Colorado assumed tremendous responsibility in being the first two states in the world
to make new drug policy through cannabis legalization. Oregon carried the momentum forward. The
magnitude of that responsibility is understated in media, literature, with few exceptions, is largely
absent from current discourse. Agencies tasked with creating the first frameworks to regulate cannabis
learned with and from the legacy market, and worked with the overall authorizing environment, at least
to the extent possible, to bring about these monumental changes.

“There’s an incredible balance…so you’ve got the feds saying its illegal, and you’ve also got
almost half of your voting population saying, “I’m not feeling really good about this policy
shift that you made” so we always, as the regulator, have to balance those that are so
happy that the product is legal with making sure that it’s strictly regulated. And I think
we’ve done, this staff has done a great job, this agency, it’s got nothing to do with me, has
done a great job with trying to make sure this industry is regulated strictly so we don’t
have the feds come in and tear the system down.” P11

This work and responsibility did not come without criticism, in addition to both apparent and expressed
expectation that regulatory agencies should have known how to set up a system that had never existed
before. The scope of that work was – and continues to be - misunderstood by segments of the
authorizing environment. One participant referred to it as intellectual dishonesty.
Enabling legislation sought to achieve social justice goals consistent with historical and procedural
perspectives rooted in concepts of democracy. Here, regulatory authority was distributed (for the most
part) to implement legislation. This resulted in what might be characterized as democratized leadership if it was leadership at all - to implement that legislation, meaning that the ability to be part of change
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was accessible in several ways. This included the creation of implementation subgroups within agencies,
providing public comment in forums across states (providing a forum for the demonstration of civic
leadership), and the creation of advisory boards. Through these processes, agencies were able to
establish foundational regulatory systems for cannabis that made it possible for future discussions of
equity to occur. While there may have been agency staff and agency heads working together, all
participant reflections provided that relationships in these spaces was not top down, but more
horizontal and evenly distributed. Participants expressed a common goal of balance, rather than
disruption, of existing systems, even though there was recognition that some displacement would occur.
A prominent participant thought undercurrent here was
whether initial efforts at legalization were “everything,”
if they went far enough, and what role regulators played
in those efforts. One participant spoke to the question very
eloquently:
“Some of the things [regarding legalization] might happen faster
where there might have been more of a gentleness, gentleness to
it. But it's hard for me to say, do it differently. And again, I say
that because I think that I did what I was good at. And that it's
okay that that wasn't everything. But it was a- you know, I think I
did what- I think I played the role I was supposed to play.” P1

Recurring subtheme:
“leadership” is not a singular
activity by one person who
“knows all.” Everyone involved
had a role in change, and no one
knew the recipe for the “magic
sauce.” Rather, all involved
offered an ingredient to make
that sauce….

“We can’t change reality.”
Initial enabling legislation was strict. Since then, however, states have passed legislation that moves in
the other direction. For example, in 2019, Washington deconstructed its original penalty structure,
lessening the impact of many violations, cutting all penalties in half, and creating a deferral program like
that offered for criminal violations such as DUI. Colorado and Oregon initially allowed vertical
integration in some form, and legislative action has resulted in removal of restrictive residency
requirements. In contrast, the Washington state system is not vertically integrated and was not
designed to accommodate out of state ownership. Over the years, various bills have been introduced
that would revise these provisions, but none have been successful. Even so, the agency is often viewed
as the barrier to alignment with other states, even though legislation is needed to dismantle the threetier system.
Was vertical integration an opportunity missed in Washington? What are the longer-term impacts of
vertical integration? For example, does vertical integration support successful social equity programs?
Some argue that it doesn’t. For states that are vertically integrated, the expenses of operating a
vertically integrated cannabis company can be capital intensive and finding that capital can be a
challenge based on a variety of factors. For those harmed by the war on drugs, those challenges may be
greater, thus making it more difficult for impacted communities to economically benefit from cannabis
legalization. This could widen the wealth gap created in part by cannabis legalization. Exploring
innovative regulatory solutions through targeted efforts that focus on how to create equitably accessible
avenues to economic opportunity is ongoing in all states.
That focus underscores, and participants acknowledged, that until national legalization occurs, states
should continue to work together toward standardized approaches to regulation to the extent possible.
For these regulators, this is not a new concept. Formalization of regulatory knowledge sharing forums,
like those offered by the Cannabis Regulators Association (CANNRA), help to increase knowledge
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democracy between states, and may help states to respond more effectively to a rapidly changing,
innovative market.
“The pace has changed. Now, it’s whack-a-mole on
testing, right? It’s the next product of the day. It’s
the next thing. And I don’t think we saw that early on
back. This constant churn of evolution particularly in
labs and standards.” – P12

Regulatory Innovation and Bias: Opportunity or Barrier to Meaningful Coalition?
“There's quite a bias out there against cannabis legalization. They

State governments work to ensure that
wanted it to be treated the same. But the cannabis industries
rallies against us…because they believe that we treat it
regulations are responsive to changing market
differently than alcohol? Well, it is.
dynamics, policy learning, and unexpected outcomes.
The public has a bias against [the agency]. I can't change reality.
Despite critic’s perceptions, systems were built into
I can't. I can recognize that the bias is, is not healthy for the
cannabis programs that sought to improve the ability industry and that we should do everything we can to remove it.
of government to do its job, and cannabis legalization But don't be so naive to believe that, that wouldn't be there.
That will take time.” – P11
was a way to showcase that. For example, in
Washington, cost-benefit analysis was built into the enabling legislation to assess the impact of cannabis
legalization on the state and recommend ways to deal with costs and other impacts incurred (Hudak,
2020). Cost-benefit analysis through statutes like the Regulatory Fairness Act (chapter 19.86 RCW) in
Washington are designed to assure that state agencies assess regulatory changes that might result in
compliance and disproportionately impact smaller businesses when those changes are not statutorily
mandated. Oregon’s approach is similar, and so is Colorado’s.
States developed seed-to-sale tracking systems, product testing standards where none had previously
existed, and worked with industry to create packaging and labeling standards to assure that consumers
received as much information about a product on a label as possible. As the industry continues to
mature, change, and innovate, regulations must change, as well. The challenge for regulators, however,
is finding the balance as noted above – the sweet spot – between providing adequate regulatory
guidance for a Schedule I controlled substance and dialing back the tightly wound safety mechanisms on
which most enabling statutes are based. The authority to make most of those adjustments generally lies
with legislative, rather than regulatory bodies. This underscores the tension between structural and
social stigmas: the deviant status of cannabis in American society still holds true, and the debate around
cannabis normalization is ongoing (Reid, 2020). Regulators remain in the middle of it.
Criticism of this dichotomous, and generally misunderstood regulatory position is harsh and frequent
from all points of the authorizing environment, and includes, but is not limited to:
•
•
•

Expectation of a flawless system that meets the competing and rapidly changing needs of
licensees, and at the same time, the more static expectations of cannabis prohibitionists, and
the long-standing needs of medical cannabis consumers;
Expectation of agency ability to contort or bend laws and rules beyond their design and
boundaries;
Demand for regulatory stability even though requests to revise regulation to meet singular
needs or interests is constant.
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These expectations have resulted in an often-fractured authorizing environment continually at odds
with itself, and that negative energy is generally directed toward the regulator. Wherever agency staff
find themselves in an organizational structure, regulators experience varying levels of professional and
personal fatigue. Here, this lived experience was described in terms of endurance and survival not
leadership. In other words, this work is hard.
These human elements of change receive little attention. Recognizing the dimensions of bias as a system
characteristic may help to shape engagement models, highlight change opportunities and approaches,
and support efforts to find common ground and collaboration across the authorizing environment.
These elements may help to shape future regulatory development.

“Don't rally against the regulator, or don't rally against it, because the bias is there, of course. We just
recognize it, and then we address it as we can.” P11

Theme 13: Remember where we came from to guide where we’re going…closing words.
Communication and Engagement:
“It has made every single agency in the state of XXX

have to talk to each other because it touches each and
every one of them.” P3
“Yes, not only working with us but working with the industry, right?
And there's certainly a segment of the industry that wants to do
what's good for business and so they don't wanna have any kind of
opposition or have things change on them. They want that
predictability. And there's a real opportunity there to be able to
partner with Public Health on certain things or at least to be able to
find compromises together. And that is an area that has the
opportunity, I think for the future. I-I think going back to prelegalization, the, we were in the, the liquor selling business, right?
The...they're still trying to find their legs in the issue but I think it's
certainly an area in the future that has a, a lot of opportunities.” P7

“I think, because we pressed that engagement, they're less cynical.
We make mistakes, as you know, and sometimes not engaging with
them on every decision that we make. But Lord knows, everybody
can be in our list serve. So, sometimes I'm a little frustrated by
people feeling like the decision was made without them.” P11

“Cannabis is now grown up. We don't need to be
concerned about treating it like an illicit substance.”
Something akin to saying we're now going to treat
cannabis essentially like any other regulated
commodity." And so 2.0 for us was that moment where
we said, "Okay, we're now sort of grown-ups and we're
gonna have publicly-traded companies and we're gonna
have lots of stockholders with minimal shares of
businesses and we don't care who you are because the
end of the day, you don't control the business." P2
“Value the process of listening to all voices in the room.
Approach conversations with people who haven't had the
same experiences as them. That they have the ability to
make people feel included rather than coming in with their
own experiences and intentions.” P7

“What I would tell myself probably is to speak up more
and be a little more forceful. And, you know, I think a lot
of it was just so many of us just didn’t know a whole lot.
And we were all learning on the fly. And if there would
have been a way to be a little more prepared and to
understand a little more, I think that’s the big advantage
that people have now. They’ve seen states go through
this. If they’re smart, we’ll take the best and leave the
worst from what other states have done.” P9

Systems Improvement and Design:
“But so just as an example, right? Like, we instead of, we could have
used bringing cannabis out of the shadows as an opportunity to learn
how to improve our systems. But we were so afraid of it that we refuse
to look at its benefits and only look at the things that scared us, which
then led to it being treated as any other commodity which it is not.” P3

“What would I do differently? I would have allowed vertical integration
because there's as you know there's a lots of other reasons why that's
been problematic.” P11

“I think what's happening is the assumption that whatever
you need medically should be available to you at a
recreational store. It begins with these stores not having a
place where there's an opportunity to have confidential
communications with patients. The atmosphere is not set
up for a confidential discussion. It’s like operating a small
clinic in a night club.” –P7

“You know, If I went back when I’ve made that decision,
if I knew I could get medical integrated into that first
session right away, that was a bigger possibility before
that. And then so I don’t think I can really take back that
decision and say that circumstance, I could, I could
change. I think the flaws that... from a little CC’s
perspective, one, we gave up too much of the territory
to other agencies initially.” P12
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“I think making sure that we are coming up with policies is not about
punishing young people for making bad choices, and not about
punishing adults from making bad choices, but about equipping them
with the information, the experiences that support them making good
choices.” P1

“There's a crazy political stances in this movement, as you
know, um, but at least be dedicated to professionalizing,
reducing harm.” P9

“Make the team a little smaller.” P5

The challenge of cannabis “exceptionalism”
“It is the challenge that each of us has had in our own domain where
we are. I think I've passed the advantages of having it. XX and I have
had some challenges with having commission models, because I don't
think the traditional federal apparatus is even tougher than state
apparatus. Um, you've got to have that participation in this world. This
requires constant, communication and information flow to do it
successfully. I can’t imagine the FDA reconciling unproven science.” –
P12

“There's no going back…there's no going back. You
know what? They're viewed as the good old days or
whatever that is. It's only going to keep morphing into
what the future is and the board to its credit, that's
cannabis 2.0, you know, took a step back and say,
"Where do we want to be in five years? What do we
have to be able to do?... It's not trying to, you know,
keep a corral around innovation. It's gonna continue to
happen.” P7

“…it just seems somewhat ironic that in some ways the criminalization
of marijuana over the last century and the preclusion of research has
in some ways created this space for allowances for exceptionally novel
products. So it’s not surprising we’re met with the question, “why
can't we do a nasal spray? Because we don’t have to follow the same
rules. And we’ll rely on a more liberal allowance from state
governments.” P2

“How do we respond to that exceptionalism? Because there’s a euphoria and aggressive innovation in the cannabis
community, not to mention the fact that they want to make money. It reminds me of one episode we were closely
involved with about three years ago. It took probably a solid year for it to play out. It was the whole concept of nasal spray
– administering cannabis through a spray in the nasal cavity and the question was whether it was safe. Arguably the
proponent was pushing boundaries and it was reflective of marijuana exceptionalism – at least the expectation that
cannabis, because it could not be licensed under a federal regime, that it be exempted from the spirit of those federal
rules and we would create another standard to allow it.” P2

Chapter 6: The Next Chapters
Of course, these haven’t been written yet. While this learning history focused solely on the
complexity of early cannabis legalization as it relates to regulatory construction, social justice
and social equity, each state can tell a story of its own. Leadership within this domain is
explored more deeply in the dissertation that this learning history has informed.
Perhaps another learning history could explore the Washington State medical and adult-use
market merger, and certainly, some participants shared observations about that during
interviews. Oregon might use a learning history to dive into challenges of overproduction, land
degradation, and product testing. And all states could visit the issue of serial sales. There is also
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the issue of national legalization and what that might mean for state systems. Until then,
perhaps this history can be used as a blueprint for future participatory research design, in the
words of those leading complex regulatory change.
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Appendix I: Learning History Data Table

PART I: PRE-LEGALIZATION
HISTORICAL
MARKER

THEME
1: The legacy landscape was
multidimensional and complex
1: The legacy landscape was
multidimensional and complex

1: The legacy landscape was
multidimensional and complex

Legacy Landscape and
Prohibition
(Chapter 1)

1: The legacy landscape was
multidimensional and complex

1: The legacy landscape was
multidimensional and complex

1: The legacy landscape was
multidimensional and complex

2: Power distribution

COMMENT
We’ve been farming indoors forever because it
was underground, right?
Well, and, and unfortunately with that, I mean, so
people are not going to continue to avail
themselves of the medicine and I say medicine that
they need. Um that is why we are here is because
people saw it as treatment first and foremost
You know, that interconnectedness that this
industry lacks for a couple reasons. One, because
in when it was, you know, underground, you didn’t
wanna raise your head up too high and call
attention to yourself. So, why are you gonna create
vast networks of information?
…some of the stuff that I saw that was really,
I'll never forget it, was packaged, processed,
like cakes or brownies wrapped in cellophane
with uh, a handwritten note on the package of
what it was. It wasn't properly packaged or
labeled. I have no idea. I mean, it was basically
someone making this in their home and then
bringing it to the dispensary or possibly making it
in the dispensary but whether it was tested,
whether it was tested for potency, uh, I-I have no
idea, but it was certainly labeled. It would-, it'd be
like something I would make in my home, Kathy...
They could sell anything, create anything…
I'll never forget, you know, a father and a mother
who met with me and the father breaking down as
he relayed his observation of his teenage son being
forced down onto the ground at pre-dawn hours by
law enforcement in Black SWAT gear. Pointing
semiautomatic rifles at his son's head and being
afraid that he was about to see his son get shot
dead. And this was all for the fact that his wife was
growing medical cannabis for a community
member, who was suffering from a disease that
made it impossible for him to keep food down,
unless he was using cannabis. She was trying her
best to comply with the informal medical
marijuana guidelines that had been established
at the time
I remember these 2 women who quite a few
months apart, called me and, separately and, I don't
think they knew each other but they saw some
information where they could get medical
marijuana or heard about it. So they met up with
this person…and they became victims of rape by
this person. It made me realize that there was
some predator out there who were using the
illegality of marijuana to get access to women to
rape them.
…it landed a place where patients could
reasonably disagree with whether or not that
definition was consistent with their personal
experiences.
I think there was some concern among the people
in the audience who were going to be testifying,

PARTICIPANT

P3

P3

P3

P11

P1

P6

P6
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because the County Sheriff was there in the room
and he had gone on a record saying in a newspaper
article that he believed there was no such thing as
medical use of marijuana.

2: Power distribution

2: Power distribution

It Isn’t What You Think
(Chapter 2)

PURPOSE

3: Wait, what does legalization
do?

3: Wait, what does legalization
do?

3: Wait, what does legalization
do?

3: Wait, what does legalization
do?

3: Wait, what does legalization
do?
3: Wait, what does legalization
do?
3.1: Wait, what does
legalization do?

I was on the street and arrested people for simple
possession of marijuana and found marijuana and
pipes on searches.
Uhm, the joke when I was a police officer -- the joke
was, you know, if you're getting low grade THC,
you're buying it from a stupid grip third-grader that's
growing it in the backyard.

I'm doing this for the people who are getting
hurt the most by our current policies. So,
everybody who gets arrested, everybody who
gets stripped searched when they are put into a
jail cell, experiences, a trauma that is absolutely
horrific. The shame of being publicly charged
as a criminal of having to show up for court
appearances, that the- had the way that that
puts your life on a completely different
trajectory once that's happened to you is
horrible for every single human being. There's
nothing good about the criminal justice system
for anybody that gets pushed into it. But for
people with terminal and medically debilitating
conditions, that's just not- that's just not an
acceptable outcome at all. So, at a minimum, we
needed to deal with that.
medical cannabis community was split on this.
And that some of the most vocal voices at the time,
were the strongest opponents to passing Initiative
502. And, um, my interpretation what was
happening was that those most vocal voices were
those who, um, saw a very profitable business
structure that they had created for themselves,
being threatened by what would happen when this
industry was brought under state regulation.
“And realizing that we were- we were on the cusp
of doing something that was going that could
potentially change, not only policy in Washington
state, but across the country and around the
world because really it- it wasn’t legal anywhere.
So that was a moment that stood out for me.”
If the law applied to everybody, we knew patients
would be protected regardless of whether or not
they could find a doctor who’s willing to say, yes,
I will, I will, you know, authorize or recommend
medical use of cannabis for you.
purposely left the medical piece out of the
initiative because she knew that the system that
was in place today, the medical law for cannabis,
was very different with that when she was
proposing through the initiative. And the most
important piece of that, I think, was that it was not
vertically integrated, right?
we tried to borrow a lot at the language from the
liquor control act. So that it would be a little bit
easier for LCB to undertake the rulemaking

a large amount of it was just copied from the liquor
statutes
they were creating fear and anxiety among patients
who use cannabis. Um, patients who had very

P2

P10

P1

P1, P11

P1, P2, P5,
P11, P9

P1

P11

P1

P4
P1
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Information, Misinformation,
and the Vote

3.1: Wait, what does
legalization do?
Information, Misinformation,
and the Vote

3.1: Wait, what does
legalization do?
Information, Misinformation,
and the Vote

3.1: Wait, what does
legalization do?
Information, Misinformation,
and the Vote

3.1: Wait, what does
legalization do?
Information, Misinformation,
and the Vote

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

serious health conditions. Um, patients who were
very afraid that they would lose access to cannabis
and we're being told that they would lose access to
cannabis
Oh my God what are those people doing over
there?
P11

We'd be able to provide more health care for
homeless, provide more housing opportunities. All
these different things that-that told people what
they wanted to hear. In essence, when they voted,
they were voting for something that they
thought was going to help them or meet their
intrinsic need or values… Uhm, in the past, but
like we all know, if you try to make everybody
happy, nobody is happy. That was sort of where
we ended up. Then, legislators got involved and
started trying to make changes. Some of them were
well received, some we're not well received. Some
of them were not, uhm, consistent with the original
language associated with the initiative.
that decision to oppose the campaign through
instilling fear in people who are vulnerable and
were already being harmed by the practices

P10

P1

[people said] I voted for but I didn't know it was
gonna do that.
And so people were just… I didn't know it was
going to do that. And a real lack of
understanding of what the whole structure
would look like. They didn't expect pot stores
down the street.
I-I have to say it's probably some of the most
painful stuff that I've witnessed and continues to be
when I think about, for lack of a better term, the
bodies on the side of the road. Like, it's just, it
wasn't, I don't know many people who got through
at all, and I don't know many, I don't know anyone
who got through unscathed. Um so it's, it definitely
took its toll um and I saw kind of it all happen.
And in essence, it meant the end of the unregulated
medical marketplace out there to a regulated
marketplace for medical and for adult-use, but I
think the loudest voices against legalization was in
a, you know, and it totally made sense because it
did exactly what they said it would do. It
displaced the need for this other unregulated
medical marketplace with a legal medical and
adult-use marketplace, and I think they were the
loudest voices against it which is kind of ironic,
but again, it was because they were making the
money by being a commercial marketplace
which is what it was never intended to be,
The problem was though, is that I think what
happens is even in that short period of time, you
end up creating a culture and an economy with
expectations and community standards around an
industry that’s unregulated. And then an
organization like MED is stood up after the fact in
response and then has to effectively confront all of
those community standards that have been
established in this new industry and change all
those expectations and behaviors. That’s a very
challenging thing

P7

P3

P11

P2

287

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

And so, they don't trust, you know, the systems
that are set up that are, you know, whether they be
medical systems or governmental systems or
whatever it is. There's a, there's an inherent
mistrust that kind of permeates everything
because of the way they have personally been
affected
“…but it also made it very very difficult for the
regulator coming in to have to deal with the
conflicts that were established by that initiative, of
the only regulated marketplace out there and not
very regulated…” P11

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

“…it's a pretty tremendous um night and day
difference between what was and what is and who
has power and who doesn’t. And honestly, who
has power are the same people that have always
had power.”

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize
4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize
4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize
4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

Culturally, you have an agency that for so many
years has a certain approach to cannabis and keep
in mind throughout this entire period it remains a
Schedule I controlled substance illegal under
federal law. Yet we have a different perspective
due to our state constitutional and legislative
mandate. That’s hard to reconcile. And that’s a
hard change culturally.”
“Then, you have regulators writing rules who I
don’t know who they were before, but they didn’t
have the experience that, at least, I had in seeing
them implemented. I think people who are being
charged of putting rules into place are out of touch.
If they have not actually lived the regulated world
and I think even an enforcement person could
probably write better rules because they’ve been
on the ground and they understand it.”

P3

P11

P3

P2

P5, P9, P10

“…power seemed to be held by the suits.”
P7, P9
“I was labeled because of my background. I was
identified of having -- to -- of a myopic perspective
that was enforcement oriented.”
“We do quite a bit of public opinion research
because we wanted to make sure obviously that
anything that we were going to put on the ballot
was going to pass.”
“The, the lack of control, feeling, feeling like they
[legacy market] don't have control um in terms of
who's growing it.”
“…the quietest group, I think, were the people that
didn't have a clue about what the government
process was and how do we go about getting
licensed. And they were afraid to ask questions
because I think they thought we would disqualify
them in some manner if they didn't know what
they were doing, which I think at one point I got
across a couple of them.”
“It was pretty strange asking people who were
working, um, in the illegal marketplace to come in
and talk to us about the illegal marketplace. It was
a well-organized black market that existed. Um,
but just standing and talking to people and

P10

P1

P3

P5

P5
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eventually is, well, come and look and we’ll show
you what we do.”

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

4: Macro/Micro Systems
Characteristics Influence and
Impact Interactions as Systems
Reorganize

“…that interconnectedness that this industry
lacks…[o]ne, because in when it was, you know,
underground, you didn’t wanna raise your head up
too high and call attention to yourself. So, why are
you gonna create vast networks of information? “
“The loudest group was the medical people that
were claiming we're damaging the rights of
medical patients. Um, I come to find out this group
of people really weren't involved in the medical
marijuana thing at all. They were antigovernment taking control of the product.”
“You had groups or people were really excited
because they had won the lottery, so to speak. You
know, they are on the list to get, um, a grow
license or to open a store to be a processor. You
had people in the medical community that felt they
were being excluded. So they were angry. Um,
really angry at times. In fact, there was one
meeting at Saint Martin’s College and somebody
threw a shoe at the board. So, I mean, those people
are angry.”
“Um, the quietest group, I think, were the people
that didn't have a clue about what the
government process was…”

P3

P5

P5

P5, P11, P12

PART II: SPADEWORK (Implementation)

5: How Do We Do
This….Now?

5: How Do We Do
This….Now?

Regulatory (and
Organizational) Growth
and Development
(Chapter 3)
5: How Do We Do
This….Now?

6: Culture Shock

6: Culture Shock

“…we were a little bit overwhelmed with having to
implement privatization of alcohol when the Costco
initiative 1182 passed in 2011. And so this just
added more to what we were doing without very–
with very little knowledge of how we would put it in
place.”
“…but to be honest with you, as a regulator of
alcohol at that time, we were busy doing our jobs.
There was not a lot of time or effort to look at how
this was going to work. We began to put teams
together just as it became more clear that it looked
like the initiative would pass. But the extent of my
knowledge was almost zero – as far as how we
would regulate the new industry. I mean we’re all
aware of cannabis, but as far as how it would be
regulated, none.”
“We put together 11 separate units of a team. So in
starting up the marijuana initiative, we took those
same 11 teams and basically did, you know, a
reverse engineering. We-we knew we had to do to
close down, so why don’t we do just the opposite to
get it started up?”
“Find out what the history and myths were about
marijuana. Because that was a big thing is in the
education piece, telling people you've heard this all
your life, but it's not true. And here's what you
haven't heard that is true. So, um, I think we did a
really good job on that basic education piece.”
Number 1, I thought I would be fired promptly. This
is going to be a highly controversial
implementation…but what I expected was some
pretty intractable implementation issues between the

P11

P11

P5

P5

P12
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6: Culture Shock

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

7: Tension is a catalyst for
change (but chaos isn’t)

legislature and public safety and marijuana
community and that, you know, obviously, the
agencies are simple, we would be right in the middle
of the crossfire and all that.
“…I think the best part of the navigation was to, at
times, just shut up and listen to what were they
dealing with, what were they angry about.”
“Some of those meetings there was the same cast of
characters that would show up everyone and trying
to, I think, cause a little distraction, a little trouble,
because they were so for the existing medical
marijuana group that was working, and so much
against state government. So, yes, those two things
combined with them that they would show up in at
times and cause trouble.”
“How did we deal with this as a new
agency?...primarily getting out there in front of the
community and getting knowledgeable very fast
about not just what we thought the issues were but
how the public opinion was thinking about it…Will
we use real science and research? and not made up
stuff…we had a chance to…create a good..
centrist... balanced, viewpoint relationship, just
based on the recommendations that came out of
there.”
“Well, how [are] you going to have the expertise?
How you gonna get it done? I said “We can get it
done because you’re gonna help us do it! That’s
how we’re going to do it.”
“…it was pretty strange asking people who were
working in the illegal marketplace to come in and
talk to us about the illegal marketplace. It was a
well-organized black market that existed…but just
standing and talking to people and eventually is,
well, come and look and we’ll show you what we
do.”
“None of us know what we’re doing, so please ask
your question.”
“So, we built up our acumen really, really quickly,
agency-wide through this sort of all-hands-on-deck
process…we delivered on that…and everyone saw
us engage the community and the recommendation
sort of fit-out of that and that process built-in
finalized, sort of the cap on the trust industry had in
us.”
“… we were very open about the process and that
was also part of, you know, that mix of gaining that
interactive trust as the regulator or dealing a
unknown world of marijuana regulation.”
“Yeah, I think in those moments of heated
discussion like at Saint Martin’s just took, I think... I
think Sharon Foster was chair then, and she just at
one point just said, “Everybody calm down. You’ll
get a chance to speak. Let us hear what people are
saying.” So, I think just taking control of the
meeting that way. I thought she did a great job.”
“That [anger] decreased over time as people saw
what was going on. There was one meeting in
Bellevue I was in, though. I’m not sure it was a
skill. Somebody was standing up upset about
something and I basically just said, “You know
what, that’s a bunch of bullshit.” And the room went
silent. Somebody from the state swore at us, you
know.”
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“And so I think there was a little bit of, I think, that
that impacted their ability to engage with us, didn't
impact our ability to engage with them. We
purposely set out to meet with them to know their
concerns. But I I think it was partly their anger with
it passing that it took a little time for them to be
engaged. It also took a little time to figure out what
the impact was happening in the community.”
“A lot of people from the agency and some people
did not want, um, this to happen. They didn't want
marijuana legalized, even though they were on the
team to help do this. So they are trying to be as
restrictive as possible. And I kept pushing back, you
know. We're supposed to make this an open market
for this product, you know. And so I think at times
they were too restrictive.”
“Recognizing all the competing priorities…. of
being caught in between the regulatory and the
prevention because it wasn't restrictive enough for
the prevention.”
“Arguably the proponent was pushing boundaries
and it was reflective of marijuana exceptionalism –
at least the expectation that cannabis, because it
could not be licensed under a federal regime, that it
be exempted from the spirit of those federal rules
and we would create another standard to allow it.
Marijuana exceptionalism. How do we respond to
that exceptionalism? Because there’s a euphoria and
aggressive innovation in the cannabis community,
not to mention the fact that they want to make
money.” - B
“You’re asking a bunch of people to interpret this
whole new area of law that nobody has ever done.”
P9
“The initial structure of the regulations was horrible.
[Staff] background was such that when some of the
rules were written, they were written with the right
idea, the right goals, the right information, but some
of the wrong language, so it said one thing, but we
couldn’t enforce it because of the way it was
written, if that makes sense.”
“It’s just what was needed at the time in order to
basically placate the federal government from taking
action against us. Our 2 US attorneys on the east and
on the west side of the state were watching closely
what we were doing, and so I think the only lesson
learned, and I’ve said it many times over the years,
is I wish I wasn’t one of the first 2 states….”
SIGNIFICANT MOMENT: COLE MEMO
“The most significant thing that happened was the
Federal Government saying, through the Cole
memo, “We will not shut you down. We will allow
you to move forward with this experiment”
“ I think I pulled up at the Target parking lot to call
my office… I was looking at my work email…when [is] this phone call the governors gonna
take place and cause I thought the AG would be
there, and I- I would try to be there and
everything….[a]nyway, it was very exciting.”
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So, I imagined cannabis prohibition in the war on
drugs in general is a very, very, very thick plate of
glass. And 502 is intended to be a diamond tip spear
that hit it and started making cracks, started making
fissures and that it was going to be more and more
work and more and more pressure that was gonna
break those fissures, make them longer, broader, et
cetera, until the whole wall came down.”
“So we met with, um, Central and South American
representatives, country representatives in Denver,
Colorado. We put together this meeting, um, with
people from all those other countries that were
absolutely furious….for years the United States had
forced them to participate on the war on drugs. And
now here we are simply opening up. And I don’t...
There had to be in at least a dozen or 15 countries in
there. We had headphones on because there were
different languages being spoken. There’s English
and Portuguese and Spanish. So, you know, we’re
wearing headphones as if it was the UN meeting then.
But you can tell when somebody was talking at us
that they were not happy even way before it got
translated. So, that was a tough meeting.”
”I think it’s a great thing that people feel so
comfortable now in pointing out the flaws with 502
because that means it worked.”
“I think that the conversation right now is
extraordinarily over simplified, um, and, um, but
that's okay. What- what matters to me is that the
conversation is happening.”
“One, um, I believe personally that people should
have a right if they want to use marijuana or not. You
know, with a product that [is] safe, what chemicals
are on it, you know, all the other things that we put in
those baselines. But I also wanted it done in such a
way that the federal government wasn't going to walk
in and say, "Okay, close it down. You're-you're
violating too many federal laws." So, always walking
that tightrope was, um, part of the equation.”
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It wasn’t possible for the state to say we’re actually
going to give the licenses to people from specific racial
categories or some give them preference. We couldn’t
preference anything in that way.” P
Unfortunately, like a lot of licensing processes and
state contracting processes, there's, there is no
favoritism, you know. It's here's what you have to do.
If you do that, then you can proceed. And, um, there
might have been a better way to educate people that are
not used to working, um, with the government or
working in a business environment to be a little more
successful.
“Beat down the doors of the agency and make sure
they know who you are.”
“I just think it's it's easy to look back and, and with the
cynicism that we have toward government today. so
polarizing is that we all know it is, and the lack of trust
that people have in their government whether it's at the
national level, at the state level, at the local level. It's
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easy, it's easier for some people to believe that there
was a motive and intention to leave people out.”
I would hope at least that regulators would be like
Allison Holcomb. And I feel like regulators, for the
most part, our regulators. They're bureaucrats, and
they're what people expect regulators to be. There's a
lot of crazy political stances in this movement…but at
least be dedicated to professionalizing, reducing harm.
If you regulate us like professionals, then maybe we
will be professional.”
“I think making sure that we are coming up with
policies is not about punishing young people for
making bad choices, and not about punishing adults
from making bad choices, but about equipping them
with the information, the experiences that support
them making good choices.”
“…kids aren't having any trouble whatsoever
getting it. And so at least, if we bring this into a
regulatory environment, perhaps we're making it more
difficult or at least, you know, we’re- we're focusing on
taking the people that are obviously willing to sell to
children out in the marketplace.”
“…creating value in a regulated framework; even
where that there is a presence of a relatively high
taxation load, with an excise tax and special sales tax,
that if you can add sufficient value to the product
through the regulatory system, then consumers, and
suppliers, and retailers, will move to that system
because there’s value there, there’s value in testing,
there’s value in packaging, there’s value in security,
there’s value in open hours of your business, there’s
value in consistency of retailers, there’s all of this
value that’s built into a regulated framework that
moves that illicit activity to the licit space.”
“It's time to take the bias away and the stigma that
people have placed on cannabis for years, even those
that supported legalization. We still, we still deal with
it today.”
“…the assumption is that most everything about social
equity has been translated into equity and ownership in
marijuana businesses.”
“Yeah, maybe we need to make it easier for people that
we've taken away their livelihood, even though it was
an illegal livelihood. And we're giving it to other
people, you know, corporations in some cases. But
how do we say, well, they're not the only ones who've
suffered. We've got all these people coming out of jail
with no skills or records that they can't um overcome.
It's challenging…the more I read on social justice, I
just listened to a pretty controversial speaker. A speech
he did at Johns Hopkins University. I have to look but
his topic was "Drug policy is racist policy."
“People [need]to respect the communities, the
identification of what they want. But the reality of what
I was pushing for is not very good…I believe if you
implement it, I don't think it's a model to success, for
the community, and have a hard time reconciling my
values to be representative of all that, while my policy
says, "Tell me this is not what we should be doing for
transfer of wealth, making up for those kinds of issues,
trying to bring [it] forward. Let me spend it on
education and the underachievement in our school
system. Let me spend it on drug and alcohol treatment
if that's the issue. Let me spend it on any other business
development which is close enough, that it's not quite
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“But it really also talks about things like the impact on
communities of maybe e-, you know, ag- this- this
business aggregating in those, in those communities
and the- and consumption impacts. And that sort of
thing which you usually don't hear talked about in the
social equity context. Both the positive and the
negative impacts of or opportunities and potential
harms”
“…why did we want to extend what has been-- What
has caused problems for those communities? And put it
right back in the communities. Put cannabis right back
in those communities when it's been a source of
problems. And are we really serving those
communities by doing that? And- and isn't there a
better way? If you want to look at the revenue that's
coming in, couldn't revenue be set aside to provide
business counseling for things other than cannabis
businesses? Why is it only for cannabis businesses? If
I've been sitting in jail for five years over minor
possession, and I've missed out on an education, and I
don't wanna sell cannabis, what are you doing for me?
“
“[Business thrives with] Sustainable income, pretty
easy to operate, protected environment. But this
environment? I think it’s very rough for government to
offer a license and create something that’s successful
for them. You’ve got to come with the savvy, the
skills, the ability, the capital, the wherewithal, and
simply creating a license to get in, which is… has been
generally, as you know, if a [state] system is, not to my
mind the big makeup for, um, the, the, the problems of
society. “
“I’m a survivor, not a leader”
“It was an exciting time. I really enjoyed it. Um,
beyond that, I don't know what I would tell myself.
Um, maybe you didn't have to talk to everybody.”
“Some of the things [regarding legalization] might
happen faster where there might have been more of a
gentleness, gentleness to it. But it's hard for me to say,
do it differently. And again, I say that because I think
that I did what I was good at. And that it's okay that
that wasn't everything. But it was a- you know, I think
I did what- I think I played the role I was supposed to
play.”
“The pace has changed. Now, it’s whack-a-mole on
testing, right? It’s the next product of the day. It’s the
next thing. And I don’t think we saw that early on
back. This constant churn of evolution particularly in
labs and standards.”
“There's quite a bias out there against cannabis
legalization. They wanted it to be treated the same. But
the cannabis industries rallies against us…because they
believe that we treat it differently than alcohol? Well, it
is.”
“The public has a bias against [the agency]. I can't
change reality. I can't. I can recognize that the bias is,
is not healthy for the industry and that we should do
everything we can to remove it. But don't be so naive
to believe that, that wouldn't be there. That will take
time.” – P11
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“Don't rally against the regulator, or don't rally against
it, because the bias is there, of course. We just
recognize it, and then we address it as we can.”
P11

“What I would tell myself probably is to speak up more
and be a little more forceful. And, you know, I think a
lot of it was just so many of us just didn’t know a
whole lot. And we were all learning on the fly. And if
there would have been a way to be a little more
prepared and to understand a little more, I think that’s
the big advantage that people have now. They’ve seen
states go through this. If they’re smart, we’ll take the
best and leave the worst from what other states have
done.”
“Cannabis is now grown up. We don't need to be
concerned about treating it like an illicit substance.”
Something akin to saying we're now going to treat
cannabis essentially like any other regulated
commodity." And so 2.0 for us was that moment where
we said, "Okay, we're now sort of grown-ups and we're
gonna have publicly-traded companies and we're gonna
have lots of stockholders with minimal shares of
businesses and we don't care who you are because the
end of the day, you don't control the business."
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